2026: FIRE SERVICE LAW Supplement - LEADERSHIP LESSONS IN LAW & AMERICAN HISTORY https://doi.org/10.7945/av8d-c920
2026: EMS LAW – LEGAL LESSONS LEARNED (3^rd Edition):
https://scholar.uc.edu/concern/documents/ht24wm15r?locale=en
2026: INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES: Fire Service, Legal Issues, American History
https://scholar.uc.edu/show/ks65hd707
2026: FIRE & EMS LAW – RECENT CASE SUMMARIES: Case summaries since 2018 from monthly newsletters: https://doi.org/10.7945/j6c2-q930
2017: TEXTBOOK: FIRE SERVICE LAW (Second Edition) (ISBN 978-1-4786-3397-6); Waveland Press: http://www.waveland.com/browse.php?t=708 (First Edition – Prentice Hall, 2008)

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Chap. 1 – American Legal System, incl. Fire Codes, Investigations, Arson

U.S. SUP CT: MED. EMERG - PD ENTER HOME W/O WARRANT

On Jan. 14, 2026, in William Trevor Case v. Montana, the Supreme Court of the United States held (9 to 0) that “In Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U. S. 398, 400 (2006), this Court held that police officers may enter a home without a warrant if they have an “objectively reasonable basis for believing” that someone inside needs emergency assistance. In 2006, the Court in Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U. S. 398, 403 (2006), held that police ca enter home to break up an ongoing fight to protect a person. In September 2021, law enforcement officers in Anaconda, Montana, entered the home of William Trevor Case after his ex-girlfriend reported he had threatened suicide, was acting erratically and may have fired a gun. Police found him hiding behind a closet curtain holding dark object (he recovered) and found his gun; the trial court judge denied his motion to suppress the gun (police didn’t need “probable cause” to enter house), and he was convicted by jury of assaulting a police officer. U.S. Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan wrote the opinion: “The question in this presented is whether that standard means that officers must have ‘probable cause’ for the intrusion, as they typically would when investigating a crime. We hold it does not.” https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-624_b07d.pdf

THE COURT HELD:

“This case began with an alarming phone call—from petitioner William Case to his ex-girlfriend J. H., both residents of a small town in Montana. Case told J. H. on the call that

‘he was going to kill himself.”’ … Because Case sounded ‘erratic,’ J. H. assumed he had been drinking…. She tried to talk Case out of committing suicide, but ‘couldn’t reel him back’: With each passing moment, Case ‘became more methodical about what he was

going to do.’ … Case said that he was ‘going to get a note’—presumably meaning a suicide note, for J. H. or others to find…. And then J. H. heard a ‘clicking’ sound, like the ‘cock[ing of] a gun.’ … J. H. told Case she was going to call the police, but that seemed only to antagonize him: Case replied ‘he would shoot them all too.”… Finally, J. H. heard ‘a pop’ followed by ‘nothing’—'just dead air.’ … She ‘yelled [Case’s] name a few

times,’ but got no response, leading her to think he had ‘pulled the trigger.’ … So she called 9–1–1 to report the incident and drove as fast as she could to Case’s home.

***

Once the [Police] chief came, the officers conferred and decided to enter the house ‘to render emergency aid.’ … In the best-case scenario, they hoped to ‘talk [Case] down’ and prevent any injury…. But given J. H.’s account, the officers considered as well another possibility—that Case had already shot himself and might be ‘in there bleeding.’ … At the same time, they worried that if Case remained unharmed, their entry could spark a confrontation…. So they equipped themselves with long-barrel guns and a ballistic shield before going in. The officers entered the house through the front door, about 40 minutes after they first arrived. They announced themselves loudly, and continued to call out as they walked through the home. Case did not answer; he was hiding in the closet of a bedroom upstairs. When one of the officers entered that room, Case threw open the closet curtain and appeared from behind it, holding ‘a black object’ which looked like a gun…. Fearing that he was about to be shot, the officer fired his own rifle. The bullet hit Case

in the abdomen, and another officer rushed to administer first aid. An ambulance was called to take Case to the nearest hospital (where he recovered). Meanwhile, one of the

officers found a handgun in a laundry basket next to the place where Case had stood.

The county attorney charged Case with assaulting a police officer…. A Montana

jury then found Case guilty of the crime charged. Case moved to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the home entry, arguing that the police had violated the Fourth Amendment by coming into his house without a warrant. The trial court denied the motion on the ground that the police officers were responding legitimately

to an “emergency.”

***

We…hold just what we have held before: that the officers may enter if, but only if, they have an “objectively reasonable basis for believing” that an occupant faces serious danger. Brigham City, 547 U. S., at 400.”

Legal lesson learned: Decision will also apply to fire and EMS forcing entry for a medical emergency.

Note: Can listen to Oral Argument in this case: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lqmk210Y9sk

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Chap. 1 – American Legal System, incl. Fire Codes, Investigations, Arson

TX: PAINTER AT FD – KNOCKED OFF LIFT - NO FD NEG

On December 31, 2025, in City of Houston v. Jose Torres, the Court of Appeals of Texas, First District, Houston held (3 to 0) that trial court, after a bench trial, improperly found that the city was liable because the station District Chief didn’t deactivate the bay door. The painter never asked that this be done, never told anyone he was going to be operating scissor lift inside the station, and never blocked the front of the bay door. https://cases.justia.com/texas/first-court-of-appeals/2025-01-23-00905-cv.pdf?ts=1767189326

THE COURT HELD:

“Jose Torres, a painter employed by Arredondo’s Real Drywall, Inc., was working at Houston Fire Department (HFD) Station #34. When he arrived on the morning of this incident, around 8:30 a.m., there were no emergency vehicles inside the fire station, although some were parked outside.

Torres began setting up his equipment, including a scissor lift, in one of the bays of the fire station so he could paint the station’s ceiling. Because the station’s large bay doors were open, and he needed them closed to paint the ceiling, Torres asked one of the firefighters on duty how to close the doors. Torres closed the bay doors by pushing a red button located inside the station. He then positioned the scissor lift directly behind one of the closed bay doors, elevated himself on it, and began painting the ceiling of the station.

Adam Ricci, a firefighter employed by HFD at Fire Station #34, arrived at the fire station that morning at 6:30 a.m.—two hours before Torres—to begin his 24-hour shift. Around 8:00 a.m.—about 30 minutes before Torres arrived—Ricci left the station in one of the emergency vehicles to respond to a call. Before he left, Ricci did not see anyone painting inside the fire station. And before returning to the station, Ricci had not seen or spoken to Torres and did not know that he (or anyone) was inside the station painting.

When Ricci returned to the fire station, he pushed a remote control inside his vehicle to open one of the bay doors. Unbeknownst to Ricci, Torres was standing on top of the scissor lift directly behind that door. When the door opened, it knocked over the scissor lift, injuring Torres.

The record shows that the bay door could have been deactivated. And, according to the City, District Chief Troy Koteras was the highest-ranking person on site that day—and he had the authority to do that. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that the City “did not act reasonably and its actions proximately causes [Torres’s] injuries.” It concluded that the City was negligent3 and awarded Torres damages.

***

Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, we hold that the evidence

establishes that the City owed no duty to Torres, a required element of negligence.

Absent proof of the common-law elements of negligence, the City was entitled to

governmental immunity under the TTCA. We therefore reverse the trial court’s

judgment and render judgment dismissing Torres’s claims against the City for lack

of subject-matter jurisdiction.”

Legal lesson learned: The injured painter was negligent and not requiring the bay door be deactivated; he is covered by worker’s comp. but can’t sue the city for damages.

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Chap. 1 – American Legal System, incl. Fire Codes, Investigations, Arson

NJ: ARSON – PD SEIZED DVR CAMERA IN GARAGE - LAWFUL

On December 4, 2025, in State of New Jersey v. Paul J. Caneiro, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held (7 to 0) that trial court improperly granted defense motion to suppress, and the Court of Appeals improperly confirmed the trial court decision. Under the “exigent circumstances” police properly seized the security camera digital video recorder, which showed defendant disconnecting the camera before starting fire in his home. https://www.njcourts.gov/system/files/court-opinions/2025/a_1_25.pdf

THE COURT HELD:

“A fire was reported at defendant Paul J. Caneiro’s home at around 5:02 a.m. in November 2018. About forty minutes after arriving at defendant’s home, and while the house fire remained active, police seized, without a warrant, a security camera digital video recorder (DVR) located in the home’s attached garage…. Defendant later provided consent to search the DVR’s contents.

***

The State alleges that defendant murdered his brother, his brother’s wife, and

their two children, and then set their house ablaze to cover up his involvement in

those crimes. The State further contends that defendant then set his own house on

fire with his wife and children asleep inside as a ruse to suggest that criminals

targeted both families. The State asserts that the DVR showed defendant

disconnecting the security camera system prior to starting the fire in his house.

***

The parties do not dispute that defendant’s consent to search the DVR was valid. They dispute only whether the warrantless seizure of the DVR was justified by the exigency exception to the warrant requirement. The trial judge, focusing on the fact that the garage itself was not on fire, granted defendant’s motion to suppress the DVR. The Appellate Division affirmed. We granted the State’s motion for leave to appeal and have proceeded on an accelerated basis.

***

Under the totality of the circumstances in this case, the police acted in an objectively reasonable manner to meet an exigency that did not permit time to secure a warrant. No bright-line rule governs the question of exigency, and determining whether the exigency exception to the warrant requirement applies requires courts to conduct an objective, fact-sensitive analysis. Drawing de novo legal conclusions from the facts found by the trial judge, the Court finds that here, time was of the essence, delay was not reasonable, and seizure of the DVR by the police without a warrant was justified by exigent circumstances.”

Legal lesson learned: Exigent circumstances justified seizing the security camera without a search warrant.

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Chap. 2 – Line Of Duty Death / Safety

NY: FIRE CHIEF – BURNED BY SHOE INSOLE HEATER

On Jan. 22, 2026, in Gregory George v, Shenzhen Tejiali Technology Co., LTB, d/b/a IHeat, U.S. Chief District Court Judge Brenda K. Sannes, United States District Court for Northern District of New York, granted the plaintiff’s motion for default judgment against the manufacturer of the lithium battery-powered heated shoe insoles, located in Shenzhen, Guangdong, People's Republic of China, which he bought through Amazon. The manufacturer has not answered the complaint or appeared in this action. https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/new-york/nyndce/6:2024cv00956/144608/40/0.pdf?ts=1769171952

THE COURT HELD:

“Gregory George turned the insoles on ‘in accordance with the instructions, put them in his boots, put socks on his feet, and put his boots on.’…He set the insoles to the medium setting (which could heat to a temperature range of 122-131°F) and walked outside…. Around five minutes later, ‘he felt an electric shock to his right foot and his right boot burst into flames.’ … It took him about 40 seconds to take the boot off. ‘George's right foot was severely burned, the skin of his right foot was blackened and some had started to peel off, and he was in extreme pain.’ ,,, He went to the hospital, where he was diagnosed with ‘second-degree burns, as well as full-thickness, or third-degree, burns covering 1.5% of his right foot.’ … The affected skin was debrided, and he was referred to a burn center for further care…. There, he received in-patient wound care for five days…. He later returned to the burn center for ‘skin grafting using donor skin from two locations on his right thigh to replace the skin that was burned on his right foot.’ … He remained at the center for inpatient care for ten days…. ORDERED that the Court will hold an evidentiary hearing on February 24, 2026, at 10:30 a.m. to determine damages in accordance with this order.”

Legal lesson learned: Be very caution of lithium battery-powered heated shoe insoles. With a foreign manufacturer he may have great difficulty collecting any damages.

Note: Defendants Amazon and seller Mirror Eleanos have been dismissed from this action.

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Chap. 2 – Line Of Duty Death / Safety

MN: PFAS CLASS ACTION – CASE REMAINS IN MONTANA

On January 12, 2026, in City and County of Butte-Silver Bow v. 3M Company, Dupont, et al., U.S. District Court Judge Brian Morris, United States District Court for the District of Montana, Butte Division, rejected Dupont’s additional argument that they cannot be sued in Montana. On January 6, 2026 the Court previously denied the defense motion to dismiss. In this latest ruling, the Court found that unlike a case dismissed in Massachusetts on December 30, 2025, Dupont and other defendants’ sales and marketing activities with Montana fire departments established the requisite presence in Montana to proceed. https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/montana/mtdce/2:2025cv00036/80451/160/0.pdf?ts=1768305911

THE COURT HELD:

“Plaintiff City and County of Butte Silver Bow (‘Plaintiff’) provided the Court with affidavits and other evidence that Dupont purposefully has directed its conduct toward Montana. The Court found relevant Dupont’s conduct of awarding Montana fire departments turnout gear sets in an annual giveaway…. Plaintiff provided declarations that Dupont, in collaboration with another Defendant, Globe, had shipped similar turnout gear at issue in this case to Montana fire departments as winners of the giveaway…. Plaintiff asserted that Defendants had encouraged the Montana fire departments who received the Dupont/Globe turnout gear sets to advertise the winnings and charitable acts of Dupont/Globe on social media….

Plaintiff further provided an affidavit by Diane Evankovich attesting that she had been made aware of these Dupont/Globe giveaways in Montana. (Doc. 132.)

The Court also found relevant Plaintiff’s assertion that Evankovich and Zach Osborne, the Butte Silver Bow Fire Chief, attested that they were contacted about and marketed directly to purchase turnout gear containing Dupont’s PFAS.”

Legal lesson learned: Pre-trial discovery will now proceed in this class-action lawsuit.

Note:

See Jan. 6, 2025 law firm press release: Montana Court Denies Motions to Dismiss Class-Action Lawsuit Fighting PFAS in Firefighter Turnout Gear.

https://www.hbsslaw.com/press/pfas-firefighter-turnout-gear/montana-court-denies-motions-to-dismiss-class-action-lawsuit-fighting-pfas-in-firefighter-turnout-gear

“A Montana federal judge today denied motions to dismiss a class-action lawsuit brought by attorneys at law firms Hagens Berman, Heenan & Cook and Bliven Law Firm to combat toxic “forever chemicals” in firefighter turnout gear sold by DuPont/Chemours, 3M and other major corporations. The firms represent the city and county of Butte-Silver Bow, Montana, to assist them and other municipalities in abating the costly premature gear replacements faced due to the rampant health risks of perfluoroalkyl and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS). *** The court rejected the defendants’ argument that they were engaging in ordinary commercial activities, explaining that ‘Defendants could not have achieved their goals of selling PFAS and turnout gear containing PFAS if Defendants’ knowledge of the harms of PFAS had been exposed. These actions by Defendants, allegedly acting together to conceal the known dangers of PFAS, do not constitute merely normal or ordinary commercial relationships.’”

See the April 4, 2025 law firm press release Butte, Montana Files Class-Action Lawsuit Fighting PFAS in Firefighter Turnout Gear to Aid Those Facing Costly Replacements.https://www.hbsslaw.com/press/pfas-firefighter-turnout-gear/butte-montana-files-class-action-lawsuit-fighting-pfas-in-firefighter-turnout-gear-to-aid-those-facing-costly-replacements

See Jan. 9, 2026 case: UNIFORMED PROFESSIONAL FIRE FIGHTERS ASSOCIATION OF CONNECTICUT, et al. v. 3M, et al. https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/6963a657827d4c0685d5653a

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Chap. 5 – Emergency Vehicle Operation

TX: AMBULANCE – IMMUNITY - PHOTO EMER LIGHTS ON

On Jan. 21, 2026, in Michelle Ojeda v. City of Grand Prairie, the Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, Dallas held (3 to 0) that trial court properly dismissed the lawsuit, since the intersection crash happened on an emergency run, lights (photo taken after the accident) and siren activated, and slowed down entering the intersection. https://cases.justia.com/texas/fifth-court-of-appeals/2026-05-24-01403-cv.pdf?ts=1769077961

THE COURT HELD:

“In an attempt to raise a fact issue, Ojeda asserts in her briefing that the ambulance's emergency lights and siren were not activated when the ambulance entered the intersection. But the summary judgment record contains no evidence supporting this assertion and the testimony of Kildal and Herrera and the photograph of the ambulance immediately after the crash establish the emergency lights and siren were activated and in operation before and during the collision…. With respect to Ojeda's contention reckless disregard is shown by Kildal entering the intersection without knowing whether the light was green or red, a driver of an emergency vehicle is permitted to proceed through a red light without stopping if they do so after slowing as necessary for safe operation…. (citing Tex. Transp. Code § 546.001(2)). *** Data obtained from the Electronic Data Recorder device in the ambulance showed Kildal slowed the ambulance down five seconds before the collision from a speed of 33.3 mph to a speed of 16.8 mph at the time of impact.” *** Under this exception, the waiver of immunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act does not apply to a claim based on a governmental employee's conduct if that employee, while responding to an emergency call or reacting to an emergency situation, acts in compliance with ‘the laws and ordinances applicable to emergency action,’ or in the absence of such a law or ordinance, the employee's actions are not taken ‘with conscious indifference or reckless disregard for the safety of others.’ Civ. Prac. & Rem. § 101.055(2).”

Legal lesson learned: After an on-duty accident, leave your siren on as you notify dispatch, and then take a photo showing your emergency lights still activated.

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Chap. 7 – Sexual Harassment, incl. Pregnancy Discrimination, Gay Rights

VA: FEMALE EMT - FIRED WRONG DATE RPT – PROCEED

On January 22, 2026, in Jada Marshall v. Accomack County Department of Public Safety, U.S. District Court Judge Raymond A. Jackson, United States District Court for Eastern District of Virginia, Norfolk, denied defense motion to dismiss the lawsuit. “When reviewed in totality, Plaintiffs workplace circumstances establish conditions sufficient for a sex-based hostile workplace claim to survive at this stage.” https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/virginia/vaedce/2:2025cv00255/573201/8/0.pdf?ts=1769187301

THE COURT HELD:

“Plaintiff began employment on September 5, 2023…. As a condition of her employment, Plaintiff was required to complete Advanced EMT and Firefighter training at the Fire Academy within 12 months of her date of hire… On October 12, 2023, Plaintiffs Fire Academy instructor, Phillip Kelly (‘Instructor Kelly’), sent Plaintiff a text message stating, ‘I would ask you out if I was not married.’ … Plaintiff reported the perceived harassment to her supervisor, Captain Shawn Malone (‘Cpt. Malone’)…. Plaintiff alleges that, following this report, Cpt. Malone ‘blamed’ and ‘belittled’ her, rather than disciplining Instructor Kelly or reporting her complaint to the County Administrator as required by DPS policy…. Cpt. Malone also told Plaintiff that ‘she was not mature or mentally fit enough to work for DPS,’ ‘she needed therapy’ and ‘she should get her home life straight.’ … Cpt. Malone also spoke to coworkers about Plaintiff, allegedly saying Plaintiff had engaged in sexual relationships with other co-workers and that Plaintiff should ‘close her legs and do her job.’ … On March 1, 2024, HR sent Plaintiff a letter granting her thirty additional days to complete the required training shifts…. Plaintiff subsequently completed all required clinical shifts during the granted extension and submitted documentation to Defendant to verify the completed shifts…. However, Plaintiff realized she incorrectly entered a date on the paperwork…. Plaintiff attempted to correct the documents, but Defendant did not accept her correction…. Instead, Defendant informed Plaintiff that she was being terminated, and cited the filing error as the sole reason for her termination…. On March 26, 2024, Plaintiff received a letter from Defendant formalizing her termination.

***

Instructor Kelly's implicit proposition, in addition to Cpt. Malone's disparaging comments about Plaintiff ‘keeping her legs closed,’ indicate inappropriate sexual discussion by Plaintiffs superiors in her workplace. And, although a hostile workplace claim must meet a demanding standard, courts in this district have found that sexual harassment by one's supervisor is more likely to meet that standard because of the influence the supervisor may have on the workplace and in light of the inherent power imbalance.”

Legal lesson learned: If an officer believes FF / EMT is not mentally “not fit for the job” then work with HR to get employee professionally evaluated.

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Chap. 8 – Race / National Origin Discrimination

OH: WHITE CAPT – No.1 LIST - NOT PROMOTED D/C TWICE

On December 29, 2025, in Michael Haas v. City of Akron, et al., U.S. District Court Judge . Philip Calabrese, United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, held that individual defendants, including the Fire Chief cannot be individually sued for conspiracy to deny him promotion. Case may now proceed to pretrial discovery against the City. In April 2024, he was ranked first of six candidates for District Chief. August, 2024 a black female (ranked No. 5 on list) was promoted (using the “Rule of five) to District Chief; and in September 2024, Haas filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. In March 2025, another District Chief retired, and the position was left vacant. The next month, Local 330 urged the Fire Chief to fill the position using the 2024 promotional list, which ranked Haas as the top candidate, but the Chief denied Local 330's grievance and refused to promote Mr. Haas to the open position. https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/ohio/ohndce/5:2025cv00885/316724/27/0.pdf?ts=1767103886

THE COURT HELD:

“Plaintiff Michael Haas is a white male who became a firefighter for the City of Akron, Ohio in July 1997…. From 2017 to 2024, Mr. Haas served as Akron's Captain of Fire Prevention and Fire Training and Safety Officer….From 2021 to 2023, Mr. Haas also served as Provisional Chief in Fire Training and in Fire Prevention….In 2024, at the age of 57, Mr. Haas participated in Akron's promotional process for consideration for a recently opened District Chief position….In April 2024, Mr. Haas was ranked first of six potential candidates for the position…. Before this ranking, Mr. Haas had no disciplinary history.

***

At all relevant times, Defendant Leon Henderson, an African American man, served as the acting Fire Chief for the City of Akron.

***

Following the promotion of [Sierjie] Lash [ranked 5^th on list] to District Chief in August 2024, retaliatory actions were taken against Mr. Haas….When he learned

about Lash’s promotion, Mr. Haas complained to [Chief] Henderson that the promotion

was discriminatory…. [Plaintiff alleged that Chief] Henderson failed to document, investigate, and report this complaint to upper management or human resources, in

violation of Akron’s policies….

***

The next month in September 2024, Mr. Haas filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and sent a second complaint of discrimination to Mr. Henderson….Later that same day, Mr. Henderson added Mr. Haas to the August 2024 transfer list…. Mr. Haas was transferred [from Captain of Fire Prevention and Fire Training and Safety Officer] to a ‘48-hour position on the line’ which required him to work 24-hour shifts….According to Mr. Haas, ‘[n]o other Captain . . . has been transferred to a 48-hour position without first either requesting it or as a result of discipline.’

***

Under the law of this Circuit, intracorporate conspiracy doctrine applies where individuals were employed in different departments. Hull, 926 F.2d at 510 (holding that a school’s superintendent, executive director, and administrator could not conspire because they were all ‘employees or agents of the [school] Board’); Upton v. City of Royal Oak, 492 F. App'x 492, 493 n.1 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine prevented a firefighter from bringing Section 1985(3) action against the mayor, city manager, assistant city attorney, and director of human resources). What matters is that the individual Defendants are “members of the same collective entity.” Hull, 926 F.2d at 510. Such is the case here, and each participated in the promotional process about which Plaintiff complains as employees or agents of the City of Akron…. For these reasons, the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine bars Mr. Hass’s civil conspiracy claim under Section 1985(3) against the individual Defendants.”

Legal lesson learned: Race discrimination case by white officer may now proceed to pre-trial discovery.

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Chap. 11 – Fair Labor Standards Act

VA: B/C PAID A FIXED SALARY – EXEMPT POSITION

On December 31, 2025, in Anthony Kelley, et al. v. The City of Alexandria, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (Richmond, VA) held (3 to 0) that Battalion Chiefs are not entitled to overtime pay as “white collar” employees; they are guaranteed a salary payment regardless of hours worked. Although the City assigned each chief an annual salary, it converted that salary into hourly rates for payroll purposes. When they work off-schedule hours, they are paid at the chief’s hourly rate. If they don’t work a scheduled shift, the City properly deducts those hours from their paid leave balance. The fight in this case is about this last category of hours. When an employee is paid weekly (or on a less frequent basis) then exemption in 29 C.F.R. § 541.602(b) applies.

https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/231752.P.pdf

THE COURT HELD:

“Current and former battalion chiefs for the City of Alexandria Fire Department sued the City seeking payment of unpaid overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The district court granted summary judgment for the City, concluding that the chiefs were exempt from the Act’s overtime-pay requirements under the ‘highly compensated employee’ exemption. That exemption requires (among other things) that the City compensate the chiefs on a ‘salary basis.’

***

The Alexandria Fire Department has ten fire stations, split evenly between two battalions. The department employs ten battalion chiefs. Battalion chiefs rotate through operational or administrative schedules. Typically, the department assigns six chiefs (three for each of the two battalions) to an operational schedule, during which they’re responsible for the day-to-day operations of the fire stations within their assigned battalion. These chiefs are scheduled to work three 24-hour shifts according to a nine-day scheduling cycle.

The nine-day cycles are staggered such that two operational chiefs are on duty each day (one for each battalion). During each nine-day cycle, the chiefs are on duty the first, third, and fifth days, and off duty the remaining six days. Their ‘work period’ is 28 days.

So if the City paid them strictly based on scheduled hours, their paychecks could vary substantially from one pay period to the next. To avoid that, the City pays those chiefs for at least 106 hours each pay period, regardless of the scheduled hours they work.

And the City also pays them for the off-schedule hours they work, at the chief’s hourly rate. The fight in this case is about this last category of hours.

***

Under 602(a), an employer must show that ‘the employee regularly receives each

pay period on a weekly, or less frequent basis, a predetermined amount constituting all or part of the employee’s compensation, which amount is not subject to reduction because of variations in the quality or quantity of the work performed.’ 29 C.F.R. § 541.602(a). This standard ensures the employee ‘get[s] at least part of his compensation through a preset weekly (or less frequent) salary.’ Helix, 598 U.S. at 46. Though employers are generally prohibited from taking deductions from this amount, the regulations allow them to do so in certain limited circumstances. 29 C.F.R. § 541.602(b).”

Legal lesson learned: There has been lots of litigation concerning Battalion Chiefs being exempt or entitled to overtime.

Note: See this review of the decision. https://www.firefighterovertime.org/2026/01/04/fourth-circuit-rules-against-battalion-chiefs-in-virginia-flsa-lawsuit/ . See also: September 17, 2018. Battalion Chiefs, Executive Exemption, and Overtime. https://www.firefighterovertime.org/2018/09/17/battalion/

See also: The 6^th Circuit on June 3, 2019 in Howard Holt, et al. v. City of Battle Creek,

held that Battalion Chiefs were not entitled to overtime pay. https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/19a0114p-06.pdf

See IAFF FLSA Manual (July 2022): https://www.iaff.org/wp-content/uploads/FLSA-Manual-2022-Edition_FINAL.22Aug01.pdf - Salary Basis.

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Chap. 12 – Drug-Free Workplace, inc. Recovery

FL: B/C MJ MEDICAL USE – DEMOTED - NOT COVERED ADA

On January 13, 2026, in John Beckman v. The Collier County Board of Commissioners, Senior U.S. District Court Judge John E. Steele, United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Fort Myers Division, granted summary judgment to the County; even though Florida allows medically prescribed marijuana, it is still an illegal Federal drug and under ADA persons using illegal drugs are not “qualified individual.” The record shows that Beckman’s disability disclosures to Fire Department occurred in October 2020, April 2021, and September 2022. He was selected for random drug testing on September 1, 2023, and after testing positive, placed on unpaid administrative leave, returned to work on October 17, 2023 he was demoted. He resigned November 9, 2023. https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/florida/flmdce/2:2024cv00585/429227/35/0.pdf?ts=1768388107

THE COURT HELD:

“Beckman began his employment with the County in 2006 as an Emergency Medical Technician. Beckman enjoyed a successful career with the County, and by 2016 had been promoted to Battalion Chief. At all relevant times Beckman had been able to perform the essential functions of his employment position with an accommodation for a gastrointestinal condition that substantially limits his major life activities. After multiple medications proved unsuccessful in managing the condition, on September 12, 2020, Beckman obtained a certification for medical marijuana use from the State of Florida.

***

In October 2020 Beckman notified both Deputy Chief Tony Camps (‘Deputy Chief Camps’) and Chief Tabatha Butcher (‘Chief Butcher’)about his medical marijuana use certification…. Beckman would periodically request and receive paid time off because of his medical condition. There were no issues about Beckman’s work performance, and Beckman continued to use the medical marijuana on and off as needed. Beckman was only tested at work because of the random drug testing protocol, and until September 1, 2023, he had never tested positive for the presence of marijuana in his system.

On September 1, 2023, Beckman was selected for random drug testing as part of the County’s testing protocol. The test came back positive for the presence of marijuana in Beckman’s system, and he was immediately placed on unpaid administrative leave until completing counseling with a substance abuse professional and returning a negative drug screening.

Beckman was cleared to return to work after testing negative for illegal substances on October 17, 2023. By October 24, 2023, Beckman received and signed a Behavioral Action Plan (‘BAP’) which included: (1) a thirty-day suspension credited as time served, (2) demotion from Battalion Chief II to Paramedic II with an approximate 24.5% pay cut, (3) a six-month driving prohibition, (4) a six-month probationary period, and (5) ineligibility for promotional opportunities for up to twenty-four months. Beckman did not appeal this discipline, but was unwilling to accept the demotion in rank. Beckman submitted a letter of resignation on October 26, 2023, and terminated his employment with the County on November 9, 2023. Beckman characterizes this as a constructive discharge by the County.

***

Beckman’s use of marijuana, even pursuant to his Florida certificate, was illegal under federal law, and the statutory exclusion is not satisfied by the Florida medical marijuana program. Accordingly, Beckman was not a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA…. But even construing this conduct as being a requested accommodation to allow the use of marijuana, it was not reasonable under the ADA because medical marijuana use was and still is illegal under federal law. Accordingly, any failure to accommodate claim based on the underlying facts fails as a matter of law.”

Legal lesson learned: Unfortunate to discipline a Battalion Chief for use of proscribed medical marijuana; numerous fire departments have in their policies or Collective Bargaining Agreements recognized the use of proscribed medical marijuana.

Note: The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) recently proposed a new rule to reclassify Marijuana as a Schedule III drug, which would allow use of marijuana for medical treatment. On December 18, 2025 President Donald J. Trump has issued an Executive Order to speed up consideration of the reclassification of marijuana. Increasing

Medical Marijuana and Cannabidiol Research, 90 FR 60541. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/12/23/2025-23846/increasing-medical-marijuana-and-cannabidiol-research

See also: Dec. 22, 2025: MD – Howard County firefighters may use medical cannabis during off-hours, starting soon. https://baltimorefishbowl.com/stories/howard-county-firefighters-medical-cannabis/

Howard County Executive Calvin Ball on Friday announced an agreement between Howard County Government and the Howard County International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF) Local 2000 to allow County Department of Fire and Rescue Services (DFRS) uniformed personnel off-duty usage of medical cannabis. The employees may not use the substance 12 hours before reporting to work, and they must present a valid medical cannabis authorization form to the County’s Office of Human Resources.

New policy allows Howard County firefighters to use medical cannabis. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wVEUB8WSdp8

Dec. 19, 2025: What Does President Trump’s New Marijuana Directive Mean for You as a Fire Chief? https://www.firefighternation.com/fire-leadership/what-does-president-trumps-new-marijuana-directive-mean-for-you-as-a-fire-chief/

Jan. 2025: KY - Louisville union sues city to allow firefighters to use medical cannabis. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1jL6w0_sguI

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Chap. 13 – EMS, incl. Community Paramedicine, COVID-1

OH: SUICIDE / SHOT HEAD – NO RESUCITATION / IMMUNITY

On January 16, 2026, in Donald Goodrich v. City of Marion, Ohio, et al., U.S. District Court Judge James R. Knepp II, United States District Court for Northern District of Ohio, Western Division, granted summary judgment to the City and the EMS personnel. The EMS called Medical Control at 12:19 a.m. and physician confirmed there was no need to resuscitate, the Corner arrived at 12:56 a.m. and determined patient was still breathing; he died at the hospital at 3:44 a.m. https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/ohio/ohndce/3:2023cv02201/301916/55/0.pdf?ts=1768658747

THE COURT HELD:

“The Court finds all Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the Fourteenth Amendment claim…. Even if the Estate could establish a constitutional violation, Defendants would still be entitled to qualified immunity…. As there is ‘no constitutional right to adequate medical care for individuals who are not in the custody of the state,’ … and the Estate has failed to establish the state-created danger exception exempts this case from that general rule, the Estate has not demonstrated the infliction of constitutional harm against Goodrich such that the City of Marion, or any Defendant, is liable. *** City of Marion EMTs Ray and Kalb were dispatched at 12:08 a.m. on October 22, 2022, to 561 N. State Street for a possible suicide attempt; they arrived four minutes later. (Ray Aff., Doc. 45-1, at 1). After police cleared the scene, Ray entered and located Goodrich, who was slumped over a speaker box with a gunshot wound to the head. Id. Ray attests that based on his observations of Goodrich’s condition, he believed that condition was incompatible with life and Goodrich should be declared deceased…. Ray states Goodrich presented ‘agonal breathing,’ but that based on his education, training, and experience, agonal breathing was a sign death was near, though the exact timing remained unpredictable….Ray understood this breathing to be a natural part of dying….Ray did not begin resuscitative efforts on Goodrich. Ray relayed his rapid trauma assessment to Dr. Brandon Forbes at the Marion General Hospital Emergency Department at approximately 12:19 a.m.; Forbes agreed resuscitative efforts were not needed and Goodrich should be declared deceased…. Ray declared Goodrich deceased shortly thereafter and called the coroner….Coroner Assistant April Short arrived at approximately 12:56 a.m., but concluded she could not transport Goodrich because he was breathing…. Kalb and Ray then transported Goodrich to Marion General Hospital…. Goodrich was ultimately declared dead at Marion General Hospital at 3:44 a.m. on October 12, 2022, following resuscitative efforts.”

Legal lesson learned: EMS properly called Medical Control to confirm resuscitation was not required; review and follow your protocol.

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Chap. 13 – EMS, incl. Community Paramedicine, COVID-19

OH: ASHMA PT – 911 / HANG UP – DISPATCHERS NEG.

On January 12, 2026, in Clinton T. Widdowson, as Administrator of the Estate of Tyler Joe-Austin Widdowson, et al. v. Lake County, Ohio, the Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eleventh District, Lake County held (2 to 1) that trial court judge should not have dismissed the two dispatchers from this lawsuit for their alleged “wanton and reckless conduct” - Angela King and Brandy Catanese. On Saturday, April 30, 2022, at 5:26 a.m., Tiler Widdowson (age 24) called 911 on his cell phone for assistance. The call was received by Sgt. King who had difficulty discerning what Widdowson was saying. She was only able to discern the word 'help.” She entered into the Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system “Male just yelling help.” Despite her repeated requests, Widdowson was unable to provide his location, and sent deputies to Cambridge Condominiums on low level welfare check. At 6:06 a.m., she relistened to the call and added in the CAD the comment “just says please help, please help, can’t breathe” and further commented “sounds like it’s not directly into the phone either.” She did not reclassify the call from a welfare check to a medical emergency and did send fire or EMS, and did have second dispatcher radio this information to the deputies. https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/11/2026/2026-Ohio-67.pdf

THE COURT HELD:

“King was the fire and EMS dispatcher and could have directly dispatched

those units (located about two minutes away) to the scene or, at the least, staged them

(put them on notice), but did not do so. Nor did she reclassify the call as a medical

emergency. Although deputies were already on the scene, the deputies, according to

Bowers, were not ‘trained medically’ to deal with a medical emergency.

We do find that the plaintiffs merit the opportunity of making that case to the

jury. Accordingly, summary judgment was improperly granted with respect to King.

***

We find that prior to hearing Tiler’s complaint that he could not breathe at about 6:06 a.m., King’s conduct was at most negligent. The initial classification of the call as a welfare check was in accordance with call center policies. In addition to classifying the event, King noted that the male caller was yelling ‘help’ and Catanese duly broadcast this information when dispatching Deputy Bowers.

After realizing the severity of the situation, however, King’s conduct could be described as the failure to exercise any care in circumstances in which there was a great probability of harm and/or the conscious disregard of or indifference to an obvious risk of harm. The critical issue of whether Tiler’s not being able to breathe constituted a medical emergency, i.e., a situation requiring an emergency medical response, is not one that needs to be resolved.”

Legal lesson learned: Please share this case with your dispatchers; a 911 call for “can’t breath” should be handled as a medical emergency with EMS responding.

Note: Dissenting Justice: “While Tiler Widdowson’s death is undeniably tragic, and while the emergency response may not have been perfect, the legal standards governing this case do not permit liability under these circumstances.”

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Chap. 16 – Discipline, incl. Code of Ethics, Social Media, Hazing

IL: CPT / FFs WORE TRUMP MASKS STATION – PROCEED

On January 27, 2026, in Curt Koopman v. City of Evanston, et al., U.S. District Court Judge Joan B. Gottschall, United States District Court for Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, denied the City’s motion to dismiss. The Captain and other members of his crew briefly wore Trump masks while watch the inauguration on TV, and a photo was taken. During the disciplinary interrogation, the Captain was asked “whether he supported Donald Trump during the recent presidential election.” https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/illinois/ilndce/1:2025cv10892/485962/24/0.pdf?ts=1769597667

THE COURT HELD:

“Koopman’s complaint alleges that on ‘January 20, 2025, Plaintiff and multiple other members of the Evanston Fire Department briefly donned Donald Trump masks

while watching the presidential inauguration on television.’ …Further, plaintiff

alleges, ‘[a]t some point thereafter, someone posted an image of Plaintiff and several other members of the Evanston Fire Department wearing Donald Trump masks on an internet site.’… ‘When wearing the mask,’ plaintiff alleges, he ‘did not make any political statement, or express any political views.’…

‘On or about January 23, 2025, Plaintiff received written notification that he was being subjected to a disciplinary investigation,’ which required his attendance at a ‘disciplinary

interrogation.’… Plaintiff alleges that during the interrogation, ‘Defendant [Fire Chief Paul] Polep ordered Plaintiff to answer all questions,’ including ‘whether he supported Donald Trump during the recent presidential election.’… After being ‘required to reveal that he was a supporter of Donald Trump,’ plaintiff ‘was subjected to a seven (7) shift suspension by Defendant Polep.’ …The suspension, plaintiff alleges, ‘was motivated by a desire to punish Plaintiff for his political support of a presidential candidate [who] was unpopular in the City of Evanston.’ … Koopman lost wages as a result of the suspension.

***

The court need not decide whether the complaint’s allegation of the reason for plaintiff’s

discipline, standing alone, would be considered plausible because the transcript of the

disciplinary interrogation offered by defendants provides evidence that plaintiff’s political affiliation was explicitly considered before he was disciplined. Plaintiff’s “support” of Donald Trump, which as far as the complaint alleges was limited to his personal beliefs and his vote, is constitutionally protected…. Because plaintiff has alleged a plausible First Amendment retaliation claim, the motion to dismiss for failure to allege that the plaintiff engaged in conduct protected by the First Amendment is denied.

***

With a few exceptions like the need for governmental efficiency or effectiveness (which

would not appear to apply to plaintiff’s actions in the privacy of his conscience or the sanctity of the voting booth), a government employer may not discipline an employee because the employee supports a particular political candidate. See Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 578 U.S. 266, 270 (2016).”

Legal lesson learned: Captain’s conduct was stupid, but avoid asking employees about their political views in the disciplinary process.

Note: The U.S. Supreme Court in Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 578 U.S. 266, 270 (2016) held:

“In this case a government official [police chief] demoted an employee [detective demoted to patrol officer] because the official believed, but incorrectly believed, that the employee had supported a particular candidate for mayor. The question is whether the official’s factual mistake makes a critical legal difference. Even though the employee had not in fact engaged in protected political activity, did his demotion ‘deprive’ him of a ‘right . . . secured by the Constitution’? 42 U. S. C. §1983. We hold that it did.” https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/578/14-1280/

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Chap. 16 – Discipline, incl. Code of Ethics, Social Media, Hazing

NV: CITY MGR FIRED – 2022 VIDEO FIRE CHIEF RESIGNING

On January 22, 2026, in Neil C. Krutz v. The City of Sparks, U.S. District Court Judge Miranda M. Du, United States District Court for the District of Nevada, held that the terminated City Manager lawsuit may proceed with his lawsuit on some claims, including that he was fired on September 5, 2023 in violation of his procedural due process protections. His contract included a provision allowing termination “for cause”). On December 5, 2022, the fire chief resigned over pending drug charge, and the City Manager made a video reporting the resignation. In 2024, the city settled with the former chief about the public leak of the video for $381,000. https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/nevada/nvdce/3:2025cv00159/173760/49/0.pdf

THE COURT HELD:

Footnote 5: “The parties dispute whether Krutz publicly disseminated the video statement or whether it was instead leaked to the public…. Defendants contend that Krutz posted the video on YouTube … whereas Krutz asserts that the video was shared privately via email with only the City of Sparks Fire Department employees, Mayor Lawson, Councilmembers Abbott, VanderWell, Anderson, Bybee, and Dahir, and Assistant City Managers Alyson McCormick and John Martini.”

Legal Lesson Learned: When a Fire Chief or other senior manager resigns, be very cautious in communicating info beyond the fact that there was a resignation; consult with legal counsel.

Note: See September 23, 2024 article and TV Video: “Former Sparks Fire Chief pleads no contest to drug-related charge.” https://www.2news.com/news/local/former-sparks-fire-chief-pleads-no-contest-to-drug-related-charge/article_484d699c-7023-11ed-b795-ff8664a2c2d9.html

“Former Sparks Fire Chief Mark Lawson pleaded no-contest last month to a drug-related charge brought against him in Dec. 2022. Included in the court’s judgement, Lawson is guilty of conspiracy to possess a drug that may not be introduced into interstate commerce, and he will have to pay a $2,000 fine and complete eight hours of substance abuse education. Earlier this year, the City of Sparks paid Lawson $381,000 to settle a lawsuit over his firing. His attorneys argued that he was unfairly fired for pending criminal charges, and that the City’s actions damaged Lawson’s reputation and ability to seek reemployment.”

See also: Sept. 5, 2024, Sparks City Council Special Meeting. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5NXiLsCyQwc. IAFF President calls for termination of City Manager (at 2:07)

See also: May 9, 2023: City Manager Survives Termination Vote [3 to 2]: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RmdIuKRFVuU

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Chap. 16 – Discipline, incl. Code of Ethics, Social Media, Hazing

OH: CHIEF FIRED – NO FED CT TRO / STATE CT CASE

On January 7, 2026, in Jeremy Betsa v. City of Avon Lake, Ohio, IAFF Local 1361, et al., U.S. Magistrate Judge James E. Grimes, Jr., issued a Report and Recommendation to U.S. District Court Judge Donald C. Nugent, United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, recommending the Court deny Jeremy Betsa’s December 15, 2025 “Emergency Motion For A Temporary Restraining Order.” He had a pending lawsuit in Lorain County Court of Common Plea, also seeking a TRO (been suspended with pay since August 2025; he was ultimately fired December 31, 2025 for “workplace conduct and leadership” issues), Federal courts follow “abstention” doctrine where they decline to intervene in matters already pending in state court. He can appeal his termination to the City’s Civil Service Commission. https://public.fastcase.com/Jhe1Qn%2BmJndQYQU6z%2FeNmypmOFzJk4IjV67xdVBvH10%2BbioR%2BE7hDrSDKPa8oeXy4gUzK0dNFlYVAdtPS9qapAikGtcKVY%2BDC%2Fxrd0A1wWk%3D?utm_medium=email&_hsenc=p2ANqtz--Rb3GwipZHtCJJMLiUWpVHk6Q4w73GSXOI_LD5Raf1axu72BnOP1L2YEQ80fNqXbpHCp329zbZOj3hD1ZT_BRNOO8R9w&_hsmi=226712652&utm_content=226712652&utm_source=hs_email

THE MAGISTRATE WROTE:

“The District Court referred Betsa's Motion to me on January 2, 2026. Doc. 28. That day, I set a hearing by videoconference for January 6…. To recap, Betsa has two lawsuits pending related to the same factual matter—one in state court and one in federal court. Also pending in both cases are Betsa's TRO motions. The heart of Betsa's lawsuits, and his TRO motions, are his claims that the City suspended him, and later terminated him, in violation of Ohio law and his federal due process rights. At the TRO hearing, Betsa explained that his Ohio lawsuit focuses on his state-law claims, whereas his federal lawsuit focuses on federal claims.

***

Betsa hasn't shown a likelihood of success on his due process claim because this Court should abstain from deciding the issue under the authority of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).

‘Under Younger abstention ... a federal court must decline to interfere with pending state civil or criminal proceedings when important state interests are involved.’ O'Neill v. Coughlan, 511 F.3d 638, 641 (6th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). ‘Younger abstention is not a question of jurisdiction, but is rather based on ‘strong policies counseling against the exercise of such jurisdiction.' Id. (citing Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 626 (1986).

***

Even if Betsa had cleanly separated his state-law and federal claims in the relevant venues, which he has not done, abstention under Younger would still be warranted. This is so because Betsa's procedural due process claim is inextricably intertwined with his state-law procedural issues which he has raised in his state case. Indeed, Betsa concedes that he is not arguing that Ohio's disciplinary and termination procedures are unconstitutional. This means that if the City properly adhered to Ohio law when it suspended and terminated Betsa, it necessarily did not violate Betsa's due process rights.^[ And Betsa has only asked the Ohio court—not this Court—to determine whether the City properly adhered to Ohio law. So the Ohio court should resolve Betsa's state-law claim before this Court wades into Betsa's related due process claim.”

Legal lesson learned: Federal courts will normally abstain when the employee has already filed a lawsuit in state court on similar issues.

Note:

Jan. 1, 2026:Avon Lake terminates fire chief after investigation into 'workplace conduct and leadership [TV VIDEO.]: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NQ_XX2qp684

Jan. 1, 2026: https://www.wkyc.com/article/news/local/lorain-county/3news-investigates-avon-lake-terminates-fire-chief-investigation-into-workplace-conduct-leadership/95-a94cb6d7-c3ff-4355-be21-18103dc8f3f4

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Chap. 16 – Discipline, incl. Code of Ethics, Social Media, Hazing

MA: FF FIRED – MUST APPEAL TO CIVIL SERVICE COMM.

On January 5, 2026, in Casley Bailey v. Boston Fire Department, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Appeal Court held (3 to 0; unpublished opinion) that the trial court properly denied his “emergency motion for a preliminary injunction to stay the disciplinary proceedings.” He was fired the same day (regarding alleged workplace injury) he filed his complaint; he must first exercise his appeal rights to the state’s Civil Service Commission (where he has previously appealed other discipline). file:///C:/Users/lawre/Downloads/25P0275.pdf

THE COURT HELD:

“The plaintiff, Casley Bailey, filed a complaint in the Superior Court against the defendant Boston Fire Department (department) seeking to stay the department's ongoing

disciplinary action against him. He accompanied the complaint with an emergency motion for a preliminary injunction to stay the disciplinary proceedings.

Meanwhile, the same day the plaintiff filed his complaint, the department announced its final decision and discharged him from service as a firefighter. In opposition to the preliminary injunction, the department argued that the request should be dismissed as moot and also for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. After a hearing, a Superior Court judge denied injunctive relief on the ground that the plaintiff ‘must first exhaust his administrative remedies before coming to Court.’ Shortly thereafter the judge dismissed the complaint because the only relief the plaintiff sought -- the stay of the disciplinary

procedures -- had been denied.

The plaintiff appeals from the dismissal of his complaint. He asserts that the physician who examined him in connection with his claimed work-related injury forged a medical release; that the department chief who oversaw the disciplinary action was biased against him; that his union colluded with the department and failed to provide adequate representation, "rendering administrative remedies futile"; that the judge failed to consider his claim of irreparable harm, particularly the loss of health insurance for his family; and, finally, that he was disciplined more severely than similarly situated

firefighters.

Notwithstanding these claims of ‘fraudulent evidence, procedural misconduct, and labor law violations,’ we conclude that the judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the

injunction and dismissing the complaint for failure to exhaust available remedies.

***

Moreover, at the time the preliminary injunction was denied and the case was dismissed, the plaintiff had not yet availed himself of the remedies available to him under the civil service statute, G. L. c. 31, §§ 41-45. The plaintiff was a tenured civil servant entitled to the protection of the statute. Documents in the plaintiff's record appendix show that within one month of the dismissal of his complaint he was actively challenging his termination in proceedings before the Civil Service Commission (commission).

The plaintiff's claim of irreparable harm -- the harm from loss of employment -- is generally not sufficient to obtain an injunction.”

Legal lesson learned: Must first exhaust administrative right of appeal to Civil Service Commission before seeking judicial relief.

Note: See his prior discipline appeals.

February 6, 2025: Civil Service Commission: https://www.mass.gov/doc/bailey-casley-v-boston-fire-department-2625/download

“The Commission affirmed the decision of the Boston Fire Department (BFD) to suspend a firefighter for 60 days for violation of rules related to untruthfulness and misrepresentation regarding the unauthorized use of emergency lights and sirens on his personal vehicle.”

May 6, 2024: Civil Service Commission - https://www.mass.gov/doc/bailey-casley-v-boston-fire-department-62724/download

“The four-tour suspension [took FMLA leave to take Lt. exam] is modified to a two-tour

suspension and the Appellant shall be restored to his position for the two remaining tours

without loss of pay or other benefits.”

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