LEADERSHIP LESSONS IN LAW & AMERICAN HISTORY FOR FIRE & EMS: https://doi.org/10.7945/av8d-c920 [for use in Fire & EMS Law classes and Fire Officer 1 classes]
EMS LAW – RECENT CASE SUMMARIES: Case summaries since 2018 from monthly newsletters: https://doi.org/10.7945/j6c2-q930 [8 years of case reviews]
FIRE & EMS LAW – CURRENT EVENTS: https://doi.org/10.7945/0dwx-fc52 [2 years of current events]
EMS LAW – LEGAL, POLITICAL & REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT OF EMS:
https://scholar.uc.edu/concern/documents/ht24wm15r?locale=en [for use in EMS law classes]

________________________________________________________________________

Chap. 1 – American Legal System, incl. Fire Codes, Investigations, Arson

UT: TOWN COUNCIL – DID NOT APPROVE NEW CHIEF

On December 26, 2025, in Daniel N. Musser v. Town of Apple Valley, et al., the Court of Appeals of Utah held (3 to 0) that the trial court properly dismissed the lawsuit by the plaintiff seeking a severance payment of one year’s salary. On November 4, 2021 he signed a contract to be Fire Chief and Police Chief, two days after the election of the new Mayor, Dina Mason Walters, who took office one month later. According to his lawsuit: “In August 2021, Apple Valley’s mayor, Dale Beddo (‘Mayor Beddo’), contacted Plaintiff and inquired whether Plaintiff would be interested in a position with Apple Valley as the police chief and fire chief…. Plaintiff informed Mayor Beddo that although Plaintiff had worked for the Colorado City Marshals Office for over six years, trained, and worked with the Colorado City Fire Department, Plaintiff did not have any Fire Certifications.” He then obtained the required certifications to be a Utah firefighter and police officer. He apparently did not know that under a council-mayor form of government, Utah law required the advice and consent of the Council when appointing a department head. See Utah Code § 10-3b-202(1)(d)(ii). The new Mayor, Ms. Walters, took office on January 3, 2022. A week later, she and a majority of the [5-member] Council sent Musser a letter terminating his employment. https://cases.justia.com/utah/court-of-appeals-published/2025-20241334-ca.pdf?ts=1766864394

THE COURT HELD:

“On November 2, 2021, [Dina Mason ] Walters was elected mayor of Apple Valley, with her term beginning in January 2022. Two days later, on November 4, 2021, Musser entered into the Contract with Apple Valley to employ him as the chief of its fire and police departments. The mayor pro tem [temporary acting Mayor] signed on behalf of Apple Valley. Musser began his employment on November 11, 2021.

In response to concerns about the validity of the Contract and Musser's employment, the mayor pro tem presented the Council with a resolution (the Appointment Resolution) on December 2, 2021, to confirm Musser's appointment as the police and fire chief. Of the five Council members, only three voted on the Appointment Resolution, with two in favor and one against. The other two Council members were absent from the vote.

Walters took office on January 3, 2022. A week later, she and a majority of the Council sent Musser a letter terminating his employment, which gave several reasons for Musser's termination. As relevant to this appeal, the letter explained that Musser's termination was necessary because the Council ‘never approved or ratified’ the Contract.

***

In response to his termination, Musser filed a complaint against the Town alleging breach of the Contract because he was terminated ‘without notice’ and was not given the severance he was entitled to under the Contract. The Contract described reasonable and sufficient notice as ‘the greater of four (4) weeks or any minimum notice required by law’ and provided, ‘Upon any termination, by [Apple Valley], the employee will be entitled to one full year of compensation paid within 14 days of termination.’

***

The district court concluded that the Contract was null and void as an ultra vires act because Musser was hired without the advice and consent of the Council. Specifically, the district court concluded that the council-mayor form of government ‘allowed [Musser] to be hired as the head of [Apple Valley's] police and fire departments only with the advice and consent of the ... Council’ pursuant to Utah law. Because the Contract was ‘executed in violation of ... statute,’ it was ‘null and void as an ultra vires act.’

Musser does not challenge this conclusion by the district court. Rather, he asserts a number of arguments as to why the Contract is nonetheless enforceable, including that he had no knowledge of the relevant statutes and ordinances and that Apple Valley ratified the Contract by acquiescence. We find neither argument persuasive…. Thus, the mayor pro tem's apparent authority and Musser's lack of knowledge are irrelevant and cannot overcome the fact that the Contract was never approved by Apple Valley…. The district court did not err in concluding that the Contract was invalid, because the Council never gave its advice and consent as required by statute. Musser's arguments to the contrary are unavailing. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Town.”

Legal lesson learned: Before accepting new position as Fire Chief, you need to first meet with the incoming Mayor and Council members before signing the contract.

Note: Read the plaintiff’s lawsuit; he apparently had been in discussions with Mayor Dale Beddo since August 2021 and took the necessary courses to be certified as a firefighter and police officer. https://www.facebook.com/groups/336997465025309/posts/424479052943816/

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Chap. 1 – American Legal System, incl. Fire Codes, Investigations, Arson

KY: FF RESIDENCY – FDs CAN REQUIRE – NEED NEW LAW

On December 18, 2025, in Nathan Torain, et al. v. City of Paducah, the Kentuck Supreme Court held (6 to 1) that the City of Paducah, which has no ambulances and relies on private ambulance service to transport patients, may impose a residency requirement that firefighters to live within McCracken County (their ordinance has exception – can reside outside County if live within 45 minute response time of Station 4). The state legislature was concerned about recruitment, particularly in rural areas has enacted a statute with following prohibition on residency. KRS 311A.027(1) states “No public agency, tax district, or other publicly funded emergency medical service first response provider or licensed ambulance service shall have a residence requirement for an employee of or volunteer for the organization.” The Kentucky Supreme Court majority decision recognizes that many fire departments do have ambulances and suggests that Kentucky legislature clarify whether “fire & EMS” departments can impose a residency requirement. The one Dissenting Justice would extend the residency statute to Paducah, which has five (5) fire stations, and one (1) private ambulance station, and all firefighters must be EMTs.

THE COURT HELD:

“Paducah’s Ordinance § 2-304 states, ‘All members of the fire department hired after October 1, 1998, shall reside within McCracken County or within forty-five minutes of Station 4 as measured by a recognized mapping program . . . as a condition of their continued employment with the fire department of the city.’

***

The trial court found,

‘If Paducah firefighters were emergency medical service first responders only, or even if their primary duty were medical service first response providers, Torian’s argument may have merit. However, firefighters are firefighters first and emergency medical responders second. KRS 311A.027 was not intended to apply to firefighters. Firefighters’ duties are governed by KRS Chapter 95 which was does not preclude ordinances establishing residence requirements for firefighters. If the legislature had intended for this section to apply to firefighters it would have used the term ‘firefighter’ in the body of the subsection and would not have placed the statute in a chapter dealing exclusively with emergency medical services.’

***

At first blush, this term would seem to encompass fire departments since they respond to emergencies; are first responders; and firefighters do, or at least are trained to, provide medical service when called. Reference to the regulations, however, demonstrates that emergency medical first response services are exclusively understood in the context of ambulance services. Since Paducah Fire Department does not provide ambulance services it is not covered by KRS 311A.027(1).

***

The Paducah Fire Department does not maintain an ambulance and it does not provide ambulance services. [Footnote 8.] It is not a ‘medical first response agency’ under the regulations, therefore, we conclude it is not an ‘emergency medical first response provider’ under KRS 311A.027(1) since the two phrases are functionally equivalent.

Footnote 8: Paducah represented both in briefing and at oral argument that Paducah Fire Department does not operate an ambulance service. The only ambulance service in Paducah is a private company operated by the local hospitals. Torian has not denied this assertion nor produced evidence to the contrary.

***

The amicus brief filed by Kentucky Professional Firefighters Association has also pointed out that several cities and counties maintain departments which combine both fire response and emergency medical services, such Winchester Fire and EMS, and Frankfort Fire and EMS. Presumably it is these kinds of combined service departments that the parties were referring to by the term ‘fire-based EMS.’ Because any department which maintains an ambulance and provides ambulance services is subject to the applicable regulations, they are distinct from those fire departments which do not. We, therefore, do not think affirming the Court of Appeals is quite as broad as amici believes.

In plain terms, this decision does not answer the question of whether combined service departments that function as both fire departments and EMS providers are subject to KRS 311A.027(1). We will not engage in dicta to provide a clue as to how that question

should be resolved. It exceeds the authority of this Court to fill gaps in the applicable legislation or regulations.

***

Nonetheless, the fact that there exists in this Commonwealth departments that combine both firefighting and emergency medical services, yet such combined departments are undefined in statutory or regulatory law, leaves them in a precarious state. We call upon the General Assembly to bring clarity to this situation; if not for the sake of the judiciary, then at least for the sake of the thousands of fire fighters in the Commonwealth who serve our communities. These men and women richly deserve, at the very least, to know

with certainty which statutes govern them. The General Assembly is quite capable of providing that certainty.”

DISSENT – Justice Michelle M. Keller

“There are five (5) fire stations versus one (1) private ambulance station in Paducah. When a citizen of Paducah calls 911 for a non-fire related medical emergency, a firefighter responds and arrives, often before the private ambulance service. The firefighters administer medical aid, as they are trained to do. In essence, this makes them emergency medical service first response providers…. By both ordinance and function, Paducah’s fire department is a publicly funded emergency medical service first-response provider, its members trained, certified, and dispatched as initial medical responders.

***

Paducah cannot have it both ways. Paducah mandates that its firefighters maintain KBEMS medical responder certification precisely because they are the first to arrive at medical 911 scenes. This operational reality places the department squarely within the statute’s definition. It calls them ‘first responders’ for training, insurance, and dispatch purposes, yet denies them that same status when the legislature extends statutory protection.”

Legal lesson learned: This decision will likely lead to further legislation to clarify residency requirements for “fire & EMS” departments.

Note: Ohio Revised Code: Section 9.481 | Residency requirements prohibited for certain employees. https://codes.ohio.gov/ohio-revised-code/section-9.481

“(2)(b) To ensure adequate response times by certain employees of political subdivisions to emergencies or disasters while ensuring that those employees generally are free to reside throughout the state, the electors of any political subdivision may file an initiative petition to submit a local law to the electorate, or the legislative authority of the political subdivision may adopt an ordinance or resolution, that requires any individual employed by that political subdivision, as a condition of employment, to reside either in the county where the political subdivision is located or in any adjacent county in this state.”

***

Cincinnati Fire Department has following residency requirements. “All members shall reside within Hamilton County, Ohio, or within any county that is adjacent to Hamilton County, Ohio, or within a 35-mile radius of CFD Headquarters, located at 430 Central Ave., Cincinnati, OH 45202.” https://www.cincinnati-oh.gov/fire/recruiting/requirements-to-apply/

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Chap. 1 – American Legal System, incl. Fire Codes, Investigations, Arson

NJ: OLD TIRES – FIRE HAZARD - COMPANY SHUT DOWN

On December 2, 2025, in Township of Gloucester v. Harry’s Tires, et al., the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division held (2 to 0) that the trial court properly denied the motion by Harry Lamplugh, owner of Harry’s Tires, to vacate the final judgment rendered 16 months prior and re-start the business. Since 2017 the Township zoning officer has ordered the tires stored outside his two locations be removed. The Township's acting fire marshal certified that Harry's Tires received numerous notices of violation through June 28, 2021 and failed to pay a total of $16,558 in unpaid fines. On August 18, 2021 the Township had the tires removed from his principal place of business - removal costs of $34,043, including waste disposal fees of $17,015 from Magnus Environmental and manpower costs for the Township's employees of $17,028. The township filed a lawsuit on January18, 2022 and the Court on February 28, 2022 granted the Township a permanent injunction, preventing defendants from operating their tire businesses "at the two locations" and requiring defendants to pay damages of $50,601. The Township thereafter remediated defendants' properties for a second time. https://cases.justia.com/new-jersey/appellate-division-unpublished/2025-a-1179-23.pdf?ts=1765469961

THE COURT HELD:

“ [Township’s acting fire marshal] certified that in November 2021, ‘the Township Fire Department responded to a fire at defendants' North Black Horse Pike location because a single tire had caught fire and ‘spread to some scrap lumber and a tree branch before it was extinguished.’ The officer attached a police report stating that ‘stacks of several hundred new and old tires’ enclosed the fire area, ‘making it a difficult area to access.’

***

The Township's emergency management coordinator certified that ‘[a] fire from any of the Harry's Tires sites would pose a major environmental and logistical nightmare for emergency responders.’

***

During argument, the … court noted the final judgment did not preclude defendants from leasing the properties or seeking approval for another use before the appropriate Township board. The second court also found that defendants offered no meritorious

defense to the Township's claims. Defendants never asserted they were ‘in

compliance’ with the Township's ordinances and had the required ‘licenses that

[they were] supposed to have.’"

Legal lesson learned: Storage of large amount of abandoned tires is a clear fire hazard.

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Chap. 2 – Line Of Duty Death / Safety

CT: RUN SMOKE – THREAT TO SHOOT FF - 14 MONTHS

On December 23, 2025, in State of Connecticut v. David Valle, the Court of Appeals of Connecticut held (3 to 0) that jury properly found homeowner guilty of one count of threatening in the second degree, and one count of interfering with an officer, and two counts of cruelty to animals. The defendant “got right into [Captain’s] face’’ and said that the shed was his smokehouse, that he was smoking a deer inside of it, and that he would ‘put a bullet in every one of [the firefighters’] heads if [they] didn’t get off his property.’ https://cases.justia.com/connecticut/court-of-appeals/2025-ac46735.pdf?ts=1766582340

THE COURT HELD:

“On the evening of December 1, 2020, the Bridgeport Fire Department (fire department) was dispatched to the vicinity of Wayne Street following a report of smoke in the area. The responding firefighters noticed smoke coming from behind a stockade fence at 675

Wayne Street. Scott Boris, then a captain with the fire department, entered the property to investigate and saw a three-sided shed like structure aflame with smoke billowing from the top. When Boris opened the gate to the fence, a ‘‘tiny and frail,’’ ‘‘unhealthy looking’’ dog, later identified as Sheeba, ran toward him. Boris also noticed a kennel behind the shed with another unhealthy looking dog, later identified as Honey, locked inside. As the fire department was attempting to extinguish the fire, a man exited the residence and told Boris that he was burning wood and did not want the fire extinguished. Boris explained to the man that a Bridgeport city ordinance prohibited such fires and that the fire department was required to extinguish it. The man went back inside the house and Boris called the Bridgeport Police Department (police department) for assistance. A short time later, the same man came back outside and, now agitated and yelling, told Boris that the homeowner was on his way and wanted the fire department off the property.

Shortly thereafter, the defendant drove at a high rate of speed toward the residence, slammed on his brakes, jumped out of the vehicle, and charged toward the firefighters. The defendant ‘’got right into [Boris’] face’’’ and said that the shed was his smokehouse, that he was smoking a deer inside of it, and that he would ‘put a bullet in every one of [the firefighters’] heads if [they] didn’t get off his property.’ The defendant also attempted to pull the hose away from the firefighters as they attempted to extinguish the fire. While the confrontation between the defendant and the firefighters was ongoing, the police arrived and detained the defendant. During the ensuing investigation, Hiram Velez, a fire inspector for the city of Bridgeport, found three deceased dogs inside the shed amidst a pile of burned trash and other debris.

***

On July 14, 2023, the court imposed a total effective sentence of 1456 days of incarceration, execution suspended after fourteen months, followed by three years of probation. This appeal followed.”

Legal lesson learned: FD Captain wisely called police when the resident became belligerent; when the owner of home threatened to shot firefighters, police were there to make a prompt arrest.

Note: The trial court judge dismissed some counts at close of prosecution’s case. “The defendant argued that it was undisputed that he was not on the property when the fire was discovered and that there was not sufficient evidence to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that he started the fire or that he had any connection to the three deceased dogs that were found in the shed.” All the photos and other exhibits were provided to jury. Defense failed to object to specific evidence being excluded.

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Chap. 3 – Homeland Security, incl. Active Shooter, Cybersecurity, Immigration

U.S. SUP. CT. – NAT. GUARD IN CHICAGO – NO DEPLOYMENT

On December 23, 2025, in Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, et al. v. Illinois, et al., the United States Supreme Court (6 to 3) issued on its “emergency docket” an Order denying the U.S. Government’s application for a stay of temporary injunction issued by U.S. District Court in Chicago. In a lawsuit brought by the State of Illinois, the District Court judge (upheld by 3-judge panel of 7^th Circuit) stopped deployment of Illinois and Texas National Guard members. On October 4, 2025, the President called 300 members of the Illinois National Guard into active federal service under Title 10 to protect federal personnel and property in and near Chicago, and the next day called up Texas National Guard. Guard members sign up for duty under a dual-enlistment structure, with three different active operational statuses: state active duty, federal active duty under Title 10 of the U.S. Code, and full-time duty under Title 32 of the U.S. Code. Guard members in Title 32 status have performed missions such as disaster relief, border security operations, airport security after the September 11th attacks, and COVID-19 response efforts. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/25a443_ba7d.pdf

THE COURT HELD:

“We conclude that the term “regular forces” in §12406(3) likely refers to the regular forces of the United States military. This interpretation means that to call the Guard into

active federal service under §12406(3), the President must be ‘unable’ with the regular military ‘to execute the laws of the United States.’ Because the statute requires an

assessment of the military’s ability to execute the laws, it likely applies only where the military could legally execute the laws. Such circumstances are exceptional: Under the Posse Comitatus Act, the military is prohibited from ‘execut[ing] the laws’ ‘except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress.’ 18 U. S. C. §1385. So before the President can federalize the Guard under §12406(3), he likely must have statutory or constitutional authority to execute the laws with the regular military and must be ‘unable’ with those forces to perform that function.’”

Legal lessons learned: Federal District Court judges in LA and Portland, Oregon have issued injunctions similar to Chicago.

Note: In Washington, D.C., the Guard from several states were activated under Title 32; a District Court judge’s injunction was stayed by the D.C. Circuit on Dec. 17, 2025. https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cadc.42631/gov.uscourts.cadc.42631.1208806141.0.pdf

See also Professor Bennett’s article in Homeland Security Today:

Dec. 28, 1995: Supreme Court Blocks National Guard Deployment to Chicago, Restricts Presidential Power Under Title 10. Landmark ruling reshapes federal authority and strengthens governors’ control over National Guard deployments. https://www.hstoday.us/us-national-guard/column-supreme-court-blocks-national-guard-deployment-to-chicago-restricts-presidential-power-under-title-10/

Other articles in Homeland Security Today:

Dec. 19, 2025: Federal Courts Continue to Block DHS and FEMA DEI Grant Conditions. Twin injunctions protect billions in emergency preparedness funding from diversity program compliance mandates. https://www.hstoday.us/fema-dhs-federal-pages/column-federal-courts-block-dhs-and-fema-dei-grant-conditions/

Oct. 7, 2025: Federal Courts Block FEMA & DHS Immigration Grant Conditions, Safeguarding Billions in Emergency Preparedness Funds. Decisions impact disaster relief, firefighter assistance, cybersecurity, and counterterrorism grants administered through FEMA and DHS. https://www.hstoday.us/perspective/eyes-on-preparedness-federal-courts-block-fema-dhs-immigration-grant-conditions-safeguarding-billions-in-emergency-preparedness-funds/

September 24, 2025: EYES IN THE SKY: Do Cities Need Warrants for Drones?

How recent federal court decisions are reshaping municipal drone enforcement for cannabis enforcement and illegal land use investigations

https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/unmanned-vehicles/eyes-in-the-sky-do-cities-need-warrants-for-drones/

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Chap. 3 – Homeland Security, incl. Active Shooter, Cybersecurity, Immigration

NY: STATE DMV RECORDS – NON-DISCLOSURE TO ICE

On December 23, 2025, in United States of America v. State of New York, et al., U.S. District Court Judge Anne M. Nardacci, United States District Court for Norther District of New York dismissed U.S. Government’s February 12, 2025 lawsuit challenging the non-disclosure provisions in the State’s “Green Light Law.” file:///C:/Users/lawre/AppData/Local/Temp/b5802e07-d751-4662-84c4-4e8fac5cbeec_Westlaw%20-%20WestClip%20Bennett%20--%20Newsletter%20Cases%20(009).zip.eec/08%20-%20United%20States%20v%20State.pdf

THE COURT HELD:

“The sum of Plaintiff's contentions with respect to conflict preemption is that it could be easier to enforce federal immigration priorities if federal authorities had unfettered access to New York State's DMV information…..

Numerous other courts have also addressed arguments of this type…. Congress may have hoped or expected that States would cooperate with any requests from the Attorney General.... But Illinois and the other States are not bound by that hope or expectation.... It would make no sense to hold that a federal statute premised on State cooperation preempts a state law withholding that cooperation. The [challenged state law] is not invalid as a matter of field or conflict preemption.”); United States v. California, 921 F.3d 865, 888 (9th Cir. 2019) (“The district court concluded that this frustration does not constitute obstacle preemption: ‘California's decision not to assist federal immigration enforcement in its endeavors is not an ‘obstacle’ to that enforcement effort. [The United States’] argument that [the challenged state laws] makes immigration enforcement far more burdensome begs the question: more burdensome than what? The laws make enforcement more burdensome than it would be if state and local law enforcement provided immigration officers with their assistance. But refusing to help is not the same as impeding. If such were the rule, obstacle preemption could be used to commandeer state resources and subvert Tenth Amendment principles.’ ... We agree.”) (first alteration in original) (quoting United States v. California, 314 F. Supp. 3d 1077, 1104 (E.D. Cal. 2018)).”

Legal lesson learned: No Congressional statute requiring states to ICE access to DMV records.

Note: ICE can obtain DMV records pursuant to a search warrant.

“12. (a) Except as required for the commissioner to issue or renew adriver's license or learner's permit that meets federal standards foridentification, as necessary for an individual seeking acceptance into atrusted traveler program, or to facilitate vehicle imports and/orexports, the commissioner, and any agent or employee of thecommissioner, shall not disclose or make accessible in any mannerrecords or information that he or she maintains, to any agency thatprimarily enforces immigration law or to any employee or agent of suchagency, unless the commissioner is presented with a lawful court orderor judicial warrant signed by a judge appointed pursuant to article IIIof the United States constitution. Upon receiving a request for suchrecords or information from an agency that primarily enforcesimmigration law, the commissioner shall, no later than three days aftersuch request, notify the individual about whom such information wasrequested, informing such individual of the request and the identity ofthe agency that made such request.” https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/VAT/201

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Chap. 3 – Homeland Security, incl. Active Shooter, Cybersecurity, Immigration

DC: VENEZUELANS - DUE PROCESS HEARING - ONLINE

On December 22, 2025, in J.G.G., et al. v, Donald Trump, U.S. Chief District Court Judge James E. Boasberg issued a preliminary injunction so that 252 Venezuelans who were flown to El Salvador on March 15, 2025, and then on July 18 released to Venezuela, can have a habeas corpus hearing. In exchange, Venezuela released ten U.S. nationals, as well as eighty Venezuelan political prisoners. https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/694a977ac92f54bb3c63226d

THE COURT HELD:

“The Government could also theoretically offer Plaintiffs a hearing without returning them to the United States so long as such hearing satisfied the requirements of due process.”

Legal Lesson Learned: The District Court is following the important “emergency docket” ruling by U.S. Supreme Court on April 7, 2025.

Note: The U.S, Supreme Court held:

“AEA [Alien Enemies Act] detainees must receive notice after the date of this order that they are subject to removal under the Act. The notice must be afforded within a reasonable time and in such a manner as will allow them to actually seek habeas relief in the proper venue before such removal occurs.” https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/24a931_2c83.pdf

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Chap. 3 – Homeland Security, incl. Active Shooter, Cybersecurity, Immigration

RI: DHS GRANTS – “SANCTUARY” STATES GET INJUNCTION

On December 22, 2025, in State of Illinois, et al. v. Kristi Noem, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, U.S. District Court Judge Mary S. McElroy, United States District Court for District of Rhode Island, granted the plaintiff states’ motion for summary judgment, finding violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. DHS in September 2025 issued award letters to state governments indicating that hundreds of millions of dollars of anticipated awards to so-called “sanctuary jurisdictions” were being reallocated to other jurisdictions. Twelve States and the District of Columbia sued, challenging both that reallocation itself and related decisions by DHS. https://ecf.rid.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2025cv0495-53

THE COURT HELD:

“In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, Congress authorized the

Homeland Security Grant Program (‘HSGP’) to strengthen national security through

grant funding to state, local, tribal, and territorial governments…. HSGP includes three grant programs: the State Homeland Security Grant Program (‘SHSP’), the Urban Area

Security Initiative (‘UASI’), and Operation Stonegarden [Border response]…. Since the beginning of the current administration, the executive branch has repeatedly sought to tie federal grant funding for programs like HSGP to state and local governments’ assistance with federal immigration enforcement. On January 20, 2025, President Trump issued an executive order directing DHS to ‘ensure that so-called ‘sanctuary’ jurisdictions . . . do not receive access to Federal funds.’ Exec. Order No. 14159, § 17, 90 Fed. Reg. 8443, 8446 (Jan. 20, 2025)…. On September 27, Defendants sent States HSGP final award letters reflecting massive funding reallocations from Plaintiffs to other jurisdictions…. In total, the difference in target allocations from the August 1 NOFO [notice of funding opportunity] and the final awards amounted to cuts of over $240 million to Plaintiffs…. And Defendants provide no substantive, contemporaneous justification whatsoever for the funding changes that took place between the DHS Directive and the final award letters, i.e., the round-number increases in awards to favored jurisdictions. Defendants’ failure to do so further renders the Reallocation Decision arbitrary and capricious.”

Legal lesson learned: Can’t punish sanctuary states and cities by reducing DHS grants.

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Chap. 3 – Homeland Security, incl. Active Shooter, Cybersecurity, Immigration

NJ: ACTING U.S. ATTY NOT CONFIRMED - DISQUALIFIED

On December 1, 2025, in United States v. Julien Giraud, Jr. et al. the U.S. Court of Appeals for Third Circuit (Philadelphia) held that Alina Habba, who was appointed Acting U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey, was properly removed by order of U.S. District Court since she was not confirmed by the Senate within 120 days of replacing the resigned U.S. Attorney. Two indicted criminal defendants were denied motions to dismiss their indictments. https://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/25-2635/25-2635-2025-12-01.pdf?ts=1764612050

THE COURT HELD:

“On March 3, under the new presidential administration, Attorney General Pamela Bondi appointed John Giordano as Interim U.S. Attorney for New Jersey pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 546(a). Giordano resigned three weeks later, at which time the Attorney General appointed Alina Habba as Interim U.S. Attorney, also pursuant to § 546(a). Habba was sworn in on March 28. On June 30, President Donald Trump nominated her for the permanent role. The Senate never acted on the nomination.

As § 546’s 120-day deadline approached, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey issued a standing order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 546(d) providing that

Desiree Grace—the First Assistant U.S. Attorney at the time— would be Interim U.S. Attorney effective upon the expiration of Habba’s 120-day term under § 546.1 In response, the Department of Justice terminated Grace’s employment….

Then on July 2, the Trump administration took several steps: (1) the President withdrew Habba’s nomination for U.S. Attorney; (2) Habba resigned as Interim U.S. Attorney; (3) the Attorney General issued an order appointing Habba as ‘Special Attorney’ to the Attorney General, accompanied by a letter authorizing Habba to conduct ‘any kind of legal proceedings … which United States Attorneys are authorized to conduct’ pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 515, App. 161–62, 165; and (4) in the same order, the Attorney General also designated Habba as First Assistant U.S. Attorney, which purported to mean that Habba automatically became Acting U.S. Attorney pursuant to the FVRA [Federal Vacancies Reform Act], 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a)(1)….

Habba is not the Acting U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey by virtue of her appointment as First Assistant U.S. Attorney because only the first assistant in place at the time the vacancy arises automatically assumes the functions and duties of the office under the FVRA. Additionally, because Habba was nominated for the vacant U.S. Attorney position, the FVRA’s nomination bar prevents her from assuming the role of Acting U.S. Attorney. Finally, the Attorney General’s delegation of all the powers of a U.S. Attorney to Habba is prohibited by the FVRA’s exclusivity provision. Therefore, we

will affirm the District Court’s disqualification order.”

Legal lesson learned: The U.S. Attorney for New Jersey has a critical responsibility, thereby requiring Senate confirmation – the District Court and the 3^rd Circuit had no patience with breaches of the appointment process.

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Chap. 5 – Emergency Vehicle Operation

LA: FF BAD DRIVING – NOT SUSP. WITHIN “60-DAY RULE”

On December 15, 2025, in Chase Bruner v. New Orleans Fire Department, the Court of Appeals of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit held (3 to 0) that the city’s Civil Service Commission properly set aside six-day suspension because the NOFD failed to comply with sixty-day investigatory timeline in the Firefighter Bill of Rights. The bad driving occurred April 11, 2024. On April 18, Major Figueroa-Camps reviewed the video of the EMS vehicles and forwarded it to Chief Keller, who on April 19 notified NOFD of the incident. The Civil Service Commission stated the 60-day clock started on April 19. The 60-days ended June 19, 2024, but Mr. Brunner was issued his suspension letter on June 21. https://cases.justia.com/louisiana/fourth-circuit-court-of-appeal/2025-2025-ca-0386.pdf?ts=1765847814

THE COURT HELD:

“On April 11, 2024, Mr. Bruner had an overtime shift as an ambulance driver for New Orleans Emergency Medical Services (‘EMS’). During his shift, Mr. Bruner violated multiple traffic laws, specifically, racing another ambulance, excessive speeding and driving on the wrong side of the street. The EMS in-vehicle camera system flagged a sudden brake event, prompting EMS Major Gerardo Figueroa-Camps (‘Major Figueroa-Camps’) to review and send the full video footage to EMS Deputy Chief Chris Keller (‘Chief Keller’) on April 18 2024, and [on April 19] Chief Keller emailed NOFD about Mr. Bruner’s traffic violations.

***

On June 21, 2024, NOFD Superintendent Roman Nelson issued a letter to Mr. Bruner informing him that he was charged for violating NOFD Rule RR5, which requires compliance with City of New Orleans policies, specifically CAO Policy 5(R) concerning driving standards. The letter further stated that Mr. Bruner would be suspended for six hours.

***

Mr. Bruner appealed his suspension to the Civil Service Commission. A hearing took place on November 15, 2024. On May 8, 2025, the Commission granted Mr. Bruner’s appeal and ordered NOFD to reimburse Mr. Bruner for all lost wages and emoluments of employment from his six-hour suspension. The Commission found that NOFD failed to comply with sixty-day investigatory timeline in the Firefighter Bill of Rights.

[Louisiana Revised Statute 33:2181, known as the Firefighters Bill of Rights],

provides ‘[a]ny investigation of a fire employee which is conducted pursuant to this Subpart shall be completed within sixty days, including the conducting of any pre-disciplinary hearing or conference.’ La. R.S. 33:2186(A). The fire department may petition the governing authority for an extension of time in which to complete its investigation upon a showing of good cause. La. R.S. 33:2186(B).”

***

The NOFD argues that the Commission’s finding was erroneous because it undermines this Court’s decision in Pitre v. Dep’t of Fire, 2021-0632 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2022), 338 So.3d 70 regarding when an investigation commences…. In Pitre, a firefighter was charged with making false statements during a formal investigation regarding another employee’s worker’s compensation claim. The NOFD sent a notification letter to the firefighter on July 8, 2020 and the firefighter was terminated on September 28, 2020….

NOFD received an enhanced video footage of the firefighter’s actions on August 7, 2020…. NOFD argued that the investigation into the firefighter did not commence until August 7, 2020…. This Court found that the investigation commenced on July 8, 2020, when NOFD conducted an interrogation, not an initial inquiry. Specifically, the

notification letter was issued to the firefighter detailing that he would be interviewed in connection with an investigation for violation of the NOFD Rules and Regulations.

***

We do not find that the Commission’s decision undermines this Court’s decision in Pitre. The facts in Pitre, are distinguishable, as the investigation into the firefighter began when NOFD made more than an initial inquiry into the firefighter’s misconduct by conducting a formal interview. Here, we find that the investigation into Mr. Bruner commenced on April 19, 2024, when NOFD was informed of Mr. Bruner’s misconduct and requested, and received evidence of his misconduct on the same date.”

Legal lesson learned: The 60-day rule can lead to confusion; be helpful if a FD policy could give specific guidance.

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File: Chap. 5 – Emergency Vehicle Operations

TX: CHIEF MVA DRIVING TO WORK - CITY IMMUNITY

On December 9, 2025, in City of Houston v. Annie Gutierrez, et al., the Court of Appeals of Texas, Fourteenth District held that trial court should have dismissed the city; under the State’s tort claims act, municipalities wave their governmental immunity for motor vehicle accidents in the performance of employee’s duties. Under the “coming and going” rule, employees driving to work are not in the performance of their duties. https://cases.justia.com/texas/fourteenth-court-of-appeals/2025-14-24-00811-cv.pdf?ts=1765287556

THE COURT HELD:

“At approximately 5:30 a.m. one morning, a Chevrolet Silverado truck struck

the back of a car in a left-hand-turn lane on Westpark Drive in Houston. City of

Houston Fire Chief Mark Griffiths was the driver of the truck, which the City owned.

Appellees sued the City alleging personal injuries from the collision. Appellees

alleged Griffiths drove negligently while in the course and scope of his City

employment at the time of the collision, and thus, the City’s immunity was waived

under the Texas Torts Claims Act (“TTCA”). See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code

Ann. § 101.021(1).

The City’s evidence showed that when this accident occurred, Griffiths was

driving from his home. Griffiths was about ten minutes away from the fire station,

but planned to go to the gym, then to work. Griffiths was wearing his gym clothes

at the time of the accident. Griffiths testified his normal routine was to go to the

gym, work out, then put on his uniform and then start work.

Griffiths’s work hours were 6:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., Tuesdays through Fridays.

Griffiths’s work duties did not include responding to emergencies. Griffiths

described his work as training firefighters and quality assurance of incoming calls

and complaints.

***

This Court recently summarized the coming-and-going rule as follows: Under the coming-and-going rule, an ‘employee is generally not acting within the scope of [her] employment when traveling to and from work.’ Painter v. Amerimex Drilling I, Ltd., 561 S.W.3d 125, 136 (Tex. 2018). The coming-and-going rule reflects that an accident while traveling to and from work does not generally arise from a person’s employment but instead from the risks and hazards inherent to the driving public. Smith v. Tex. Emp. Ins. Ass’n, 105 S.W.2d 192, 193 (Tex. [Comm’n Op.] 1937); see Cameron Int’l Corp. v. Martinez, 662 S.W.3d 373, 376 (Tex. 2022). ‘Such travel hazards do not arise out of the business of an employer; thus, the law does not hold the employer liable for injuries resulting from engaging in these risks.’ Cameron, 662 S.W.3d at 376.”

Legal lesson learned: The motorist may pursue litigation against the Chief in his personal capacity, but not the city.

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Chap. 6 – Employment Litigation, incl. Work Comp., Age Discrim., Vet Rights

DE: BACK INJURY – “RECURRENCE” PRIOR AT ANOTHER FD

On December 4, 2025, in Corey Ferrell v. City of Wilmington, the Supreme Court of Delaware held (3 to 0) that Wilmington Fire Department had no workers comp liability for 2023 incident, where the firefighter injured his back carrying two high-rise packs (second was for his officer) up high-rise, since this was a “recurrence” of a 2015 claim settled with the Belvedere Fire Department where he worked on part-time basis. https://cases.justia.com/delaware/supreme-court/2025-152-2025.pdf?ts=1764862317

THE COURT HELD:

“Ultimately, the Board concluded that the 2023 incident was a recurrence of the injury that Ferrell sustained in 2015. In reaching that conclusion, the Board placed significant weight on Dr. Matz’s opinion and testimony. The Board found that the 2023 incident did not aggravate the 2015 injury and did not cause a new, separately compensable injury to Ferrell. The Board agreed with Dr. Matz that a comparison of Ferrell’s MRIs showed the expected progression of spinal deterioration from the 2015 injury, and the Board found that the act of walking up the stairs carrying the high-rise packs was not enough to create a ‘genuine intervening event.’ The Board therefore held that liability for the 2023 incident would remain under the 2015 claim and denied Ferrell’s petition for workers’ compensation coverage from Wilmington FD.

***

The Board heard contrasting medical opinions from Dr. Tucker and Dr. Matz, both of whom relied on their physical evaluations of Ferrell and their comparisons of his 2015 and 2023 MRIs.

***

Dr. Matz is an orthopedic surgeon whom the Board found credible. In Dr. Matz’s opinion, the results of Ferrell’s MRIs showed that his condition was degenerative, not acute, and ‘the sort of progression that you would expect with the natural aging process.’ The Board agreed that the MRIs—performed eight years apart—may have shown some worsening in Ferrell’s condition, but the progression was expected. The Board accepted Dr. Matz’s expert opinion that Ferrell’s condition was degenerative and a ‘slowly progressive thoracic disc disease.’”

Legal lesson learned: Since the firefighter had settled his 2015 claim, he had no workers comp coverage for the 2023 claim.

Note: The Court wrote: “In 2018, Ferrell accepted a commutation of the 2015 claim with Belvedere’s workers’ compensation insurance carrier. The commutation globally resolved the claim and released the insurer from further liability with respect to the injury.”

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Chap. 6 – Employment Litigation, incl. Work Comp., Age Discrim., Vet Right

WV: FF R-WRIST – TRIPPED AMBULANCE – BENEFITS CONT

On December 4, 2025, in City of Wheeling v. David Gilbert, the West Virginia Intermediate Court of Appeals held (3 to 0) that the Worker’s Comp Board properly reversed the hearing officer who closed the claim on November 5, 2024. He is entitled to continued coverage for his December 1, 2023 injury of his right wrist when he tripped and caught himself while getting into an ambulance. https://www.courtswv.gov/sites/default/pubfilesmnt/2025-12/25-ICA-222_MD.pdf

THE COURT HELD:

“Mr. Gilbert had not worked since June 2, 2024.

***

On July 31, 2024, the claim administrator issued an order denying the addition of

scapholunate instability of the right wrist and scapholunate ligament tear of the right wrist as compensable conditions of the claim. Mr. Gilbert protested this claim.

***

Mr. Gilbert was evaluated by Joseph Grady II, M.D., on September 6, 2024. Mr. Gilbert reported pain and a shifting sensation within the radial aspect of the right wrist. Dr. Grady noted that Mr. Gilbert had not worked since June 2, 2024. The assessment was right wrist pain with demonstrated right scapholunate ligament tear on direct visualization during arthroscopic examination. Dr. Grady opined that the right wrist sprain that occurred with the initial injury had resolved, and Mr. Gilbert had reached maximum medical improvement (‘MMI’) for the compensable injury. Dr. Grady further opined that Mr. Gilbert would have difficulty working full duty at his regular job because of the right-hand pain and weakness, which Dr. Grady attributed to the non compensable scapholunate ligament tear.

***

Mr. Gilbert underwent a scapholunate ligament reconstruction, with tendon graft

and internal brace augmentation of the right wrist on September 12, 2024. The post-

operative diagnosis was a complete tear of the scapholunate ligament of the right wrist.

***

On September 30, 2024, the claim administrator issued an order suspending Mr.

Gilbert’s TTD benefits based upon Dr. Grady’s finding of MMI. On November 5, 2024,

the claim administrator issued an order closing the claim for TTD benefits. Mr. Gilbert

protested this order.

***

Upon review, we conclude that the Board was not clearly wrong in finding that the

closure of the claim for TTD benefits was premature and improper. We note that TTD

payments are payable during an injured worker’s recovery period after a compensable

injury. Pursuant to West Virginia Code § 23-4-7a, TTD benefits are not payable once an

injured worker reaches MMI, is released to return to work, or actually returns to work.

Upon review, we conclude that the Board was not clearly wrong in finding that the evidence established that the closing of the claim for TTD benefits on November 5, 2024, was premature. “

Legal lesson learned: Another “battle of the experts.” Nice to read that the firefighter will have continuing coverage until he reaches MMI (Maximum Medical Improvement).

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Chap. 8 – Race / National Origin Discrimination

OH: 47-YR BLACK - RESIGNED – DEFAMATION / FILED LATE

On December 15, 2025, in Christian Baccus v. City of Columbus Division of Fire, U.S. District Court Judge Edmund A. Sargus, United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Eastern Division, as recommended in a Report and Recommendation by U.S. Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson, granted the City’s partial motion to dismiss his claims of defamation by training officers. Under Ohio law, an action for libel and slander must be brought “within one year after the cause of action accrued.” Ohio Revised Code § 2305.11(A). He resigned on March 14, 2024, and his pro se [no attorney] lawsuit was not filed until June 30, 2025. https://public.fastcase.com/Jhe1Qn%2BmJndQYQU6z%2FeNm77nYWugAlzsBoxNmmqkM3E6Q88Vkqy0VZ5SiNrQruK%2B?utm_medium=email&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-9AvFND94NtmZ3W9IwgKnyu4_gZwqiYmIH5_4QpXW_NHE8WVWhb5SJK4Whyo4GFBslMpA9EnrqLvXRYy-

THE COURT HELD:

“This case is about discrimination Plaintiff Christian Baccus allegedly experienced at the hands of the City of Columbus, Division of Fire (the “City”). As told by his pro se Amended Complaint, Plaintiff-a Black, 47-year-old man-was employed by the City as a firefighter in ‘Recruit Class #119.’

***

Though not completely clear, it seems that during Fire Assignments, Plaintiff was disciplined by his superiors for aspects of his practical performance…. He also experienced ‘ridicule’ at the hands of one of his instructors, and he alleges his superiors ‘lied’ about him on evaluations and elsewhere…. Then on March 14, 2024, the City gave Plaintiff the ‘option to resign or be terminated.’ … Initially Plaintiff opted for termination, but he later ‘changed [his] decision to resign.’ … Plaintiff further claims that other recruits who were white or women were not treated similarly….. For some, the City authorized additional training; and for others, the City allowed enrollment in other recruit classes…. Plaintiff also says he was ‘treated differently’ because of his age…. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that the City's firefighter recruit evaluation methods are subjective and result in Black male recruits being dismissed at a higher rate than white or female recruits.

***

Ultimately, though, the Undersigned need not designate the exact day any of the allegedly defamatory statements happened. As stated, Ohio law is clear that an action for defamation must be brought within one year after the cause of action accrued, and the general rule is the statute of limitations begins to run when the defendant first speaks or publishes the allegedly defamatory words. See Ohio Revised Code § 2305.11(A); Haas, 2024 WL 3925724, at *3.

***

Taken together, this means that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint may assert defamation claims only for statements spoken or published on or after June 30, 2024-within one year of when he initiated this action. Any prior claims are time-barred.”

Legal lesson learned: The defamation claims are dismissed; pretrial discovery may now proceed on the race and age claims.

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Chap. 9 – Americans With Disabilities Act

SC: MEDIC PTSD – DIDN’T INTERVIEW FOR BILLING JOB

On December 18, 2025, in William D. Shugart v. Chester County, Senior U.S. District Court Judge Cameron McGowan Currie, United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Rock Hill Division, granted defense motion for summary judgment; no proof of ADA discrimination or retaliation for taking FMLA leave. Plaintiff was a Senior Medic with Chest County EMS, and on September 8, 2021 there was incident where a gun shot came from a house. He sought treatment for PTSD and history of depression and went on 12-weeks of FMLA leave. On January 1, 2023 he was terminated when he was medically cleared to return to work as a paramedic but did not return. His supervisor encouraged him to apply for billing position that opened with a recent retirement, but he cancelled the January 30 (1 pm) in-person interview the day prior, and did not respond to offer of ZOOM interview. https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/south-carolina/scdce/0:2024cv00826/288831/46/0.pdf

THE COURT HELD:

“Plaintiff was employed by Chester County in its Emergency Medical Services (‘EMS’)

department from May 2016 until January 2023….He was promoted to Senior Paramedic on December 4, 2021…. An essential function of the Senior Paramedic was operation of an ambulance.

***

Plaintiff was provided the opportunity to apply and interview for the billing specialist

position when it was posted, but cancelled the interview the day before, and did not respond to inquiries about another option for the interview. The job was filled by a person with finance or accounting experience. For the reasons above, the court finds summary judgment is appropriate for Defendant on Plaintiff’s claims of ADA discrimination and retaliation.

***

To make out an FMLA interference claim, an employee must demonstrate he was entitled to an FMLA benefit, his employer interfered with the provision of that benefit, and the interference caused him harm. Adkins v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.4th 785, 796 (4th Cir. 2023). The court agrees with the Magistrate Judge Defendant has produced evidence Plaintiff was provided his twelve-week statutorily mandated FMLA leave, his position was protected during that time, and there is no evidence his use of FMLA leave was a factor in his termination. Plaintiff has failed to refute this evidence. In fact, the record shows Defendant went out of its way to assist Plaintiff in obtaining the appropriate paperwork when Plaintiff indicated he was ready to come back to work, even though he indicated he would not be going back on an ambulance.”

Legal lesson learned: Plaintiff’s supervisors went out of their way to assist the paramedic.

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Chap. 13 – EMS, incl. Community Paramedicine, COVID-1

IL: VICTIM DIED – MEDIC TELL JURY “EXCITED UTTERANCE”

On December 23, 2025, in The People of the State of Illinois v. Londre Brown, the Court of Appeals of Illinois, First District, Fifth Division held (3 to 0) that the defendant was properly convicted by a jury of two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault and one count of aggravated battery of a person 60 years of age or older, and the sentence of 54 years. The paramedic was properly allowed to testify about the victim’s comments to her at the scene – excited utterance exception to hearsay rule and EMS run report was admissible as nontestimonial medical record (she died before trail, apparently from unrelated cause). https://ilcourtsaudio.blob.core.windows.net/

THE COURT HELD:

“Christopher Daly, a paramedic, testified that, on December 13, 2019, at approximately

8:30 p.m. when he arrived at the scene, he observed an elderly woman sitting at the top of the stairs, who was ‘stressed out’ and ‘near hysterical.’ The victim did not want anyone to touch her; she was ‘shaking’ and ‘very scared.’ Daly’s partner, Anthony Hoard, coaxed her down the stairs. After the victim stepped outside, she sat in a chair they had brought, and they took her to the ambulance. Her demeanor in the ambulance was the same as it had been at the top of stairs: ‘anxious, nervous, seemed very scared.’ Daly explained that, because he was the paramedic, he assessed the patient while his partner did the documentation. While Daly was assessing her and asking, ‘what happened,’ the victim said that defendant had bitten her and had ‘stuck his penis in her mouth.’ The victim said defendant was holding her down and she was fighting him off and ‘that’s why she was hurt all over.”

Daly described the injuries he observed, including a very deep cut in her right thigh

that seemed almost to the bone. Daly explained that doctors at the hospital would want to know how big the knife was, what kind of knife was used, and whether it was clean or dirty.

For this reason, Daly went back inside the victim’s house and asked defendant ‘What kind of knife did you use to cut her?’ ‘ Defendant replied: ‘I didn’t use a knife. I bit her.’ Daly described defendant’s demeanor as ‘[a]lmost smug,’ like he ‘didn’t care.’ After speaking with defendant.

***

The ‘Excited Utterance’ exception permits the introduction of ‘[a] statement relating

to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.’ Ill. R. Evid. 803(2) (eff. Jan. 25, 2023). For a hearsay statement to be admissible under this exception, our supreme court has set forth three ‘must’ requirements: (1) ‘there must be an occurrence sufficiently startling to produce a spontaneous and unreflecting statement,’(2) ‘there must be an absence of time for the declarant to fabricate the statement,’ and (3) ‘the statement must relate to the circumstances of the occurrence.’ (Emphases added.) People v. Sutton, 233 Ill. 2d 89, 107 (2009); People v. Williams, 193 Ill. 2d 306, 352 (2000); Jones, 2025 IL App (1st) 230771, ¶ 114; People v. Morales, 2021 IL App (2d) 190408, ¶ 12.

***

[T]here is no indication that their [EMS] report was intended as a substitute for victim testimony, as opposed to a medical record intended to enable accurate treatment once they reached the hospital and doctors.”

Legal lesson learned: Excited utterances are admissible as an exception to the Hearsay Rule; a best practice is to document to victim’s comments in the EMR run report.

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Chap. 13 – EMS, incl. Community Paramedicine, COVID-19

NY: NO TRANSPORT – PT AGREED WITH EMS – IMMUNITY

On December 23, 2025, in Kathleen Gumkowski, Administrator Of The Estate Of Gregory Gumkowski, Deceased, et al. v. Thomas Shwaab, M.D., et al., the Supreme Court of New York, Fourth Department, held (5 to 0) that the trial improperly denied summary judgment for the Town of Tonawanda, Town of Tonawanda EMS and two paramedics on the run. EMS and the patient jointly agreed no transport was necessary. https://law.justia.com/cases/new-york/appellate-division-fourth-department/2025/816-1-ca-24-01193.html

THE COURT HELD:

“Following his discharge [on Jan. 11, 2016 from Roswell Park Cancer Institute], decedent called Roswell Park on several occasions, including a call to Pieri [Christine Pieri, R.N.] on January 13, 2016, wherein decedent reported shallow breathing and lightheadedness. A few hours later, decedent called 911 with a chief complaint of shortness of breath. Rutenkroger and Rice, paramedics employed by the Town of Tonawanda, arrived at the decedent's residence, took his vital signs, and assessed his condition. Given decedent's history of anxiety and the absence of any other clinical indications of respiratory distress, the paramedics concluded that decedent's shortness of breath was caused by anxiety. According to plaintiff's deposition testimony, decedent and the paramedics made "a joint decision" that decedent would not be taken to the emergency room that day, and decedent signed a treatment refusal acknowledgment.

***

Under the circumstances presented here, we conclude that the Town defendants established that Rutenkroger's and Rice's actions were discretionary and, thus, the Town defendants are entitled to governmental function immunity.

***

[W]e agree with the Town defendants that they are entitled to governmental function immunity and the court therefore erred in denying their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and cross-claims against them. ‘A municipality is immune from liability where the actions of its employees in performing governmental functions involve[ ] the exercise of discretion’ (Morales v City of New York, 235 AD3d 595, 597 [1st Dept 2025]; see McLean v City of New York, 12 NY3d 194, 202-203 [2009]). ‘[A]mbulance assistance rendered by first responders . . . should be viewed as a classic governmental, rather than proprietary, function’ (Applewhite v Accuhealth, Inc., 21 NY3d 420, 430 [2013] [internal quotation marks omitted]).” https://law.justia.com/cases/new-york/appellate-division-fourth-department/2025/816-1-ca-24-01193.html

Legal lesson learned: Medics and patient made “joint decision” to not transport – hopefully they also had patient sign a refusal form. When in doubt, also call Hospital Medical Control.

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Chap. 13 – EMS, incl. Community Paramedicine, COVID-19

NY: DISPATCH DID NOT TELL PT 1^st UNIT ALS - IMMUNITY

On December 18, 2025, in Ebony Hinkson, et al. v. New York-Presbyterian Queens, et al., the Supreme Court of New York, First Department held (4 to ) that that trial court judge improperly denied motion to dismiss by City of New York and FDNY EMS. Dispatch did not advise patient that ALS would be first on scene. https://law.justia.com/cases/new-york/appellate-division-first-department/2025/index-no-153104-18-appeal-no-5428-case-no-2024-01885.html

THE COURT HELD:

“To establish the requisite ‘assumption by the municipality, through promises or actions, of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who was injured’ … plaintiff relies solely on the 911 operator's purported assurance to the decedent's grandmother that an ambulance was on its way; the grandmother does not claim to have received any additional assurances from the FDNY paramedics themselves. It is not enough that they arrived and provided treatment because that is what emergency responders do for any member of the public (see Estate of Kyle A. v New York City Hous. Auth., 181 AD3d 492, 493 [1st Dept 2020]). Even ignoring any purported inconsistencies between the grandmother's deposition testimony and her summary judgment opposition affidavit with respect to what the 911 operator said, any special duty created by the 911 operator's purported assurance that the ambulance was on its way was fulfilled when the first ambulance (operated by defendant New York-Presbyterian d/b/a New York Presbyterian EMS [NYP-EMS]) arrived five minutes later.

***

Plaintiff does not claim that the 911 operator promised that the ambulance would be capable of rendering advanced life support (ALS) rather than basic life support or that it would be operated by the FDNY as opposed to some other provider. The 911 operator at any rate also dispatched an FDNY ALS ambulance at the same time; it was just farther away and took longer (14 minutes) to arrive. Plaintiff does not claim that there was anything negligent about the amount of time it took the FDNY ambulance to arrive, challenging only the NYP-EMS ambulance's delay of transport (for which the City is not responsible) (see Brown v Transcare N.Y., Inc., 27 AD3d 350, 351 [1st Dept 2006]), and the FDNY paramedics' failure to properly intubate the decedent (which had nothing to do with their time of arrival).”

Legal lesson learned: Dispatchers and EMS enjoy immunity – owe no “special duty” t patients.

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Chap. 13 – EMS, incl. Community Paramedicine, COVID-19

CA: AMR – WAS COUNTY EMS - ConFIRE WINS CONTRACT

On December 18, 2025 in American Medical Response of Inland Empire v. County of San Bernardino, et al.; the California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, First Division held (3 to 0; unpublished decision) that trial court improperly granted AMR a preliminary injunction during the pendency of this lawsuit to stop the County from switching to ConFire as their new EMS provider. https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/nonpub/D085716.PDF

THE COURT HELD:

“AMR began operating as the ambulance service provider for the County in the late 1970s. Since that time, the County has retained AMR as its exclusive EMS provider, grandfathered into its system in accordance with section 1797.224 of the EMS Act.

***

In 2022, the County initiated a competitive process to improve its EMS system and issued a request for proposal (RFP) seeking bidders for a new exclusive contract to provide EMS services. The RFP set forth three overarching goals for its procurement process-to improve service delivery to customers and partners, to establish a more efficient EMS system, and to make investments back into the system.

***

The County and ConFire appeal from the preliminary injunction order, asserting the trial court improperly determined the County had a ministerial duty to advance only AMR's proposal to the County's Board of Supervisors because it was the ‘highest-scoring’ proposal. Further, the County and ConFire assert the County did not abuse its discretion by advancing both ConFire's and AMR's proposals to the Board and ultimately selecting ConFire as the provider.”

***

The County received responses to the RFP from AMR and ConFire. Four evaluators scored both proposals. Three of the four evaluators gave ConFire a higher score. The total cumulative score for AMR, however, was higher by four points. ConFire received individual scores of: 383, 384, 363 and 385. AMR’s scores were: 373, 419, 346, 381. After the proposals were scored, in June 2023, the County sent a letter to both AMR and ConFire stating that because the scores for both proposers were ‘substantially equivalent’ it intended to ‘move forward with negotiations’ with both entities.

***

On November 3, 2023, AMR submitted a letter protesting the County’s decision to advance both proposals to the Board…. On November 28, 2023, the County sent a letter to AMR denying its protest.

***

At a regular meeting of the County’s Board on December 5, 2023, AMR and ConFire each presented their proposals. Thereafter, the Board heard several public comments in support of each proposal, including from representatives of cities within the exclusive operation area for which the RFP was issued. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Board voted to deny AMR’s protest and award the service contract to ConFire.

***

In short, the RFP’s plain language provides that the County may negotiate with more than one proposer and that the final determination is left to the discretion of the Board based on the scoring, and the Board’s determination of the proposer’s ability to meet the needs of the County and provide the best value. Contrary to the trial court’s finding, the RFP does not impose a ministerial duty on the County to negotiate solely with the proposer who received the highest total score…. Given our conclusion that AMR cannot show a likelihood of prevailing on the merits of its mandate claim and the general rule against enjoining public agencies, AMR has not shown that its risk of injury supports the imposition of a preliminary injunction.”

Legal lesson learned: The RFP was clear and Courts as a general rule oppose issuing injunctions against public agencies.

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Chap. 13 – EMS, incl. Community Paramedicine, COVID-19

UT: EMS – SUES INSUR. CO. NOT PAYING STATE RATES

On December 12, 2025, in Gold Cross Services, Inc. v. The Cigna Group, U.S. District court Judge Dale A. Kimball, United States District Court, D. Utah, denied The Cigna Group’s motion to dismiss; the EMS services provided by Gold Cross to patients insured by Cigna were billed at State levels, and Cigna’s not paying full price is a breach of the “implied contract” claim. As of July 1, 2024 the state’s maximum ambulance base rate permitted for EMT services is $1,176.11, for AEMT services is $1,552.68, and for Paramedic services is $2,270.22. See Utah Admin. Code R911-8-200(6). The Cigna Group’s counterclaim of “up charging” is dismissed since they failed to provide any proof of a charge over the state’s rates (reviewed 50 claims and alleged $406, 328.73 in overbillings. Case will now go to pre-trial discovery. https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/utah/utdce/2:2025cv00111/154289/32/0.pdf?ts=1765634947

THE COURT HELD:

“Under this regulatory framework, an ambulance provider may not charge more than the

maximum base rate for an ambulance transfer and may not include costs for procedures or medications administered to patients in that base rate. Utah’s regulatory framework also recognizes that ambulance providers may incur additional costs during ambulance transports beyond what is covered by the maximum base rates. To account for these costs, an ambulance provider may charge for mileage, supplies, and medications as prescribed by law in addition to the base rate.

***

Utah law provides a rate for ambulance transport that is charged regardless of which HCPCS code is used. The statutory rate is what Gold Cross is entitled to charge. While Cigna claims that the use of certain HCPCS codes caused Cigna to incorrectly evaluate the claim under the respective insured’s policy, this is Cigna’s own mistake and it stems from Cigna’s failure to account for Utah’s statutory framework. Utah’s regulatory

framework allows ambulance providers to bill at the level of service dispatched, not the level of service rendered.

***

However, Cigna fails to appreciate that these duties [to pay state’s rates] were alleged to have been breached when Cigna inconsistently assigned different allowed amounts for the exact same HCPCS code and ambulance service. These duties were also allegedly breached when Cigna refused to consider Utah’s statutory framework when evaluating claims. As a result, Cigna has assigned different allowed amounts to identical HCPCS codes that are less than what are customary under Utah law. The parties can explore these duties and the alleged factual allegations in discovery. At the motion to dismiss stage, Gold Cross’ allegations are sufficiently pled. The court, therefore, denies Cigna’s motion to dismiss the claim.”

Legal lesson learned: Pre-trial discovery will focus on any evidence of “up charging: by the ambulance company.

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Chap. 13 – EMS, incl. Community Paramedicine, COVID-19

MI: DEF. IMPERSONATED EMT / FOOTBALL – CHILD PORN

On December 10, 2025, in United States of America v. Scott A. Lantzy, U.S. District Court Judge Thomas L. Ludington, United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Northern Division. Denied new trial for the convicted child pornographer. On October 26, 2021, a jury convicted Defendant on all five counts, and he was sentenced to 235 months of imprisonment, followed by a lifetime term of supervised release. On October 4, 2023, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed his conviction. Two years after his trial, that he had ineffective defense attorney. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-mied-1_19-cr-20167/pdf/USCOURTS-mied-1_19-cr-20167-2.pdf

THE COURT HELD:

“In 2018, Defendant Scott A. Lantzy impersonated an Emergency Medical Technician

(EMT) at a high school football game…. In so doing, Defendant pretended to assist a player who had broken his leg during that game and then followed him to the hospital…. Once at the hospital, Defendant ‘remained in the player’s’ room ‘for over two hours before he was identified as an imposter.’

***

As a part of the investigation into the EMT incident, law enforcement learned that before

that, Defendant had ‘developed a close relationship with another student.’ … Defendant gave the student gifts and ‘asked the student and his friend to house sit for several days.’…When the student agreed, Defendant gave him a camera and directed him to take pictures of what he and his friend did while housesitting…. Defendant then texted the student daily to see if he had taken pictures and responded to one picture that it was ‘nice to see that’ the student and his friend were clothed…. In addition to that line of text messages, Defendant discussed ‘sex with the student.’

***

In sum, Defendant’s Motion is time-barred. Defendant moved for a new trial over two years after his 14-day deadline under Criminal Rule 33. And he does not argue—nor could he—that this inordinate delay was the product of excusable neglect. As a result, Defendant’s Motion for a New Trial, ECF No. 125, will be denied.”

Legal lesson learned: Child pornography is a terrible offense; impersonating an EMT in pursuit of children is particularly offense.

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Chap. 13 – EMS, incl. Community Paramedicine, COVID-19

GA: AGITATED PT – VERSED / PRONE / DIED – QUAL IMMUN.

On December 1, 2025, in Yvonne M. West, individually and as administrator of the estate of Jamon West v. Dekalb County, Georgia, et al., the U.S. Court of Appeals for 11^th Circuit (Atlanta) held (3 to 0; unpublished opinion) that the trial court judge properly dismissed the lawsuit; no deliberate indifference to the needs of the patient and therefore firefighters have qualified immunity. While the fire department’s policy manual warns that patients with excited delirium “should never be oriented in a prone position” and should only be restrained with “soft medical restraints” there was no proof that EMS violated any clearly established law regarding deliberate indifference to medical need. On August 16, 2019, the patient was at his mother’s home, she called 911 when he suffered “an episode of behavioral crisis,” known as “excited delirium.” Firefighters held him prone in grass, administered Haldol and Versed, and when quieted down, police removed the handcuffs and soft restraints were used. When moving him to ambulance, he went into cardia arrest, then a coma and died few days later.

https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/unpub/files/202413197.pdf

THE COURT HELD:

“When Firefighters Winkler and Lakatos initially responded to the call, West appeared ‘highly agitated, hyperactive, confused, and not in control of his behavior.’ Firefighters Winkler and Lakatos restrained West ‘in a prone position, face down on the ground’ with the help of fire department Captain Ditmore and Firefighters Kelly, Van Wie, and Fleming, who arrived shortly after Winkler and Lakatos had started restraining West. ‘[F]our or five firefighters appl[ied] force to all four [of West’s] extremities and to his back.’ West’s mother cried for the firefighters to stop because her son couldn’t breathe with his face pressed in the grass. One of the firefighters told West’s mother ‘that she would be arrested if she did not back away.’ Captain Ditmore then ‘took command of the scene,’ directing Firefighter Payne to inject West with a ‘chemical restraint.’ Firefighter Payne gave West the maximum dosage permitted by county policy of two sedatives, Haldol and Versed.

***

After the firefighters had given West the sedatives, county police officers arrived. Captain Ditmore asked the police to handcuff West. Police Officers Lattimore and Williams handcuffed West’s hands behind his back with Captain Ditmore’s assistance. Captain Ditmore walked away to make a status report by radio. The officers left West ‘in a prone position with his hands cuffed behind his back,’ and West continued to be restrained ‘in this manner long enough for the sedatives to take effect.’ After Captain Ditmore finished his call and ‘observed that . . . West was calm,’ he ‘ordered the handcuffs removed and replaced with soft restraints.’ As the defendants began to transport West across his mother’s yard, ‘his respiratory rate dropped and he went into cardiac arrest.’ West was transported to the hospital, fell into a coma, and died a few days later. After performing an autopsy, the county medical examiner concluded that West had ‘died of ‘[d]elayed complications of cardiorespiratory arrest due [to] probable excited delirium and physical restraint,’ describing West’s death as a homicide.

***

DeKalb County officials conducted an internal investigation and determined that the first responders involved in West’s death had complied with county policy.

***

Turning to the specific practices at issue here, Ms. West does not actually allege that the use of prone restraints or behind-the-back handcuffing on individuals with excited delirium was ‘so obvious” that liability attaches for a single incident. See Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1329 (11th Cir. 2015) (rejecting failure-to-train claim where the complaint ‘d[id] not allege that the need for specialized training in the constitutional restrictions on the use of force when dealing with mentally ill citizens [wa]s ‘so obvious’ that the failure to provide such training amounts to deliberate indifference’). And even if she did, training in the proper use of restraints on individuals with excited delirium ‘falls far short of the kind of ‘obvious’ need for training that would support a finding of deliberate indifference to constitutional rights on the part of the [county].’ Canton, 489 U.S. at 396–97 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding no obvious need to train police in diagnosing mental illness)….

***

Because Captain Ditmore and Firefighter Payne did not violate any clearly established law regarding deliberate indifference to medical need, Ms. West cannot overcome their qualified immunity at the dismissal stage.”

Legal lesson learned: Review your EMS protocols concerning holding combative patient in prone position after administering Haldol and Versed

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Chap. 13 – EMS, incl. Community Paramedicine, COVID-19

IL: 330 LB PATIENT – GURNEY FALL – QUAL. IMMUNITY

On November 26, 2025, in Nancy Gabriel, Administrator of the Estate of James Gabriel v. Alton Memorial Hospital, et al., the Court of Appeals of Illinois, Fifth District held (3 to 0) that the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the defendants; there was no evidence of willful and wanton misconduct by EMS. On February 2, 2019, after ambulance transport from the hospital to a nursing home, the EMS lost control of the gurney and the strapped patient fell on his head, and died March 23, 2019. https://cases.justia.com/illinois/court-of-appeals-fifth-appellate-district/2025-5-24-0729-0.pdf?ts=1764692248

THE COURT HELD:

“The sidewalk leading to the ambulance entrance of the nursing facility had a right-hand turn. As Brooks and Bell approached the turn, they slowed down. As they began the turn, Bell saw that The sidewalk leading to the ambulance entrance of the nursing facility had a Bell saw that James had shifted his body, which tilted the gurney to the left. Bell attempted to balance the gurney and called out to Brooks for assistance. In Bell's deposition, he testified that James was ‘such a heavy guy, I can't do it by myself.

Brooks started to turn around, and "felt the [gurney's]bar twist in [his] hand.’ Brooks and Bell held onto the bars in a futile attempt to prevent the fall.

James fell face down onto the ground but avoided striking the concrete. He remained strapped into the gurney, and with effort, Brooks and Bell were slowly able to get the gurney back into an upright position. Following his fall, the nursing facility refused to accept James, and Brooks and Bell transported him back to St. Anthony's Hospital. James sustained a laceration above his left eye from the fall.

***

Alton Memorial can only be held liable for damages in this case pursuant to section

3.150(a) of the EMS Systems Act, which provides: ‘Any person, agency or governmental body certified, licensed or authorized pursuant to this Act … who in good faith provides emergency or non-emergency medical services …in the normal course of conducting their duties …shall not be civilly liable as a result of their acts or omissions in providing such services unless such acts or omissions … constitute willful and wanton misconduct.” 210 ILCS 50/3.150(a).

***

We find that summary judgment was appropriate where the pleadings, depositions and any admissions and/or affidavits on file, when viewed in the light most favorable to Nancy, established that there was no genuine issue of material fact to support an allegation of willful and wanton misconduct on behalf of Alton Memorial’s ambulance crew.”

Legal lesson learned: Moving a 330 pound patient is particularly challenging; no liability for negligent conduct that is not deemed willful and wanton misconduct.

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Chap. 15 – Mental Health, incl. CISM, Peer Support, Pet Therapy

IL: CHICAGO FD – PASSED MENTAL FITNESS FOR DUTY

On December 3, 2025, in Lee Ann McKay v. Nicole Patino, et al., U.S. District Court Judge Jorge L. Alonso, United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division, dismissed the plaintiff’s pro se [no attorney] lawsuit. There were no constitutional rights violated when in May 2024 two Office of Inspector General investigators came to her home, unannounced, to interview her about her January 2024 complain of inferior bathroom facilities available to women in certain firehouses. Likewise, there was no violation of her constitutional rights when Dr. Nicole Patino, Chief Medical Director for the City of Chicago, Office of Public Safety Administration on July 11, 2024 took her blood pressure, or when she was ordered by Dr. Patino to take a mental capacity examination with a psychologist (July 15 tests, and August 2024, psychologist found her fit for duty); or to take pulmonary function test on December 31, 2024. https://public.fastcase.com/Jhe1Qn%2BmJndQYQU6z%2FeNm%2BcFVCy5tJw2gy1zfbpkLaze9U67QqLJTV5FE2cJQCoqnSyWDfbWSo3ic5o1p0zHzyDw8vgxY%2BBok5izm2ejH6U%3D?utm_medium=email&_hsenc=p2ANqtz--bkYiy1pyPlPSsVe74xwULcEQroRrEa3UI3GrVMXxBGgBl78iSBqXQuZMV2NG07-VaF6HXpA1gGzG-xJKwbOenCq2wOg&_hsmi=226712652&utm_content=226712652&utm_source=hs_email

THE COURT HELD:

“To the extent Plaintiff complains of [OIG investigators] Lauder and Arellano showing up to her house or of any psychological test she was given, she fails to state a claim of a constitutional violation.

***

Dr. Patino is entitled to qualified immunity on the issue of whether the pulmonary function testing violated the Fourth Amendment

***

It follows that Dr. Marder [pulmonary function test] and any other defendant alleged to have participated in the testing is likewise protected by qualified immunity from any Fourth Amendment claim.

***

Plaintiff's pro se status and the surplusage in Plaintiff's complaint counsel against dismissal with prejudice at this point. As the Court has taken pains to recount in some detail above, Plaintiff's allegations go far beyond what is necessary to assert a Fourth Amendment claim. Although she does not rely on any other legal theory in her response briefs, the Court cannot say for certain whether there is not some potentially viable claim within the scope of the events described in her complaint that she might be able to plausibly state in an amended complaint. Therefore, the Court will grant Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint, if she can do so in compliance with the principles set forth in this Order and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”

Legal lesson learned: Qualified immunity protects Fire Department’s physicians conducting fitness for duty exams.

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File: Chap. 16 – Discipline, incl. Code of Ethics, Social Media, Hazing

CA: KOBE BRYANT CRASH – PHOTOS – NO RETALIATION

On December 23, 2025, in Brian Jordan v. County of Los Angeles, the California Court of Appeals, Second District, Third Division held (3 to 0, unpublished decision) that trial court properly dismissed the former Captain’s lawsuit for retaliation. Jordan responded to the scene of the Jan. 26, 2020 helicopter crash that killed NBA star Kobe Bryant, his daughter, Christopher Chester’s wife and daughter, among others. He was ordered to take photos of the scene. He alleged that he was later told to lie about taking those photos. He further alleged that when he refused to lie, the County retaliated against him by failing to pay for his legal representation in an action brought by the crash victims’ families (November 2021 deposition and August 2022 trial) and by denying him a retirement badge. https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/nonpub/B333041.PDF

THE COURT HELD:

“A superior officer, Anthony Marrone, ordered Jordan, in the scope of Jordan’s work as a safety officer for the LACFD, to photograph the crash site. Jordan did so. An unnamed superior officer later told Jordan to delete all photos he had taken, and he complied. According to the complaint, at an unspecified later date, ‘defendants’ told Jordan to claim he had not taken any pictures. He refused to do so.

***

On December 2, 2020, Jordan applied for disability retirement. On December 3, he received a Notice of Intent to Terminate (Notice) from the LACFD. The Notice was based on the claim that Jordan had taken and disseminated photos of the crash site without authorization.

***

In May 2021, Christopher Chester named Jordan as a defendant in his lawsuit concerning the crash photographs. Jordan retained an attorney to represent him in the matter. The County, through Deputy Fire Chief William McCloud, offered to pay for Jordan’s legal defense, but [Jordan alleges] only if he was willing to change lawyers and testify that he did not take any pictures at the crash site. Jordan rejected the County’s offer through his attorney.

***

Thus, the only employment action at issue is the Notice. However, the County’s issuance of the Notice in December 2020 could not be retaliation for Jordan’s deposition and trial

testimony which did not take place until November 2021 and August 2022, respectively…. However, Jordan’s government claim, which he attached to the

second amended complaint, indicates that this conversation occurred after he was named as a defendant in the Chester action in May 2021, several months after the County issued the Notice…. it is apparent on the face of the complaint that there could be no causal link between the protected activity and the actionable alleged retaliatory conduct.”

Legal lesson learned: If ever ordered to destroy photos or other evidence, or to lie about your on duty conduct, immediately report it to a senior supervisor or prosecutor.

Note: For example, see Ohio Revised Code – Whistleblower statute:

Section 4113.52 | Reporting violations by state and local officials and employees

https://codes.ohio.gov/ohio-revised-code/section-4113.52

“(f) If a person becomes aware in the course of the person's employment of a violation of any state or federal statute or any ordinance or regulation of a political subdivision that the person's employer has authority to correct, and the person reasonably believes that the violation is a criminal offense that is likely to cause an imminent risk of physical harm to persons or a hazard to public health or safety, a felony, or an improper solicitation for a contribution, the person orally shall notify the person's supervisor or other responsible officer of the person's employer of the violation and subsequently shall file with that supervisor or officer a written report that provides sufficient detail to identify and describe the violation. If the employer does not correct the violation or make a reasonable and good faith effort to correct the violation within twenty-four hours after the oral notification or the receipt of the report, whichever is earlier, the person may file a written report that provides sufficient detail to identify and describe the violation with the prosecuting authority of the county or municipal corporation where the violation occurred, with a peace officer, with the inspector general if the violation is within the inspector general's jurisdiction, with the auditor of state's fraud-reporting system under section 117.103 of the Revised Code if applicable, or with any other appropriate public official or agency that has regulatory authority over the employer and the industry, trade, or business in which the employer is engaged.”

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File: Chap. 16 – Discipline, incl. Code of Ethics, Social Media, Hazing

FEMA: 13-DAY SUSP – PROFANITY – TENSION FEMALES

On December 22, 2025, in Karl Rabenhorst v. Kristi L. Noem, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Court of Appeals for Seventh Circuit (Chicago) held (3 to 0) that the DHS was properly granted summary judgment; the former FEMA employee was suspended for 13 days and also removed from deployment in Puerto Rice in October 2017 because of his misconduct. https://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/24-1297/24-1297-2025-12-22.pdf?ts=1766437242

THE COURT HELD:

“Rabenhorst was deployed to Puerto Rico in October 2017 in the wake of Hurricane Maria. Based on his military aviation and air operations experience, Rabenhorst was assigned to help oversee Puerto Rico air operations related to the disaster relief effort, including the airlifting of emergency aid to the island and medical evacuations from the island. In that capacity, Rabenhorst was working with female FEMA employees in their twenties who, according to him, knew nothing about air operations and management. Tensions arose between Rabenhorst and his female coworkers, and a number of the women became uncomfortable working with him. During staff meetings, Rabenhorst reportedly used profanity, treated his female coworkers and supervisors with disrespect, and on one occasion referred to one or more of female colleagues as ‘sorority girls’ and remarked as to one of them that he had ‘paddled the butts of daughters who were older than her.’ Ultimately, approximately one month after Rabenhorst arrived in Puerto Rico, Josie Arcurio, the FEMA official serving as chief of staff for the relief effort, decided to remove him from the operation for cause, in view of his treatment of co-workers, and had him escorted out of the air operations branch in the view of other employees.

***

There was nothing suggesting that O’Leary [his Supervisor] may have harbored a retaliatory animus; nothing indicating that similarly-situated employees were treated more leniently than Rabenhorst; and nothing suggesting that O’Leary’s stated reasons for disciplining Rabenhorst were pretextual.”

Legal lesson learned: Inappropriate comments can lead to discipline.

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Chap. 16 – Discipline, incl. Code of Ethics, Social Media, Hazing

IL: FF CONVICTED – ENTERED FALSE HRS 2 YRS - $17,000

On December 15, 2025, in The People of the State of Illinois v. Greg Algrim, the Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District held (3 to 0) that the firefighter, with 22 years on the job, was properly convicted in bench trial of 19 counts of theft, which occurred between August 2, 2019, and September 10, 2021. The firefighter had administrator privileges with the scheduling software, and would add a false day that he worked a shift, and then after he was paid by direct deposit he would delete the false entry. The trial court sentenced him to three years’ probation and ordered him to pay $17,211.52 in restitution. https://cases.justia.com/illinois/court-of-appeals-second-appellate-district/2025-2-24-0565.pdf?ts=1765847849

THE COURT HELD:

“Defendant worked as a firefighter for the Elburn and Countryside Fire Protection District (District) until September 20, 2021, when he was placed on paid administrative leave pending the District’s inquiry into discrepancies between the hours he had been paid for and the hours he had actually worked. The police interviewed defendant on September 30, 2021, and he subsequently resigned on November 25, 2021.

On July 20, 2022, a grand jury indicted defendant on 20 counts of theft that occurred between August 2, 2019, and September 10, 2021….. Defendant waived his right to a jury trial, and a bench trial was held over the course of four days in 2024: February 1 and 2, March 21, and April 9.

***

The State first called Merry Morris, who had worked as a financial specialist for the District for nearly 12 years. In that role, Morris processed payroll for the District. When asked to describe her role in the payroll process, Morris stated:

“Once I was advised that the timecards had been looked at [by supervisors], then I

would pull the schedule from the scheduling software and download that into an Excel spreadsheet, and then I would look over the spreadsheet for any obvious anomalies or errors, and then that was downloaded into the payroll company’s software so that checks could be written.”

Defendant was one of three employees who had administrator privileges with the scheduling software. Morris said she had no way to check whether employees worked the number of hours listed; she “wasn’t there, so [she] had no means of doing that.” Employees were paid every other Friday and were required to report their hours by Monday morning preceding a payday. The hours reported by employees had to be approved by their “officers.” All payments were made by direct deposit.

***

[Assistant Fire Chief] Huneke testified that, on September 10, 2021, defendant informed him that an employee of the District had not received overtime pay for a particular day. When Huneke accessed the scheduling software to investigate the issue, he happened to notice that defendant appeared on the schedule as a fourth medic on the day in question. Huneke explained that, typically, only three medics were assigned to each ambulance. Huneke verified that defendant received pay for working that day. Huneke then texted defendant to ask if he had been paid for working that day. Defendant replied that he was unsure whether he had been paid, but if he had, it was a mistake and the money should be deducted from his next paycheck. Huneke notified Joe Cluchey, the fire chief at the time, of defendant’s payroll discrepancy. Cluchey instructed Huneke to examine the entire payroll for other discrepancies. Huneke found two additional payroll discrepancies, both for wages paid to defendant. Huneke did not find discrepancies for any other employee.

***

The log for the scheduling software showed that, on July 29 at 7:45 a.m., defendant signed into the scheduling software. At 7:57 a.m., defendant added himself to the schedule as a medic for voluntary overtime from 7 a.m. on July 24 to 7 a.m. on July 25. Payroll processing occurred the following Monday, July 29. On August 2, defendant signed into the scheduling software and deleted the 24-hour overtime shift that he had added. Huneke went on to testify about other discrepancies in the reports that inflated defendant’s pay. Huneke stated that his investigation found no discrepancies affecting other employees.”

Legal lesson learned: Payroll software should reflect all entries and deletions; and should be audited at least each year by auditing entity.

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Chap. 16 – Discipline, incl. Code of Ethics, Social Media, Hazing

NY: FDNY – LOST COVID RELIGIOUS APPEAL – NO CASE

On December 17, 2025, In The Matter of Christopher Hughes v. New York City Fire Department, et al., the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department held (4 to 0) that the trial court judge decision reinstating the firefighter is reversed; NYFD properly fired the plaintiff on July 27, 2022 after denying his religious accommodation request. https://law.justia.com/cases/new-york/appellate-division-second-department/2025/2024-01225.html

THE COURT HELD:

“The petitioner was a firefighter with the New York City Fire Department (hereinafter the FDNY). By order dated October 20, 2021, the New York City Commissioner of Health and Mental Hygiene issued a mandate requiring all City employees, among others, to submit proof that they had received at least one dose of a COVID-19 vaccine by October 29, 2021 (hereinafter the vaccine mandate). On November 1, 2021, the petitioner was placed on leave, without pay, since he failed to submit proof of vaccination or request a reasonable accommodation by the specified deadline.

On November 5, 2021, the petitioner submitted a request to the FDNY's Equal Employment Opportunity Office for a reasonable accommodation from the vaccine mandate based on his religion, which was denied on December 8, 2021. The petitioner then appealed to the City of New York Reasonable Accommodation Appeals Panel (hereinafter the Panel). In a determination dated July 11, 2022, the Panel upheld the FDNY's denial of the petitioner's request for a reasonable accommodation. The FDNY then terminated the petitioner's employment on July 27, 2022.

***

Supreme Court, Kings County (Joy F. Campanelli, J), dated October 18, 2023 … granted the petition, in effect, annulled the determination dated July 11, 2022, directed the New York City Fire Department and the City of New York to reinstate the petitioner to his position as a firefighter with a reasonable accommodation from the vaccine mandate and back pay, and directed that the petitioner was entitled to an award of attorneys' fees.

***

The [FDNY] provided information on the process for reviewing accommodation requests related to the vaccine mandate and informed employees on how to appeal request denials. The record demonstrates that the petitioner availed himself of this process. Moreover, the record shows that there were multiple communications between the petitioner, the FDNY, and the Panel regarding the petitioner's request. The petitioner "failed to establish that, under the unique circumstances present at the time of the vaccine mandate, the NYCHRL required a more robust or individual dialogue" (Matter of Smith v New York City Fire Dept., 239 AD3d at 872).”

Legal lesson learned: The Supreme Court of New York has repeatedly upheld termination decisions after firefighters has appealed to the City of New York Reasonable Accommodation Appeals Panel.

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