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APRIL 2026 – FIRE & EMS LAW NEWSLETTER
- Apr 7
- 35 min read
[NEWSLETTER IS NOT PROVIDING LEGAL ADVICE.]
21 RECENT CASE REVIEWS
UPDATING: 2017: TEXTBOOK: FIRE SERVICE LAW (Second Edition; 2017)
(ISBN 978-1-4786-3397-6); Waveland Press: http://www.waveland.com/browse.php?t=708
Chap. 1 – American Legal System, incl. Fire Codes, Investigations, Arson
Chap. 2 – Line Of Duty Death / Safety
Chap. 3 – Homeland Security, incl. Active Shooter, Cybersecurity, Immigration
Chap. 4 – Incident Command, incl. Training, Drones, Communications
Chap. 5 – Emergency Vehicle Operations
Chap. 6 – Employment Litigation, incl. Work Comp., Age, Vet Rights
Chap. 7 – Sexual Harassment, incl. Pregnancy Discrimination, Gay Rights
Chap. 8 – Race / National Origin Discrimination
Chap. 9 – Americans With Disabilities Act
Chap. 10 – Family Medical Leave Act
Chap. 11 – Fair Labor Standards Act
Chap. 12 – Drug-Free Workplace, inc. Recovery
Chap. 13 – EMS, incl. Community Paramedicine, COVID-19
Chap. 14 – Physical & Medical Fitness, incl. Heart Health
Chap. 15 – Mental Health, incl. CISM, Peer Support, Pet Therapy
Chap. 16 – Discipline, incl. Code of Ethics, Social Media, Hazing
Chap. 17 – Arbitration, incl. Mediation, Labor Relations
Chap. 18 – Legislation, incl. Public Records
Textbooks/Other Publications
2026: FIRE & EMS - POLITICAL & LEGAL APPLICATIONS FOR EMERGENCY SERVICES (3 Author text for National Fire Academy / FESHE online course): https://doi.org/10.7945/av8d-c920
2026: Fire & EMS - EMS POLITICAL & LEGAL APPLICATIONS FOR EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES (4 Author text for National Fire Academy / FESHE online course): https://scholar.uc.edu/concern/documents/ht24wm15r?locale=en
2026: FIRE & EMS - RECENT CASE SUMMARIES: Case summaries since 2018 from monthly newsletters (supplement my 2017 Textbook, Fire Service Law): https://doi.org/10.7945/j6c2-q930
2026: FIRE & EMS - CURRENT EVENTS & AMERICAN HISTORY: https://doi.org/10.7945/0dwx-fc52
2026: INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES: Fire Service, Legal Issues, American History (new UC course starting Fall 2026)
2017: TEXTBOOK: FIRE SERVICE LAW (Second Edition) (ISBN 978-1-4786-3397-6); Waveland Press: http://www.waveland.com/browse.php?t=708 (First Edition – Prentice Hall, 2008).
2006: CHIEF FIRE OFFICER’S DESK REFERENCE: Jones & Bartlett, Chap. 4: U.S. Legal System.
2005: FIRE & EMS LAW FOR OFFICERS: Fire Protection Publications, Okla. State: Employment Best Practices (2005); Safety (2004).
________________________________________________________________________
Chap. 1 – American Legal System, incl. Fire Codes, Investigations, Arson
TX: PUBLIC RECORDS - 19 CHILDREN / 2 TEACHERS KILLED
On March 6, 2026, in Texas Department of Public Safety, et al. v. Texas Tribune, CBS News; Cable News Network, Inc., et al., the Texas Fifteenth Court of Appeals held (3 to 0) that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment to news media for access to law enforcement records while District Attorney was actively interviewing witnesses. The prosecutor had filed an affidavit confirming that her office will be questioning many witnesses and needs such “testimony to be uninfluenced by media accounts.”
THE COURT HELD: “On May 24, 2022, an 18-year-old former student of Robb Elementary in Uvalde shot his grandmother, crashed her truck in a ditch near the school, made his way to the school, and killed twenty-one people and injured seventeen others. Three hundred and seventy-six officers from almost two dozen state, federal, and local law enforcement agencies responded to the shooting, including ninety-one from DPS. Although some arrived within minutes of the gunman, approximately seventy-four minutes elapsed between the time the gunman entered the school and when officers breached the room where he was located and killed him. The loss of life and time it took to neutralize the gunman immediately prompted questions about law enforcement’s response.
***
[District Attorney] Mitchell opined that her office will be questioning many witnesses and needs such ‘testimony to be uninfluenced by media accounts.’ She alleged that this has already become an issue as one interviewed witness said ‘that they cannot remember if what they are stating to investigators is their individual and personal recollection from the event or from events reported by and in the media.’ At bottom, Mitchell opined that disclosing the information ‘would ultimately leave [her] office, the families of the deceased and injured children, the other victims, and the overall Uvalde community with an investigation for which a valid prosecution could not be dependent.’
***
[W]e hold that DPS carried its burden of supplying more than a mere scintilla of evidence to support the law enforcement’s exception’s application. Significantly, we do not hold that each file and video clip contained in the massive volume of responsive information is forever shielded from public view. Rather, we conclude that DPS cleared the bar of defeating a summary judgment with respect to the responsive information and is entitled to proceed to a trial. At trial, DPS will bear the burden of proving that the information sought qualifies for the law enforcement exception to disclosure. But that was not DPS’s burden at this early juncture.:
Legal lesson learned: Public records requests must be balanced against the need for investigators to interview witnesses without being influenced by the media.
Chap. 2 – Line Of Duty Death / Safety
TX: DRUNK – HEAD ON AMBULANCE – 2 DEAD / 30 YRS
On March 19, 2026, in Mitchell Trevino v. The State of Texas, the Court of Appeals of Texas, Thirteenth District, Corpus Christi-Edinburg held (3 to 0; unpublished opinion) that trial court judge properly rejected defendant’s offer to stipulate that he was intoxicated and two were killed (EMS driver and patient) and third seriously injured (EMT). The prosecution had every right to provide testimony, photographs, body-camera video of the horrible scene. The jury assessed imprisonment of total 30 years.
THE COURT HELD: “In December 2018, Trevino collided with the rear of a vehicle traveling in front of him, crossed into an oncoming lane of traffic, and hit an ambulance head on. The
ambulance driver was killed, a patient was killed, and an emergency medical technician
(EMT) was injured. Prior to the commencement of trial, Trevino offered to stipulate that
he was intoxicated, there were two fatalities, and one person suffered serious bodily
injury. The State did not accept Trevino’s offer to stipulate in lieu of presenting evidence.
***
Here, Trevino cannot ‘stipulate or admit his way out of the full evidentiary force of
the case as the [state chose] chooses to present it.’ … While the State’s evidence is certainly necessary for definitionally proving the elements of an offense, that is not the only role of such evidence…. Evidence also plays a role in providing human jurors what stipulations cannot: narratives, complexity, ability to draw inferences, and connection to human experience.”
Legal lesson learned: State was entitled to show the jury the terrible result of drunk driving.
Chap. 2 – Line Of Duty Death / Safety
PA: SPEEDING DRIVER – KILLED “FIRE POLICE” - 25 YRS
On March 10, 2026, in Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Dawann Matrick Simmons, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held (3 to 0; non precedential) that the trial court judge properly rejected criminal defendant’s motion to set aside his guilty plea. Court wrote: “His statement that he was unaware of the likelihood of the imposition of the maximum sentence may be true, but it is of no matter.” On November 7, 2024 he pled no contest to first count - Count 1, Homicide by Vehicle, a Felony of the Third Degree; and guilty to 9 other counts, with trial court judge advising him of max sentence for each count, and total aggregate of 25 years and six months. On January 2, 2025 he was sentenced to an aggregate of 109 to 218 months’ incarceration.
THE COURT HELD: “On August 20, 2023, near the intersection of West Main Road and Brickyard Road in North East, Pennsylvania, emergency personnel responded to a two-
vehicle crash…. Emergency personnel included the Fuller Hose Company of the North East
Volunteer Fire Department and Pennsylvania State Troopers, relevantly including Fire Police Officer Shawn Giles…. Officer Giles was responsible for traffic control in the eastbound lane while firefighters and state troopers performed their investigation of the crash…. Officer Giles was wearing fluorescent clothing and holding fluorescent flags while conducting these
official duties…. At this time, Appellant was traveling in a silver Lexus at a high rate of
speed in the left eastbound lane on State Route 20. Notably, Appellant, the driver and sole occupant of the Lexus, was driving with his license suspended by PennDOT…. Maintaining a high rate of speed, Appellant traveled into the right lane, then abruptly swerved back into the left lane to avoid colliding with a vehicle stopped by Officer Giles…. During this maneuver,
Appellant’s Lexus struck Officer Giles, causing his death as a result of blunt force trauma.
Through forensic calculation and investigation, Appellant’s vehicle was determined to have been traveling approximately 78 miles per hour (mph) immediately prior to the crash and approximately 58 mph when his vehicle impacted the victim. The posted speed limit was 55 mph, and the required speed limit in an emergency response area is 20 mph less than the posted speed limit, thus resulting in a reduced speed limit of 35 mph.”
Legal lesson learned: Trial court gave him the “max” – very appropriate for his misconduct.
Chap. 2 – Line Of Duty Death / Safety
TX: FD CAPTAIN / DISPATCHER – BEARD - NO OVERTIME
On March 6, 2026, in Brandon E. O’Neal v. City of Houston, et al., U.S. District Court Judge Keith P. Ellison, United States District Court for Southern District of Texas, Houston Division, denied the City’s motion for summary judgment concerning religious discrimination. The plaintiff, African American man and a devout non-denominational Christian is a Senior Communication Captain and dispatcher at the Houston Emergency Center where other City employees who work alongside Plaintiff, such as police officers, wear beards. The Fire Department refuses to allow plaintiff to work overtime so long as he is in breach of the no beard policy. https://public.fastcase.com/Jhe1Qn%2BmJndQYQU6z%2FeNm3W8hWyjy%2F1qvTK0bYKmSBd7FCE1skWJo447G5Oh2b2vHFVB1fMS7gUR6rAKwE%2FNSCY%2BUXiquDJL%2FDOTOozOi%2FE%3D?utm_medium=email&_hsenc=p2ANqtz--CwMJ1WgahfFouwurH1AvRaq-FpGCK4j_ZGMvVW2VvGo-JzLehL1L025aP9c9K1EJ-bt_z2jfpLFjtfV3Ucq7sQ0mkPQ&_hsmi=226712652&utm_content=226712652&utm_source=hs_email
THE COURT HELD: “O'Neal is a nondenominational Christian. Since 2020, O'Neal has worn a beard. According to O'Neal, his Christian faith compels him to wear a beard, particularly during observance of the “Nazarite Vow.” … (‘My religious belief is to have a beard as commanded and required in the Holy Bible.’); …(‘When I observe the Nazarite Vow it requires no razor to touch my head and let the hair grow long.).
***
The relevant question is therefore whether, as a matter of law, Defendant has shown that allowing O'Neal to wear a three inch long, one-and-a-half-inch thick beard presented an undue hardship. The Court concludes that it has not. Notably, Plaintiff does not work in an active firefighting setting and is not deployed in emergencies. Rather, he works in dispatch at the Houston Emergency Center (HEC), alongside many other City and non-City employees. He is not required to wear personal protective gear and has not even been issued such gear…. Chief West specifically stated in his deposition that safety concerns were not relevant to the denial of Plaintiff's request…. (Q: [D]id safety come into play in the decision to deny Captain O'Neil's request? A: Safety did not.”). Additionally, the Court took judicial notice of the fact that other City employees who work alongside Plaintiff at the HEC, such as police officers, wear beards…. Finally, the undue burden now asserted by Defendant in its summary judgment motion—'safety concerns related to O'Neal's ability to wear SCBA face piece and/or other safety equipment’—were never mentioned in the letters denying O'Neal's requests for accommodation. Thus, a jury could reasonably conclude that accommodating O'Neal's religious practice would not pose an undue hardship to the City.”
Legal lesson learned: A jury will be asked to decide whether a firefighter / dispatcher must be clean-shaven.
Chap. 3 – Homeland Security, incl. Active Shooter, Cybersecurity, Immigration
PA: WEAPON MASS DESTRUCTION – TANNERITE - EMT HURT
On February 19, 2026, in Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Ladell Emery Hannon, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, held (3 to 0; unpublished decision) that jury properly convicted a former police officer of use of a weapon of mass destruction [Tannerite], and stalking an EMT [Harrison Jordan] who was dating his former wife [also an EMT]. Tannerite is used to produce exploding targets for long-range shooting practice. The police officer put tracers on his former wife’s vehicle and on Mr. Jordan’s vehicle. On December 21, 2021, Jordan was injured by an explosion outside his apartment - a five-gallon bucket of Tannerite exploded injuring Jordan; he suffered ruptured eardrums, wounds caused by shrapnel and cement, and burns; the explosion also damaged the apartment building. The defendant was sentenced on November 22, 2024 to an aggregate term of 17½ to 35 years of incarceration. https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Superior/out/J-S42019-25m%20-%20106685903347676413.pdf?cb=1
THE COURT HELD: “Early in the morning on December 21, 2021, Mr. Jordan left his
apartment. However, he noticed a smoking five-gallon bucket outside of his residence. Mr. Jordan attempted to run but did not get far before the bucket exploded. The explosion caused extensive damage to the apartment building, a vacant church opposite the building, and vehicles parked along the street. The explosion also shattered the window of [another resident’s] apartment, cut his finger and damaged his car, and damaged the apartment building itself, which
was owned by D. Agostino. Mr. Jordan suffered ruptured eardrums, wounds caused by shrapnel and cement, and burns. He was taken by ambulance to a local hospital but eventually airlifted to a larger facility in Allentown.
***
During the subsequent investigation, police officers discovered a tracker installed under Ms. Hannon’s vehicle. Officers determined that Appellant had purchased six total trackers, including one placed on Mr. Jordan’s car, and had obtained subscriptions for electronic receipt of the tracking information. Officers also tracked the locations of Appellant’s two cell phones leading up to the explosion, and determined that either one or both of Appellant’s phones were near or at Mr. Jordan’s home frequently at various times of the day and evening in October and November, including the day Mr. Jordan’s camera was stolen.
***
Further, police officers tracked Appellant’s purchases and discovered that he had made purchases at fireworks stores that coincided with the costs of hobby fuses, a book called The Art of Lockpicking, and reports on Mr. Jordan from various data aggregator sites such as Spokeo and Peoplefinders. Appellant also made suspicious searches from September through December,
which included inquiries about Spokeo, Mr. Jordan, lockpicking sets, fireworks, ‘how many pounds of [Tannerite] is deadly’ and ‘10 lbs of tannerite vs. car,’ homemade detonators, and how many foot-pounds of energy were required to kill a human being or penetrate a human skull.”
Legal lesson learned: Circumstantial evidence proved the defendant was the bomber.
Note: See this article: September 26, 2016: “Explosives used in New York bombing.” https://pubs.acs.org/doi/10.1021/cen-09438-notw2
“Tannerite, made and sold by Tannerite Sports, is used to produce exploding targets for long-range shooting practice. The targets explode when hit by a bullet, allowing shooters to hear and see that they’ve successfully made the shot. According to the Tannerite patent, the explosive consists of an 8:1 ratio of two mixtures: a so-called oxidizer component containing 85% ammonium nitrate powder by weight, and 15% ammonium perchlorate; and a “catalyst” component that is 90% explosive grade aluminum powder—which serves as the fuel—along with 5% titanium sponge and 5% zirconium hydride.”
File: Chap. 4, Incident Command
NC: DIESEL SPILL – TRUCKING CO. NOT TOLD TO CLEAN UP
On March 18, 2026, in William Fulp Wrecker Service, Inc. v. Fishline Trucking, L.L.C., the Court of Appeals of North Carolina held (3 to 0) that trial court judge properly granted summary judgment to the trucking company; they were billed $289,707.00by the wrecker service for the clean up, but the plaintiff “performed the remediation at the direction of government agencies, and the evidence does not indicate defendant requested, authorized, or knowingly accepted the benefit” and the County’s attempts to impose liability for hazardous material spills from transportation accidents, it exceeds the county’s regulatory authority (only regulates “nonhazardous solid waste”). https://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=2&pdf=44475
THE COURT HELD: “On 22 August 2017, a tractor-trailer owned by defendant Finishline Trucking, L.L.C., overturned in Davie County, North Carolina, resulting in a fire and the
release of diesel fuel and other automotive fluids. Emergency responders, including
the Davie County Fire Marshal’s Office and Emergency Management Services (‘EMS’), arrived at the scene. Fire Marshal Jerry Myers determined a cleanup was necessary and contacted plaintiff William Fulp Wrecker Service, Inc. to assist in containing and remediating the spill. Plaintiff’s work spanned nine days, involving personnel, equipment, and oversight from the North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality (‘NCDEQ’) and a geologist who conducted soil and water testing.
***
Plaintiff contends defendant was aware of and accepted the benefit of the cleanup, citing communications between Kent Fulp, plaintiff’s vice president, and an individual he believed to be Edward Garcia, Finishline’s owner. Plaintiff further states defendant’s representative provided insurance details, indicating an expectation that coverage would apply. Plaintiff sent defendant an invoice for $289,707.00 on 14 September 2017 but received no payment.”
Legal lesson learned: Incident Commander or other government official should directly contact trucking company and direct them to start clean-up immediately, with the certified clean-up company of their choice.
File: Chap. 4, Incident Command
WI: POLE SHED FIRE – OWNER WITH HOSE – TOLD TO STOP
On March 17, 2026, in James Bourn v. Jake Blum and Samantha Caress, U.S. District Court Judge William M. Conley, United States District Court for Western District of Wisconsin, granted summary judgment to Deputy Sheriffs; they did not violate the homeowner’s Fourth Amendment rights by forcibly removing him from his yard trying to put out pole shed fire with his garden hose. He first ignored a firefighter who told him to move back - there were flammable materials in the barn, and a 500-pound propane tank nearby. When he didn’t move back, Deputy Samantha Caress grabbed his right shoulder, and told him that “It's not safe, get back.” When he didn’t comply, the Deputies forcibly took him to the ground, handcuffed him, and moved him to yard across the road. After he calmed down, the handcuffs were removed. https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/wisconsin/wiwdc/3:2025cv00128/54061/28/0.pdf?ts=1773851973
THE COURT HELD: “While plaintiff here claims that he did not receive instructions from a firefighter or law enforcement to step back until just before Caress and Blum restrained him, and understandably believes the defendants overreacted, the issue for qualified immunity is not whether plaintiff behaved unreasonably, but rather what a reasonable officer in defendants' position would objectively believe. From that perspective, an objective officer would believe both that: (1) plaintiff was refusing to comply with instructions to step back from the fire because he remained nearby with his hose; and (2) it would be dangerous to allow plaintiff to remain even 15 feet away from rapidly burning structures with known flammables present, including a nearby 500-pound propane tank. Further, the dash-cam footage from Caress's squad car shows large amounts of smoke emerging from the structures and traveling the length of the entrance road…. While plaintiff attempts to minimize the danger he faced by arguing that he was far enough away so as not to feel any heat from the fire and had successfully contained the fire to his shed and garage for some 20 minutes with the spray from his hose, again what matters is the information known to defendants at the time of the encounter, which included a firefighter's assessment that plaintiff needed to move back and plaintiff's apparent, repeated refusal to heed those warnings.
***
At that point, Deputy Caress approached plaintiff and told him it was time to step back from the fire. When plaintiff failed to turn around or respond, Caress grasped his upper arm and/or shoulder to gain his attention. Deputy Blum then also stepped in to assist Caress by grabbing plaintiff's shoulder and forearms. Plaintiff subsequently stiffened his arms, and during the struggle, the hose he was holding sprayed Blum in the face. At some point, Blum delivered one, half-strength knee strike to plaintiff's abdomen before Caress was able to remove the hose from plaintiff's hand, then Blum and plaintiff both fell to the ground.
When the deputies attempted to stand plaintiff up to move him away from the fire, plaintiff claimed that his legs did not work, so they each grabbed one of his arms and carried him away from the fire and across the road. Once across the road, the deputies placed plaintiff in a seated position and asked again him if he would like to be examined by the EMTs on scene. Instead, plaintiff requested that the handcuffs be removed, which the deputies did within 30 seconds, but only after plaintiff agreed with Deputy Caress's request to calm down.
After sitting on the ground for a brief period, plaintiff stood up and began walking back and forth. Within about two minutes of the deputies seizing plaintiff, Deputy Steinkraus and a Menomonie Fire Department firetruck both arrived at plaintiff's residence …and Caress and Blum left the scene as Steinkraus took over. The EMTs on scene then determined that plaintiff did not need to be transported to a hospital.”
Legal lesson learned: The plaintiff was lucky he was not charged and prosecuted for obstructing firefighters and law enforcement.
Chap. 5 – Emergency Vehicle Operation
NY: MEDIC REPORTED EMT SPEEDING – NEXT DAY RADAR
On February 26, 2026, in Robert Kuiken v. County of Hamilton, Michael Tracy, et al., U.S. District Court Judge Anthony Brindisi, United States District Court for Northern District of New York, granted the defense motion for summary judgment. The 82-year-old volunteer EMT was observed speeding and crossing center line in his personal vehicle (with a green “courtesy” light). by a Paramedic (“critical care technician”) responding from another department. The Medic reported this to volunteer’s department, and made a complaint to a Deputy Sheriff. The next day, the Deputy was running radar and recorded the EMT speeding in his private vehicle on another run and issued a citation. Court rejected plaintiff’s claim of “selective prosecution” – claiming the critical care technician falsely accused the volunteer of driving recklessly, and that the Deputy “selectively enforced vehicle and traffic laws against plaintiff the next day by charging him with traffic offenses based on false accusations.”
The COURT HELD: “On July 17, 2021, Tracy [Michael Tracy; critical care technician and supervisor with the Greater Amsterdam Volunteer Ambulance Corps] filed a complaint with Deputy O’Brien regarding plaintiff’s allegedly unsafe driving earlier that day…. Though Tracy indicated that he wanted to pursue a criminal complaint against plaintiff … the Deputy defendants informed Tracy that the Sheriff’s Office could not file charges based on Tracy’s allegations. The next day, Deputy Loomis ticketed plaintiff for speeding and for failing to comply with a lawful order…. It is undisputed that Deputy Loomis observed plaintiff speeding and witnessed him drive away from a traffic stop [continued on to EMS call location] on July 18, 2021…. Just as the Deputy defendants exercised independent judgment in declining to prosecute plaintiff based on Tracy’s complaint, the undisputed evidence establishes that Deputy Loomis decided to pull plaintiff over only after observing him speeding and confirming that observation with a radar.
***
On May 24, 2022, plaintiff appeared in court in connection with the July 18, 2021, traffic tickets…. After rejecting a number of plea deals that would have required him to plead guilty to traffic infractions, plaintiff eventually agreed to plead guilty to two parking violations on the advice of his attorney.”
Legal lesson learned: The critical care technician property reported the volunteer’s unsafe driving.
Note: After the first speeding incident, the volunteer was directed by his Department to stop making runs until he was instructed to do so. “Even though [p]laintiff never retired nor resigned, in July 2022, SVAC leadership showed up at [p]laintiff’s house unsolicited and presented him with a framed document recognizing his 41 years of service to the community of Speculator.”
Chap. 6 – Employment Litigation, incl. Work Comp., Age Discrim., Vet Rights
NY: FDNY - 7 BACK INJURIES – DEGENERATIVE / NO ADR
On February 24, 2026, in Marcus Cevallos v. Robert Tucker, as the Fire Commissioner of the City of New York, Judge Kathleen Waterman-Marshall, Supreme Court, New York County, held that plaintiff was properly awarded only ordinary disability retirement (ODR), and denied Accident Disability Retirement (ADR) because his medical history revealed degenerative changes and not changes cause by his workplace injuries. Between March 2014 and August 2022, he suffered seven documented line of duty injuries to his back, but on March 29, 2014, he was seen in the emergency room at Phelps Memorial Hospital, and told the examiner that he had "chronic back pain and was taking Naprosyn." This is less than a year on the job, with no previous injuries to his back. https://cases.justia.com/new-york/other-courts/2026-2026-ny-slip-op-30695-u.pdf?ts=1773178122
THE COURT HELD: “Put simply, the Medical Board was presented with competing and arguably conflicting medical evidence concerning the cause of Mr. Cevallos' disability. By way of brief example, on the one hand, the report of Mr. Cevallos' doctor urges that there was no pre-existing condition prior to Mr. Cevallos' line of duty injuries, because he was able to pass the physical exam and the 2012 x-ray showed no structural issues. One the other hand, March 2014 medical records show that Mr. Cevallos complained of chronic back pain as the result of weightlifting, requiring medication, and various radiographic studies revealed degenerative disc herniations and bulges and the absence of an acute injury. The Medical Board was entitled to review the competing evidence and recommend that the disability was caused by degenerative disease, notwithstanding the prior line of duty injuries.”
Legal lesson learned: Courts will generally not “second guess” the Medical Board.
Chap. 7 – Sexual Harassment, incl. Pregnancy Discrimination
CT: FEMALE CAPT – ORDER PORN REMOVED – RETALIATION
On March 10, 2026, in Melanie Depamphilis v. Town of Newington, et al., U.S. District Court Judge Sarala v. Nagala, United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, denied the municipal defendant’s motion to dismiss the hostile work environment claims, which will now proceed to pre-trial discovery. Claims alleging a Town official policy or custom that led to the hostile work environment were dismissed. The plaintiff was the Captain in charge of the Town’s Fire Company No. 2 (and a 2018 retired lieutenant from Hartford Fire Department). On July 10, 2023 she learned of a firefighter having pornography in his locker, and she ordered it removed; the firefighter did so but demanded to know who told her about the materials. Based on other allegations, on August 17, 2023 she was placed on administrative leave; and restored to her position as Captain on November 6, 2023 but also that she would be placed on a one-year probation based on her “actions and behaviors” and “issues related to the morale at Company 2.” https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/connecticut/ctdce/3:2025cv00524/164327/45/0.pdf?ts=1773222843
THE COURT HELD: “The Court concludes that Plaintiff has plausibly stated a claim that she was subjected to a hostile work environment under both Title VII and the CFEPA…. Examining the totality of the circumstances, Plaintiff's complaint alleges facts supporting a reasonable inference that the Municipal Defendants subjected Plaintiff to negative treatment because of her sex.
***
First, the Second Circuit has noted that the mere presence of pornography in a workplace can alter a female plaintiff's ‘status in th[at] workplace.’ Wolak v. Spucci, 217 F.3d 157, 161 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Patane, 508 F.3d at 114. Although Plaintiff does not allege she was directly exposed to these materials like the plaintiffs in Wolak and Patane, the presence of
pornography in a male firefighter's locker can be considered ‘particularly offensive to women and intended to provoke Plaintiff's reaction as a woman,’ for purposes of stating a plausible claim of a hostile work environment….
When considered in combination with the pornography incident, these allegations, taken as true, show that both the Individual and Municipal Defendants undermined, denigrated, and affirmatively sidelined Plaintiff—a decorated female leader in the NVPD. Thus, they state a plausible claim that the Municipal Defendants created hostile work environment for Plaintiff because of her sex.”
Legal lesson learned: The presence of pornography can “alter a female’s status in the workplace.
Chap. 11 – Fair Labor Standards Act, and Military Leave
SC: FLSA – MEDIC / CROSS TRAINED – NEVER DID FIRES
On March 19, 2026, in Abbey Beemer, individually and on behalf of similarly situated v. Clarendon County, U.S. District Court Judge David C. Norton, United States District Court for District of South Carolina, Charleston Division, denied the County’s motion for summary judgment. At issue is whether Beemer had the legal authority and responsibility to engage in fire suppression; while plaintiff is classified as a “Paramedic / FF” and trained in fire suppression, she has never been engaged in fire suppression on an emergency run. Lawsuit will therefore need to be tried. https://public.fastcase.com/Jhe1Qn%2BmJndQYQU6z%2FeNm%2BPcmzEUVte9Pmbex8cM1KJhQVcQIKDJJA5UPuX3qlPH?utm_medium=email&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-9n4bTEROfuVqHNVuq5wnBdHGUWCVVD7aN6VD7jCXCE8dULoI4uW2020fH1jBBreK2QqG5jL3hff-Wxt2LEWhDNRofrqw&_hsmi=226712652&utm_content=226712652&utm_source=hs_email
THE COURT HELD: ”Over the course of her employment with the County's Fire Rescue Department, Beemer was a part-time ‘paramedic’ and then promoted to a full-time ‘Paramedic/FF’…. The County required her to receive basic firefighter certifications from the South Carolina Fire Academy … and participate in regular firefighter training exercises…. The ambulance to which she was assigned was equipped with firefighter ‘turn out’ gear (protective, heat-resistant boots, helmet, and jacket), breathing apparatuses, and extrication equipment issued to her by the County…. Beemer has been routinely dispatched to fire emergencies alongside firefighter units…. However, Beemer has not engaged a live fire, and she believed that firefighting duties were not within the responsibilities of her employment.
***
There is a genuine issue of fact as to whether Beemer has a ‘responsibility to engage in fire suppression’ under both the ‘some real obligation’ the ‘forward-looking’ standards. There are not sufficient facts in the record to determine whether the County actually expected Beemer, as part of her employment, to perform the firefighting duties for which she was trained. Compare Cleveland, 420 F.3d at 984 (finding ‘dual function paramedics’ who were fully trained in firefighting had no real obligation to engage in fire suppression because they were not regularly dispatched to fire scenes, did not carry firefighting equipment, and were expected to perform only medical services), with Huff, 516 F.3d at 1281 (finding ‘cross-trained firefighter/paramedics’ had forward-looking responsibility to engage in fire suppression because they possessed advanced training, were regularly dispatched to fire emergencies, and could be disciplined if they refused to do so). Beemer's job title is ‘Paramedic/FF’ and she is frequently dispatched to fire emergencies, but her job description does not explicitly detail whether she is responsible for fire suppression. See Lawrence, 527 F.3d at 305-06 (finding ‘fire service paramedics’ lacked responsibility under Section 203(y) where their job description did
not ‘refer[ ] to any role with respect to fire protection or fire suppression.’).”
Legal lesson learned: To avoid similar litigation, job descriptions should clearly include EMS role in fire suppression; also consider having EMS on occasion participate in fire suppression (at least overhaul while wearing SCBA).
Chap. 12: Drug-Free Workplace
FL: DRUG-TEST - FF/EMT TOOK HUSBAND’S DRUG – FIRED
On March 4, 2026, in Dawn Oakley v. Polk County Board of Commissioners, U.S. District Court Judge Virginia M. Hernandez Covington, United States District Court, Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division, granted the County’s motion for summary judgment. The Court wrote: “Ms. Oakley argues that termination was a draconian punishment for a good employee who made a mistake. The Court tends to agree and has sympathy for Ms. Oakley. But this Court cannot second guess whether the County's decision was “prudent or fair.”… This Court does “not sit as a super-personnel department that reexamines an entity's business decisions.” https://ecf.flmd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2025-00120-37-8-cv
THE COURT HELD: “On March 28, 2022, Ms. Oakley was selected to undergo a random drug test…. Before she drove to Bartow where the test would be administered, Ms. Oakley took two pills from her to-go pill bottle that she believed were Tylenol to alleviate her back pain….But Ms. Oakley accidentally ingested her husband's Vyvanse, which she mistook for Tylenol…. The weekend before her drug test, Ms. Oakley put one of her husband's Vyvanse pills in her to-go pill bottle in case they decided to spend the night in Orlando after a concert…. Ms. Oakley had forgotten about her husband's Vyvanse, failing to remove it from her to-go bottle…. Ms. Oakley completed a breathalyzer test and provided a urine sample…. Ms. Oakley admitted to taking 70 milligrams of Vyvanse, and, although she did not feel any effects from the medication, she was still under its influence during her shift.
***
From January 2015 through December 2023, Polk County either terminated or allowed resignation in lieu of termination for 14 employees after positive random drug tests….Eight of these employees, including Ms. Oakley, worked for PCFR…. The group included two African American males, one Hispanic male, and one white male…. The fifth male did not disclose his racial identity, so that remains unknown…. In addition to Ms. Oakley, two white females have also been terminated for positive drug tests…. Four white males and two Hispanic males who worked in the County's other divisions also lost their jobs after positive drug tests.”
Legal lesson learned: The County has consistently followed its drug free workplace policy (even if it may be called “harsh”).
Chap. 13 – EMS, incl. Community Paramedicine, COVID-1
OK: COMBATIVE PT - “POSITIONAL ASPHYXIA” – DIED
On March 18, 2026, in Charles Kaleb Vanlandingham, Administrator for the Estate of Charles Lamar Vanlandingham v. The City of Oklahoma City, et al., U.S. District Court Judge Timothy D. DeGiusti, United States District Court for Western District of Oklahoma, denied the defense motion for summary judgment, finding that there was a lack of training by police officers and EMS/fire of positional asphyxia. There is “sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that the City acted with deliberate indifference.” Court did dismiss claims that Officer Lee violated state negligence law. “The body-worn camera footage shows Officer Lee entering the home, placing handcuffs on Mr. Vanlandingham, and placing his weight and shin on Plaintiff's back to restrain him. The Court finds these actions consistent with an officer taking an individual into protective custody.”
THE COURT HELD: “The Court finds there is evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the need for additional training was so obvious as to support a finding of deliberate indifference. Although Defendant offers extensive evidence regarding its training for officers that has been accredited by a national accrediting organization, Plaintiff provides evidence that the OCPD has known of the dangers of positional asphyxia and has failed to update or change their use of force policy.
***
On September 15, 2019, at approximately 3:54 a.m., Theresa Hancock called 911 seeking help for her boyfriend, Charles Vanlandingham, who was having a medical emergency ….Paramedics employed by American Medical Response Ambulance Service were dispatched to the home where they found Mr. Vanlandingham on a bed ….One of the paramedics attempted to move him from the bed to a cot…. it is undisputed that at some point during this attempt, the paramedic pushed his panic button and sent another paramedic to the ambulance to call for assistance from both the fire department and Oklahoma City police officers…. Shortly thereafter, four firefighters arrived at the scene … the first firefighter entered the home and found the paramedic struggling with Mr. Vanlandingham… After several minutes, the firefighter placed Mr. Vanlandingham on the ground in a prone position…. Upon entering the home, Officer Lee went to the room where Mr. Vanlandingham was located and saw him wheezing and experiencing labored breaching…. A paramedic asked Officer Lee if he had a set of handcuffs, to which Officer Lee immediately responded by securing two sets of handcuffs on Mr. Vanlandingham …. Although someone on the scene asked whether soft restraints should be used, the paramedic stated that it was his call and he wanted Mr. Vanlandingham to remain handcuffed until he was in the ambulance…. Officer Lee told dispatch that he was in custody but needed the assistance of another officer…. He proceeded to place his shin across Mr. Vanlandingham's back while four other firefighters held him down…. Officer Lee estimates that he placed 10% to 20% of his total body weight on Mr. Vanlandingham for approximately 90 seconds…. Another firefighter was holding and bending Mr. Vanlandingham's right leg to his buttocks while his other leg was held down by another firefighter …. While Mr. Vanlandingham was still handcuffed, the paramedics administered 5mg of Versed, and within seconds he became unresponsive…. Officer Lee removed the handcuffs and left the room …. Paramedics then began to render emergency aid for approximately 30 minutes, but it was unsuccessful and Mr. Vanlandingham was pronounced dead at the scene.”
Legal lesson learned: EMS should review their protocols, and conduct joint training with law enforcement, on handling a combative patient.
Note: See 2025 YouTube video: “What Is Positional Asphyxia And How To Prevent It? - Law Enforcement Insider.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_LFgzOE_WU8
See also U.S. Department of Justice June 1995 bulletin: “Positional Asphyxia—Sudden Death.” https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles/posasph.pdf
Chap. 13 – EMS, incl. Community Paramedicine, COVID-19
MN: PT TOLD MEDIC USING HEROIN – RUN RPT ADMISSIBLE
On March 18, 2026, in State of Minnesota v. Anthony Richard Smeby, the Supreme Court of Minnesota held (6 to 1) that the trial court judge properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the EMS run record confirming that prior to the three-car crash Smeby told the paramedics and his girlfriend that he had used heroin. The jury convicted him driving while under the influence of a controlled substance. The Court of Appeals rejected Smeby’s argument on appeal that the disclosure of his statements to the paramedics and his girlfriend violated the physician-patient privilege statute; holding that “paramedics are categorically excluded from the physician-patient privilege statute” since EMS not mentioned in the statute. Minnesota Supreme Court clarified that if EMS were performing activities are the specific direction of a physician [such as in Emergency Department] that a defendant’s comments about his heroin use could be privileged. https://cases.justia.com/minnesota/supreme-court/2026-a23-0516.pdf?ts=1773911973
THE COURT HELD: “In August 2021, law enforcement officers responded to the scene of a three-car accident and found appellant Anthony Richard Smeby unconscious behind the wheel of one of the cars. After an officer administered two doses of Narcan,1 Smeby regained
consciousness. Ambulance paramedics transported Smeby to a hospital. A district court
later signed a search warrant presented by law enforcement that authorized the State to
search the medical records and ambulance run sheets related to Smeby from the date of the
accident. The search revealed that Smeby told the paramedics and his girlfriend that he
had used heroin.
***
We now clarify that Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 1(d), applies to communications between paramedics and patients if the paramedic is acting ‘under the direction’ of the treating physician such that there is an agency relationship with the physician….
The same is true for Smeby’s girlfriend’s statements to the nurse about his heroin use. For the reasons already explained, those statements are not protected by the physician-patient privilege or the nurse-patient privilege. The inclusion of the girlfriend’s comment in Smeby’s medical record does not render the girlfriend’s comment privileged.”
Legal lesson learned: EMS wisely documented in EMS run report that both the patient and his girlfriend stated he was using heroin prior to crash.
Note: See the Minnesota privilege statue. https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/cite/595.02
“(d) A licensed physician or surgeon, dentist, or chiropractor shall not, without the consent of the patient, be allowed to disclose any information or any opinion based thereon which the professional acquired in attending the patient in a professional capacity, and which was necessary to enable the professional to act in that capacity; after the decease of the patient, in an action to recover insurance benefits, where the insurance has been in existence two years or more, the beneficiaries shall be deemed to be the personal representatives of the deceased person for the purpose of waiving this privilege, and no oral or written waiver of the privilege shall have any binding force or effect except when made upon the trial or examination where the evidence is offered or received.”
Chap. 13 – EMS, incl. Community Paramedicine, COVID-19
FL: EMS & HOSP BLOOD DRAWS – SUBPOENA MURDER
On March 18, 20266, in Kyle Matthew Hill v. State of Florida, the Florida Court of Appeals, Second District, held (3 to 0) that trial court judge properly refused the defendant’s motion to quash the state’s subpoena for EMS blood draw and EMS run report, and the Hospital’s blood draw records. The State indicted Mr. Hill for first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, DUI manslaughter, and DUI with serious bodily injury, and the State seeks the death penalty. https://flcourts-media.flcourts.gov/content/download/2486201/opinion/Opinion_2025-1955.pdf
THE COURT HELD: “Allegedly, Mr. Hill purposefully sideswiped another vehicle, causing
it to leave the roadway and crash into a pole. The collision injured the driver and killed her passenger. Police suspected that Mr. Hill was driving under the influence of alcohol. They directed emergency medical services (EMS) personnel to conduct a blood draw. EMS personnel then took Mr. Hill to the hospital where staff performed another blood draw.
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Thus, the charging documents indicate that Mr. Hill's medical records will provide evidence of intoxication. Mr. Hill contends that the State's quantum of evidence was insufficient to support issuance of the subpoenas. He laments that ‘[t]he State advanced a brief argument, and presented no evidence . . . other than the arrest affidavits.’ We are unpersuaded.”
Legal lesson learned: The defendant is facing death penalty, and the blood draw records will be provided to the jury.
Chap. 13 – EMS, incl. Community Paramedicine, COVID-19
TN: SEIZURE PT - TASED - SPIT SOCK - FACE DOWN – DIED
On March 16, 2026, in Karen Goodwin, individually and on behalf of Austin Hunter Turner, deceased v. City of Bristol, Tennessee, U.S. District Court Judge Clifton L. Corker, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, Greeneville Division, granted defense motion for summary judgment. Combative patient, face down, restraints on hands and feet – died. Family did not file lawsuit within one year – August 30, 2017 death; case filed six years later. https://public.fastcase.com/Jhe1Qn%2BmJndQYQU6z%2FeNm%2BJGkZOBI%2FIR3xMI1hqgTrQGqCoob0t8sJ6Oq4%2B3vNWN?utm_medium=email&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-9C5O8INd3-mOP0XdLpifj0NkMcgvHJMlYVXVlVDxFjxItyF7mxImlUcaWgD0DywBt6olIyvEknUS-SxKw_pSJ1xCMABg&_hsmi=226712652&utm_content=226712652&utm_source=hs_email
THE COURT HELD: “Tennessee's one-year statute of limitations therefore expired on August 30, 2018—nearly six years before this action was filed. Plaintiff's § 1983 claims must therefore be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
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Though Plaintiff is not seen on camera when Turner was tased, the footage makes clear that she was standing only a few feet away. [Bristol Police Officer Eric] Keller's warning, the sound of the taser, and Turner's audible reaction would have been plainly perceptible to anyone in the room. The struggle continued for roughly another minute as officers and paramedics attempted to secure Turner in handcuffs…. The footage next shows Plaintiff outside after the paramedics moved Turner towards the ambulance. She got out of her car and walked towards Turner as he lay face down on the cot with a spit sock over his head and restraints on both his hands and feet…. Plaintiff stood beside him facing the cot…. She is also seen outside the ambulance looking inside while officers and paramedics applied pressure to Turner's head…. She was also outside the ambulance door seconds after someone shut the door.”
Legal lesson learned: Case was not timely filed. Review your protocol about transporting combative patients, handcuffed, face down with spit sock.
Chap. 13 – EMS, incl. Community Paramedicine, COVID-19
CA: EMS DIVERTED BY HOSP - PREGNANT PT – EMTALA
On March 13, 2026 in Keiko Kawamura v. Mammoth Hospital, et al., U.S. Magistrate Judge has issued a Report and Recommendation to U.S. District Court judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, that the lawsuit filed by pro se plaintiff (not represented by an attorney) may proceed against the Hospital under Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) because Mammoth Hospital failed to screen her under 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) and failed to stabilize her under § 1395dd(b). However, the EMTALA does not provide for litigation against any individual doctors. She claims the ambulance was three minutes from the hospital, in third stage of labor and EMS were directed to take her to another hospital, resulting in an almost 2-hour delay between when EMS personnel first made contact with Plaintiff and the time physicians evaluated her. https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/california/caedce/1:2025cv00789/467494/25/0.pdf?ts=1773524860
THE COURT HELD: “The Court has screened Plaintiff's second amended complaint and concludes that it sufficiently states a claim that Defendant Mammoth Hospital violated EMTALA, specifically that it failed to screen her under 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) and failed to stabilize her under § 1395dd(b). However, the Court recommends that all other claims and Defendants be dismissed without further leave to amend.
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Moreover, Plaintiff's second amended complaint alleges that Plaintiff was approximately three minutes from Mammoth hospital while in labor…. Communications between EMS services and Mammoth Hospital indicate that Mammoth Hospital knew that Plaintiff had an emergency medical condition, including “that Plaintiff was still in the third stage of labor, had not yet
delivered the placenta, was actively hemorrhaging, and that the umbilical cord remained attached to the newborn.” … Despite knowing this, Mammoth Hospital declined to screen Plaintiff for medical care or provide stabilizing treatment, and instead diverted the ambulance that Plaintiff was in to NIHD, [Northern Inyo Healthcare District] resulting in an almost 2-hour delay between when EMS personnel made contact with Plaintiff and the time NIHD evaluated her…. Liberally construing the allegations in Plaintiff's second amended complaint, the Court concludes that she has sufficiently stated a claim against Defendant Mammoth Hospital for violation of 42 U.S.C. § § 1395dd(a) and (b) to proceed past screening.
However, as noted in the Court's previous screening order, because a private EMTALA right of action is authorized as to “a participating hospital's violation” under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A), Plaintiff cannot sue non-hospital Defendants, i.e., Dr. Howell, Tom Parker, and Does 1-10.”
Legal lesson learned: The case will now proceed to pre-trial discovery with the hospital.
Note: Plaintiff also claimed a HIPAA violation. “In addition, Plaintiff's claims under HIPAA are subject to dismissal because, as the Court previously advised Plaintiff in the screening order, HIPAA does not authorize a private right of action for HIPAA violations.”
Chap. 15 – Mental Health, incl. CISM, Peer Support, Pet Therapy
MI: PSYCH EXAM – UNFIT DUTY / FF NO FOLLOW UP - FIRED
On March 17, 2026 in Dan Martin v. City of Flat Rock Fire Department and City of Flat Rock, the Court of Appeals of Michigan held (3 to 0; unpublished decision) that trial court properly granted summary judgment to the defense after pre-trial discovery was completed. Plaintiff clamed retaliation for being a whistleblower about hostile conduct towards him by another firefighter and his support for a discrimination claim by another firefighter. The Court held that the Fire Chief had a legitimate basis to order him on May 8, 2029 to undergo a psychological examination, to continue him on administrative leave when he was determined to currently be unfit for duty, and to terminate him in December 2019 for failure to the undertake the recommended neuropsychological testing, and 12 psychotherapy sessions with a therapist, and consultation with his physician regarding antidepression medication. https://www.courts.michigan.gov/494b62/siteassets/case-documents/uploads/opinions/final/coa/20260317_c372830_50_372830.opn.pdf
THE COURT HELD: “Plaintiff has failed to present sufficient evidence from which a fact-finder could reasonably infer that defendants’ decisions to place plaintiff on administrative leave and to continue his leave had a retaliatory basis.
***
Fire Chief Vack recommended that plaintiff undergo physical and psychological
evaluations on the basis of his own observations as well as concerns reported to him by Sergeant John Rose, Sergeant Rich, Metzger, and other firefighters. These concerns included: plaintiff failed to pay attention to details, acted strangely, had slurred/mumbled speech, had issues maintaining his train of thought during a conversation, was taking numerous medications that appeared to alter his mental status, embellished stories, authored reports that did not make sense, had driving issues, provided inaccurate patient histories, and behaved erratically. Fire Chief Vack expressed that he was concerned about plaintiff’s physical and mental health as well at the city’s and fire department’s liability exposure.”
Legal lesson learned: There was a legitimate basis to order psychological exam of the firefighter.
File: Chap. 16 – Discipline, incl. Code of Ethics, Social Media, Hazing
TX: FF MISD – NO WRITTEN NOTICE TO CHIEF – 3 DAY SUSP
On March 17, 2026, in Fenton Petry v. City of Houston, Texas, and Police Officers and Firefighters Civil Service Commission, the Court of Appeals of Texas, Fourteenth District held that both the “independent hearing examiner” and a District Court judge properly upheld the 3-day suspension for firefighter’s failure to inform the fire chief of his misdemeanor conviction of abuse of official capacity. Fire Department regulations require firefighters to give written notice to the Fire Chief within twenty-four hours of “any court hearing dates and results involving a criminal matter.” https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=2b0bcd7a-4ade-4d61-a274-df674ed3857f&coa=coa14&DT=Opinion&MediaID=e76a99e8-4da0-48c8-9433-ea85e5f312cd
THE COURT HELD: “Fenton Petry, the firefighter at issue, was charged with a felony count of
misuse of official information. See Tex. Penal Code § 39.06. He later pleaded guilty
to a lesser misdemeanor count of abuse of official capacity…. Another document attached to the court slip alluded to a conviction. This document was styled as ‘Collections Instructions,’ and it contained a note saying ‘$100 fine, Class C, court cost payment plan granted.’ But the document did not identify the offense or even state that there had been a conviction.”
***
Petry testified that he timely gave a copy of the judgment of conviction to his station captain, rather than the Fire Chief. But he also indicated that he anticipated that his captain would forward that judgment up the chain of command to the Fire Chief…. The Assistant Fire Chief further testified that the captain did not inform anyone in the chain of command about Petry’s conviction, and that the burden of providing that notice ultimately fell on Petry. The Assistant Fire Chief said that Petry knew of this burden because he had complied with it in the past when such notice happened to paint him in a beneficial light. The Assistant Fire Chief referred to an earlier occasion when Petry had been charged with DWI, and Petry directly notified the Fire Chief after that charge had been dismissed.”
Legal lesson learned: Excellent Fire Department policy – 24-hour written notice to Fire Chief of “any court hearing dates and results involving a criminal matter.”
File: Chap. 16 – Discipline, incl. Code of Ethics, Social Media, Hazing
MO: BC FIRED – USED AFFF STRUCTURE FIRE – VIOL ORDER
On March 3, 2026, in David Matusik v. Lake Ozark Fire Protection District, the Court of Appeals of Missouri, Western District, Third Division held (3 to 0) that the Board of Directors held a due process hearing and had just cause to terminate Matusik’s employment. New Fire Chief was hired in April 2023, and in November 2023, he discovered the District was still using AFFF foam (cancer risk); on November 11, 2023 issued a written order prohibiting its use “unless an absolute life safety issue exists.” Less that two weeks later, on November 24, 2023, Matusik responded to a rekindled fire; was a “wind driven” fire that had spread to two homes beyond the initial involved home, and he decided to use the AFFF at the fire. The Fire Chief recommended his termination for this decision, plus working a shift trade that he converted to overtime pay without Chief’s permission. The Battalion Chief appealed to Circuit Court judge that reversed the termination; the Court of Appeals reinstated the termination. https://cases.justia.com/missouri/court-of-appeals/2026-wd88004.pdf?ts=1772555406
THE COURT HELD: “We affirm the decision of the Board and remand the cause to the circuit court with directions to reinstate the Board’s decision terminating Matusik’s employment… With respect to his use of the AFFF, the Board found that Matusik was aware of Fire Chief’s order regarding the use of AFFF and knew that use of the foam without a life safety emergency was prohibited. The Board also discounted Matusik’s testimony that Fire Chief’s order gave him discretion to use AFFF because the only discretion afforded was if there was a life safety issue. The Board concluded that the evidence did not support a finding that any person’s life was in danger and that Matusik had other options available to him to fight the fire. The Board found Matusik’s decision to use the AFFF contradicted a direct order and was not supported by the facts…. The Board affirmed the disciplinary recommendation and terminated Matusik’s employment.”
Legal lesson learned: The Battalion Chief disobeyed the Chief’s order to not use AFFF foam.
Note: See July 8, 2024 GAO report: “Firefighting Foam: DOD is Working to Address Challenges to Transitioning to PFAS-Free Alternatives.” https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-107322
“The Defense Department is required to transition away from using firefighting foam that contains PFAS, a class of chemicals that poses health risks and has been found in drinking water around bases. This kind of foam has been considered the most effective product for suppressing jet fuel fires.”
Chap. 17: Arbitration, incl. Mediation, Labor Relations
IL: PREG LEAVE – 112 DAYS - SENIORITY RECORD FIXED
On March 10, 2026, in Sarah Schmidt v. City of Naperville, U.S. District Court Judge Steven C. Seeger. United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, granted the City’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff took maternity leave for first child starting in November 2012, and second child in June 2014, but the Fire Department mistakenly didn’t reduce 112 days of unpaid leave until the 2020 seniority list. In September 2022, it also expressly flagged that correction, but it never told the firefighter or her union. She learned about the correction in June 2023 and filed EEOC charge. EEOC charges must be filed within 300 days – way after the change was flagged, and the Court stated: “The bottom line is that Schmidt slept on her rights.”
THE COURT HELD: “On September 22, 2022, Division Chief Daniel] Smith published the 2023 seniority list. For the first time, Smith added a notation that called attention to the reduction in Schmidt's seniority.
“Schmidt seniorty [sic] reduced by 112 days. 2 [leave of absences] 11/12 & 6/14.”
The numbers at the end reflected the months and years when Schmidt took leave, meaning November 2012 and June 2014.
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The list is available to the employees, but the fire department does not send the list directly to the employees, either. Employees do not receive an email or other notification when Smith publishes the seniority list…. Even so, the publication of the list does take place at the same time as the sweepstakes for vacation time. Every year, the fire department sends an official notice that bidding on the upcoming year's vacation days has begun.”
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During her tenure, Schmidt took two pregnancy-related periods of unpaid leave lasting longer than 30 days. In 2012, Schmidt was pregnant and took unpaid leave from November 30, 2012, to January 13, 2013…. In 2014, Schmidt had another child, taking unpaid leave from June 8 to August 24, 2014…. So, Schmidt took unpaid leave twice, and each absence lasted longer than 30 consecutive days. She took unpaid leave for a total of 112 days. Under the CBA, Schmidt was not entitled to seniority credit for that period of time. See CBA, at § 8.1 (Dckt. No. 26-2).”
Legal lesson learned: The Fire Department, when it learned of its mistake in not reducing the seniority, “flagged” the correction on the 2023 seniority list; perhaps they could have avoided the EEOC charge and this litigation if they had simply advised her (and her union) of the correction.
Note: The Court stated: “For whatever reason, no one from the fire department reached out to Schmidt directly and drew her attention to the correction. And for whatever reason, Schmidt did not notice the correction in the 2020 seniority list, or the 2021 seniority list, or the 2022 seniority list. Schmidt didn't realize that the fire department had reduced her seniority until June 2023.”
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