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JUNE 2026 – FIRE & EMS LAW NEWSLETTER
- 2 days ago
- 57 min read
[NEWSLETTER IS NOT PROVIDING LEGAL ADVICE.]
24 RECENT CASE REVIEWS
UPDATING: 2017: TEXTBOOK: FIRE SERVICE LAW (Second Edition; 2017)
(ISBN 978-1-4786-3397-6); Waveland Press: http://www.waveland.com/browse.php?t=708
Chap. 1 – American Legal System, incl. Fire Codes, Investigations, Arson
Legal lesson learned: No construction permit will be issued until “Oak Run develops an emergency-services-and-response plan in consultation with local authorities, provide fire and emergency responders with training and proper firefighting equipment to enable them to respond to emergency situations.”
Legal lesson learned: Tax dollars to support paid FD; public safety is “among the most important responsibilities.”
Legal lesson learned: There was probable cause to arrest Willey with misconduct at an emergency, making false alarms, and disorderly conduct; even if charges later dropped by prosecutor.
Legal lesson learned: State prison was properly denied habeas corpus by federal district court judge. Trial judge wisely appointed “standby counsel” even if the defendant represented himself and did closing argument.
Chap. 2 – Line Of Duty Death / Safety
Legal lesson learned: Important decision; driver is held responsible for killing a firefighter at a busy accident scene.
Legal lesson learned: The defendant received a fair trial, with uniformed firefighters in attendance.
Legal lesson learned: Unfortunate that the state has two different statutes of limitations for a family of filing for work comp and line of duty death benefits.
Chap. 3 – Homeland Security, incl. Active Shooter, Cybersecurity, Immigration
Legal lesson learned: 6th Circuit decision very helpful great precedence for other courts reviewing U.S. Government appeals of short sentences of terrorists.
Chap. 4 – Incident Command, incl. Training, Drones, Communications
Legal lesson learned: If your local power company has slow response to Priority 1 calls, invite them to present at meeting of FDs; if no improvement, consider contacting your state utility agency.
Chap. 5 – Emergency Vehicle Operations
Chap. 6 – Employment Litigation, incl. Work Comp., Age, Vet Rights
Legal lesson learned: Background checks are important; include both positive and negative feedback from prior FD employers.
Chap. 7 – Sexual Harassment, incl. Pregnancy Discrimination, Gay Rights
Legal lesson learned: A Fire Chief was required to recuse himself from discipline concerning his brother, his son and his niece; but had legal right to express concern to Town about gender discrimination to wars his niece.
Legal lesson learned: Outside firm independently selected three lead candidates for Fire Chief position, and plaintiff did not make the cut.
Chap. 8 – Race / National Origin Discrimination
Legal lesson learned: Threats of violence cannot be tolerated, without regard to the race of the offender.
Chap. 9 – Americans With Disabilities Act
Legal lesson learned: Under ADA, requests by an injured employee for a reasonable extension of recovery time can be considered a ADA-protected right; case will proceed with pre-trial discovery.
Chap. 10 – Family Medical Leave Act
Chap. 11 – Fair Labor Standards Act
Legal lesson learned: Case will now proceed to pre-trial discovery. FLSA class actions can include both firefighters, Captains and other non-exempt officers.
Chap. 12 – Drug-Free Workplace, inc. Recovery
Chap. 13 – EMS, incl. Community Paramedicine, COVID-19
Legal lesson learned: The Tennessee Public Protection Act protects whistleblowers; case will now proceed to pre-trial discovery; a jury may ultimately reward Medic with substantial damages.
Legal lesson learned: Novel decision – no immunity for an injury arising out of accident involving a motor vehicle (ambulance).
Legal lesson learned: The City was very generous in offering numerous positions that avoided patient contact.
Legal lesson learned: Drug immunity statutes are designed to encourage third parties to call 911; Idaho’s statute only applies if the person is suffering a drug-related emergency.
Legal lesson learned: EMS Medical Directors have the “absolute right” to designate appropriate level of EMS personnel.
Chap. 14 – Physical & Medical Fitness, incl. Heart Health
Chap. 15 – Mental Health, incl. CISM, Peer Support, Pet Therapy
Legal lesson learned: The ADA does not require an employer to allow use of proscribed marijuana for an emergency responder.
Chap. 16 – Discipline, incl. Code of Ethics, Social Media, Hazing
Legal lesson learned: Court made it clear that comments that can be viewed as “abusive or violent behavior” can lead to termination.
Legal lesson learned: Absence without leave can result in termination; it is a serious offense.
Chap. 17 – Arbitration, incl. Mediation, Labor Relations
Legal lesson learned: Union Secretary protected from retaliation under First Amendment if court finds he communicated to Commissioners as a citizen on a matter of public concern.
Chap. 18 – Legislation, incl. Public Records
24 cases have been added to:
LIBRARY RECENT CASE SUMMARIES
1,661 CASES (2018 – Present)
Posted online, UC Libraries, Scholar@UC: https://doi.org/10.7945/j6c2-q930
________________________________________________________________________
FULL CASE REVIEWS
Chap. 1 – American Legal System, incl. Fire Codes, Investigations, Arson
OH: SOLAR PROJECT - 6,000 ACRES - NFPA / FD EQUIP
On May 26, 2026, In re Application of Oak Run Solar Project, L.L.C., the Ohio Supreme Court held (4 to 3) that the project may proceed, over the objections of 3 Townships and County, after the developers submit to the State Board photographic simulations or an artist’s pictorial sketches of the proposed facility substations. The Court, however, held that the safety-related details can be properly worked out in the future prior to start of construction. THE COURT WROTE: “And there appears to be no dispute that there is no effective way to extinguish a lithium-ion-battery fire and that after a fire starts, the only recourse is to try to prevent the fire from spreading. In view of these risks, the local governments assert that the board should not have approved the project without requiring Oak Run to provide for measures to prevent the spread of fire and the release of fumes into the community and that the board should have been more thorough in evaluating the availability of water supplies to contain a fire once it starts….
Oak Run will develop an emergency-services-and-response plan in consultation with local authorities, provide fire and emergency responders with training and proper firefighting equipment to enable them to respond to emergency situations…. We think the BESS’s [Battery Energy Storage System] ultimate compliance with the National Fire Protection Association’s Standard for the Installation of Stationary Energy Storage Systems is a better safeguard than this court’s collective armchair firefighting expertise.” https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2026/2026-Ohio-1849.pdf
THE COURT HELD:
“The facility will sit on about 4,400 acres of privately owned land within an approximate 6,050-acre project area…. The facility will include an 800 megawatt (‘MW’) solar-powered electric-generating facility, a 300 MW alternating-current battery-energy storage system (‘BESS’) comprised of two 150 MW facilities, and two 3.45-mile-long transmission lines…. approximately 328 battery containers, along with 82 inverters and 82 transformers.
***
The BESS will conform to the National Fire Protection Association’s Standard for the Installation of Stationary Energy Storage Systems, and a fire-protection engineer will review the fire-protection design of the facility. Oak Run will develop an emergency-services-and-response plan in consultation with local authorities, provide fire and emergency responders with training and proper firefighting equipment to enable them to respond to emergency situations at the BESS, and collaborate with local authorities to ensure that sufficient water resources and a long-term water supply are available for any firefighting needs, in accordance with the applicable fire code.”
Legal lesson learned: No construction permit will be issued until “Oak Run develops an emergency-services-and-response plan in consultation with local authorities, provide fire and emergency responders with training and proper firefighting equipment to enable them to respond to emergency situations.”
Chap. 1 – American Legal System, incl. Fire Codes, Investigations, Arson
NC: OUTER BANKS - LODGING TAXES / PAID FIRE DEPT
On May 22, 2026, in Gerald Constanzo, et al. v. Currituck County North Carolina, et al, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held (7 to 0) that hotel room occupancy tax revenues, which North Carolina legislature restricts spending only on “promot[ing] travel and tourism” as well as “tourism-related expenditures,” can be spent on improving public safety services for heavily: “For several annual budget cycles, the County, through the Board of Commissioners, has expended occupancy tax revenues on various public safety services. These costs included law enforcement personnel and equipment, emergency medical services personnel, a paid fire district (instead of an all-volunteer fire response service), beach lifeguards, and repairing and maintaining coastal roads…. The County could––and here, did–– reasonably conclude that the challenged public safety spending is tourism-related because tourists are not likely to visit Currituck if they believe it is unsafe and because substantial tourism-related population changes greatly increase the demand for public safety services in the area and at a year-round cost.” https://cases.justia.com/north-carolina/supreme-court/2026-101pa24.pdf?ts=1779464497
THE COURT HELD:
“Defendant Currituck County, through its Board of Commissioners, decided to spend occupancy tax revenues on certain public safety services—including law enforcement, emergency medical services, and fire response, predominately tied to the heavily touristed beach destination of Corolla along the northern Outer Banks. In the Commission’s view, these expenditures are tourism-related because Currituck County’s population doubles during peak season and the County incurs substantial year-round costs to provide adequate public safety services during that period. The Commissioners believe that tourists and business travelers visit the County because it has a reputation for being safe and family-friendly and that tourists would be deterred from visiting the County if it were unable to provide sufficient police, fire, and emergency response services to protect them during their visit.
***
Plaintiffs are [hotel and other ] property owners who collect and remit occupancy tax proceeds to Currituck County and a civic association whose members include other such property owners (collectively, the property owners)…. They sought a declaratory judgment to that effect and an injunction prohibiting the County from making such expenditures…. They argue that the definition of ‘tourism-related expenditures’ encompasses only literal tourist attractions, such as Beaufort’s pirate invasion weekend, Morehead City’s Big Rock fishing tournament, Kitty Hawk’s aviation history museum, and Carolina Beach’s beach music festival.
***
Protecting public safety is among the most important responsibilities North
Carolinians entrust to their democratically elected officials. Doing so while promoting
economic growth and fairly allocating the tax burden across the community is an
ongoing challenge for many elected officials.
***
Existing services were also, in the Commissioners’ view, insufficient to support
the tourist population. Again, the County’s 28,000 year-round population doubles to
about 60,000 during tourist season when most tourists flock to Corolla. Commissioners testified that protecting the tourist population requires significantly more public safety personnel than the County would have otherwise. More people means a greater risk of accidents, drownings, heatstrokes, physical altercations, and other safety risks. As one commissioner put it, ‘[W]e have to have more [s]heriffs or EMS because of the influx of the tourists on our county.’”
Legal lesson learned: Tax dollars to support paid FD; public safety is “among the most important responsibilities.”
Chap. 1 – American Legal System, incl. Fire Codes, Investigations, Arson
OH: FIRE / PUSHED FF, THEN CALLED 911 – PROB CAUSE
On May 20, 2026, in Paula Willey v. Springfield Township, et al., the Court of Appeals of Ohio, Ninth District, Summit County, held (3 to 0) that trial court properly granted summary judgment to police and firefighters; there was probable cause to arrest Willey with misconduct at an emergency in violation of R.C. 2917.13, making false alarms in violation of R.C. 2917.32, and disorderly conduct in violation of R.C. 2917.11, even though the charges were dismissed several months later. THE COURT WROTE: “Willey failed to point to any evidence suggesting the police officers did not have probable cause to arrest her for misconduct at an emergency, making false alarms, and disorderly conduct. Willey did not dispute that several witnesses informed officers that Willey was yelling and screaming at firefighters, had ‘put hands on the firefighter,’ and had pushed him twice while he was on duty at the scene of a fire. Sergeant London testified that Chief Wincik had informed him the fire department was leaving the scene due to an altercation which involved Willey. Both Sergeant London and Officer Chapman testified Willey consistently yelled at them despite being asked to lower her voice and remain calm. Willey did not point to any evidence to dispute this testimony. Finally, Willey did not testify that she called 9-1-1 to report an emergency. Rather, she testified she called 9-1-1 for the purpose of speaking to the officer's supervisor despite having been informed that a supervisor was not available.” https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/9/2026/2026-Ohio-1842.pdf
THE COURT HELD:
“In the early evening hours of June 22, 2022, a fire started at the primary residence.
[Leann] Burks was at home with her three children, five dogs, and three cats. The Springfield Township Fire Department responded. The home was a total loss…. Willey, Burks’ mother, resided in a separate structure on the property, identified by the parties as
a mother-in-law suite….
***
Although Willey was advised of the fire, she did not arrive at the property until
around 12:30 a.m. Nonetheless, firefighters were still on scene addressing the fire. After Willey arrived, an altercation occurred between Willey and Burks, [Chase]Whipp, a number of Burks’ friends (Burrell, Abigail Christian, and David Christian), and a firefighter.
***
Sergeant London testified Willey appeared ‘pretty intoxicated[.]’ He stated he smelled the odor of alcoholic beverage come from Willey's person and that she displayed irrational behavior, was argumentative, and had a hard time following directions. Officer Chapman also testified that he smelled an odor of alcohol.
***
Both Sergeant London and Officer Chapman testified that Willey called 9-1-1 and requested other officers to come to the scene while they were talking to her. A review of the officers' body camera footage shows officers had been on the scene for more than forty-five minutes and had already taken Willey's witness statement before Willey made the call. Sergeant London testified he told Willey to hang up the phone and then placed her in handcuffs and arrested her for misuse of 9-1-1 for reporting an emergency. Officer Chapman also testified that Willey was charged with misuse of 9-1-1 due to calling the emergency line while the officers were already on scene. Sergeant London testified Willey was arrested for disorderly conduct for ‘raising her voice causing an annoyance alarm at the emergency scene.’ He stated she was arrested for misconduct at emergency because ‘Firefighters were doing their job and they were leaving because of her conduct.’ Sergeant London testified he did not know when or why the charges were dismissed. Officer Chapman testified he did not know why the charges were dismissed.”
Legal lesson learned: There was probable cause to arrest Willey with misconduct at an emergency, making false alarms, and disorderly conduct; even if charges later dropped by prosecutor.
Chap. 1 – American Legal System, incl. Fire Codes, Investigations, Arson
MI: ARSON – DROP ATTY / “STANDBY” ATTY – 7 YRS PRISON
On May 20, 2026, in Steve Ellis Karacson v. David Shaver, Warden, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (Cincinnati) held that the prisoner serving seven years in Michigan state prison was properly denied habeas corpus by federal district court judge. His conviction by a jury was affirmed on appeal by the Michigan Court of Appeals, which held that the Michigan state court judge properly warned the defendant of danger of dropping his second appointed attorney on the morning of trial. The Michigan judge also wisely had the second attorney serve as “standby counsel” throughout the trial; the defendant questioned jurors and made his own closing argument. THE COURT WROTE: “Indeed, the attorney had ably represented Karacson before trial by negotiating a bond reduction and rejecting the state’s plea offers…. The attorney was still Karacson’s standby counsel, and he continued to aid Karacson throughout trial even though Karacson was representing himself. He even introduced himself to the jury pool as someone who would be “assisting” Karacson, and the trial court called the attorney a ‘kind of legal advisor.’ https://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/25-1089/25-1089-2026-05-20.pdf?ts=1779309039
THE COURT HELD:
“In 2017, a fire devastated Steve Karacson’s house. It took firefighters two or three hours
to put out the flames. The next day, investigators entered the house with an arson dog and
detected the smell of gasoline. They also determined that the fire had multiple origin points inside the house. After reviewing this evidence and eliminating other possible causes, they concluded the fire was an act of arson. Karacson had fire insurance, so the investigation focused on him.
Karacson told investigators he wasn’t home on the night of the fire. He claimed instead
that he’d traveled to Kentucky two days before the fire and returned the morning after the fire. But location data from his cell phone said otherwise. The morning before the fire, Karacson’s phone connected to towers along a route heading north from Kentucky back to Michigan. And less than an hour before the fire, his phone pinged a tower near his house. Police officers also found a receipt in Karacson’s wallet showing that, just hours before the fire, he had bought a five-gallon gas can and a pair of utility gloves from a Michigan hardware store. So Michigan charged Karacson with arson and insurance fraud.
***
Karacson later changed his story to say that he was at a friend’s house in Michigan the night of the fire. But he didn’t want the police to ask that friend any questions, so it’s unclear how anyone could have confirmed his story.
***
The jury convicted Karacson on all counts. Although his conviction carried a possible
life sentence, the trial court opted for a more lenient punishment. It reasoned that Karacson hadn’t hurt anyone, harmed anyone else’s property, or received any insurance money. The court therefore sentenced him to only seven years in prison.”
Legal lesson learned: State prisoner was properly denied habeas corpus by federal district court judge. Trial judge wisely appointed “standby counsel” even if the defendant represented himself and did closing argument.
Note: Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) on April 24, 1966, in response to the Oklahoma City bombing; it limits federal judges granting state prisoners petitions for federal habeas release. “So to obtain relief under AEDPA, Karacson must show that the Michigan court’s decision was (1) “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or (2) “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence” before the state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(2).
Chap. 2 – Line Of Duty Death / Safety
OH: SPEEDING IN MVA AREA – KILLED FF – 15 YRS/LIFE
On May 29, 2026, in The State of Ohio v. Leander Bissell, the Supreme Court of Ohio held (7 to 0) that conviction for felony-murder after bench trial (no jury) is affirmed; the defendant must serve 15 years to life for the crimes of felonious assault, felony murder, involuntary manslaughter, aggravated vehicular homicide, failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer, and failure to stop after an accident. The Court reversed the Ohio Eight District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County) which held (2 to 1) there was insufficient evidence of driver’s intent to harm. On November 19, 2022, at approximately 8:15 p.m., Engine Company 22 of the City of Cleveland Division of Fire received an emergency dispatch for a vehicle crash on Interstate 90, a four-lane highway, near the exit of Martin Luther King Boulevard. One vehicle had flipped over onto its top on the left shoulder of the highway, blocking a part of the far-left high-speed lane. Firefighter Johnny Tetrick was struck and killed, picking up debris from the highway, when the defendant sped by police cars at 49 mph, throwing Tetrick 102.5 feet, and then fled the scene. THE COURT WROTE: The Eighth District’s reasoning is wrong. The Eighth District reasoned that criminal knowledge requires an offender’s ‘intention that a result will occur,’ id., but that is not so. ‘A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is aware that the person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature.’ (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2901.22(B).
Therefore, an offender’s purpose or intention to cause a result is not required when
determining an offender’s knowledge, ‘only an awareness of the probable
consequences of one’s actions.’” https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2026/2026-Ohio-1965.pdf
THE COURT HELD:
“Judge Celebrezze [Court of Appeals] dissented from the majority opinion. According
to Judge Celebrezze, Bissell’s conduct in speeding through an area of stopped
traffic and a heavy first-responder presence established sufficient evidence that
Bissell acted knowingly when he hit Tetrick in the roadway because it was probable
that Bissell’s conduct would cause physical harm…. (Celebrezze, J.,
dissenting). With respect to the failure-to-comply charge, Judge Celebrezze
reasoned that the parked police vehicles with flashing lights on the highway served
as an order or direction from police officers…. (Celebrezze, J., dissenting).
***
Considering the evidence in this case in the light most favorable to
the State, sufficient evidence exists to establish that Bissell was aware that his
conduct would probably cause serious physical harm to a bystander or first
responder like Tetrick for purposes of Bissell’s felony-murder conviction.”
Legal lesson learned: Important decision; driver is held responsible for killing a firefighter at a busy accident scene.
Chap. 2 – Line Of Duty Death / Safety
CA: DEF. SHOT & KILLED CAPT – UNIFORMED FFs AT TRIAL
On May 29, 2026, in The People v. Robert Alston Sommerville, the California Court of Appeals, Third District, San Joaquin held (3 to 0) the conviction was affirmed. Somerville was found guilty on Feb. 14, 2023, by a jury of the shooting death of 47-year-old Stockton Fire Capt. Vidal “Max” Fortuna; he was sentenced to 15 years to life in prison. On January 31, 2022, at 4:45 am, a fire department dispatcher received multiple calls regarding a fire near the Crosstown Freeway and Aurora Street in Stockton. The dispatcher instructed Engine 2 to respond and described it as an outdoor fire. A few minutes later, an alarm company called the dispatcher to report an audible alarm at a commercial building at an address on South Aurora Street. The dispatcher then updated Engine 2 on the building alarm and location. Robert Somerville was living in his commercial building in Stockton; not realizing there was a fire outside and firefighters were trying to get in, defendant grabbed his gun, announced he had a firearm, told the perceived intruders to move away, and shot ‘a couple rounds at the door.’ Captain Max Fortuna (captain) was struck and died. THE COURT WROTE: “After the jury rendered its verdict, defendant filed a motion for new trial. Among other things, he argued that the uniformed firefighter presence denied him a fair trial, claiming there were over 25 uniformed firefighters in the courtroom at times and the hallway was ‘packed with clusters of firefighters in uniform’ in the morning and after lunch. At the hearing on the motion, defendant also argued that ‘[E]ngine 2 [had] circled this courthouse almost every day during the lunch hour.’ The court denied the motion, citing (1) its records on the number of uniformed firefighters in the courtroom; (2) the fact that the jury went to the jury room rather than the hallway during breaks; (3) the fact that it did not witness or become aware of any intimidating conduct; (4) the fact that the jury never saw more uniformed firefighters than civilians; (5) the right of firefighters to watch the trial just like any member of the public; and (6) the jurors’ agreement during voir dire not be influenced by hearing a firefighter case or having firefighters in the audience. *** Defendant contends the presence of uniformed firefighters in the courtroom and the circling of Engine 2 during the lunch hour denied him a fair trial. In support, he cites the number of firefighters in the hallway in the morning and at lunch and the many media requests indicating the ‘local community’s close and strong relationship with the firefighters.’ We are not persuaded.*** Here, the trial court acted within its discretion. At the beginning and end of trial, the court instructed the jury against letting bias influence its decision, and both parties reinforced that instruction in closing arguments. The court noted it never saw more uniformed firefighters than civilians in the courtroom, and that observation does not conflict with counsel’s statements on the record. And counsel never objected to firefighter presence in the hallways.”
THE COURT HELD:
“Engine 2 arrived carrying three firefighters – the driver, a probationary firefighter,
and captain. After opening the outer property gate with a saw, probationary firefighter
started spraying the area. Captain told them they needed to get inside the building, so he
and driver went to a roll-up door and started cutting into the padlocks with a saw and an
angle grinder.
Meanwhile, inside the building, defendant was asleep in his room. One of his
employees (employee) was also inside the building sleeping in a trailer. Defendant woke
to the sound of cutting noises in the back of the building that made him think someone
was trying to break in. He didn’t know there was a fire happening. He did smell smoke,
but it smelled the ‘same way [as] when you’re cutting metal.’ He ‘went out there and
said, ‘Move away from the building. I have a firearm.’ After ‘nobody said anything,’
he ‘squeezed a couple of rounds at the door,’ specifically ‘down in the corner’ because
he was ‘not trying to shoot anybody.’ He just wanted to ‘scare them off’ because he:
(1) had a ‘problem with people trying to break in,’ (2) had ‘a lot of valuable equipment
in there,’ (3) had a ‘problem in the back trailer with homeless people,’ and (4) figured
people brazen enough to break in had to be armed. He also had macular degeneration
and could not see well in the dark. At some point, he woke employee and told her to call
for help, which she did by calling 911 twice. Employee later testified that defendant
saved her life that day by waking her up.
***
The court also avoided unnecessary juror exposure to spectators by returning jurors to the jury room during breaks. Even assuming the multiple media requests evidenced a “close and strong relationship” between the community and the firefighters, as defendant argues, we conclude the court properly exercised its discretion to guard against any improper influence or pressure without impairing the firefighters’ rights to attend the trial. For these reasons, we conclude the presence of uniformed firefighters at trial was not inherently prejudicial. And because defendant does not contend there was actual prejudice, we reject his fair trial claim.
***
Here, the trial court instructed the jury that defendant was not guilty of murder if,
among other requirements, he reasonably believed he was defending a home from
someone who intended or tried to commit a robbery ‘whose character and manner
reasonably created a fear of death or serious bodily harm’ or ‘violently or tumultuously
tried to enter that home intending to commit an act of violence against someone inside.’
This instruction accurately stated the law as applied to the facts.”
Legal lesson learned: The defendant received a fair trial, with uniformed firefighters in attendance.
Note: See Aug. 22, 2024 article: “Man given 15 years to life for fatally shooting fire captain in 2022.” https://stocktonia.org/news/public-safety/2024/08/22/man-given-15-years-to-life-for-fatally-shooting-fire-captain-in-2022/
Chap. 2 – Line Of Duty Death / Safety
MO: LODD PAYMENT - MUST FILE 1-YR – EVEN WC GRANTED
On May 26, 2026, in Patrick Brian Williams (Deceased), and Jennifer Williams v. City of Kansas City, et al., the Court of Appeals of Missouri, Western District, Second Division held (3 to 0) that the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission properly denied Line of Duty Death cash benefits (currently $25,000; and up to $20,000 for funeral expenses), since the claim was not filed within one year of his death. Firefighter Williams served as a firefighter for the City of Kansas City, Missouri, for 38 years. Due to his exposure to multiple workplace carcinogens, he developed metastatic neuroendocrine carcinoma and multiple myeloma, and he died on February 23, 2018. Mrs. Williams didn’t file LODD claim until September 25, 2023. Prior to filing the LDC claim, she timely filed Worker’s Comp claim and on August 31, 2023, the ALJ issued an award of workers’ compensation benefits. THE COURT WROTE: “Specifically, Williams argues the LDC Claim is a successive adjudication presenting the same facts and issues as those previously decided in her WC Award. She asserts the WC Award issued findings of fact and conclusions of law which were dispositive of the issues before the Commission in the LDC Claim, thus the Commission is bound by its findings in the WC Award. The end result of her argument appears to be that the time limit in which to file an LDC claim is somehow tolled until the WC claim is resolved. On the other hand, Respondent argues that the law of the case doctrine is not implicated here because the doctrine only applies to subsequent proceedings in the same case, and Williams’s WC Claim and LDC Claim are two entirely separate matters. We agree with Respondent.” https://cases.justia.com/missouri/court-of-appeals/2026-wd88291.pdf?ts=1779809421
THE COURT HELD:
“LDC claims and WC claims are also subject to different statutes of limitations, further evidencing their separate nature. Contrast section 287.243.3(1) (creating a one-year statute of limitations in which to file an LDC claim), with section 287.430 (creating a statute of limitations ranging from one to three years for WC claims, depending on the circumstances).
***
Williams’s point on appeal relating to the law of the case doctrine is denied as her WC Claim is wholly separate and distinct from her LDC Claim such that the aw of the case doctrine is not implicated.”
Legal lesson learned: Unfortunate that the state has two different statutes of limitations for a family of filing for work comp and line of duty death benefits.
Chap. 3 – Homeland Security, incl. Active Shooter, Cybersecurity, Immigration
KY: FED JUDGE ORDERED TO INCREASE SENTENCE – ISIS
On May 13, 2026, in United States of America v. Mirsad Ramic, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (Cincinnati) held (3 to 0) that the Federal District Court judge who presided over his jury trial must resentence the defendant. Mirsad Ramic, born in Bonia, but moved with his family to Bowling Green, Kentucky, became naturalized U.S. citizen. Less than a year later, he became radicalized; online posts included he hoped President Obama’s teenage daughters would one day be sold as ISIS slaves. He reached out to ISIS, took ISIS training, then traveled to Syria, where he participated in the siege of Kobane (2014 – 2015) which was being defended by U.S. military – the siege claimed over 100,000 lives. A jury convicted him of providing material support to a terrorist group and receiving military-type training from ISIS. THE COURT WROTE: “For those crimes, Ramic faced an advisory sentence of 360 to 600 months’ imprisonment under the Sentencing Guidelines. But the district court [Judge Gregory N. Stivers] sentenced Ramic to only 101 months in prison. Because the district court’s substantial variance is substantively unreasonable, we vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing.” https://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/25-5471/25-5471-2026-05-13.pdf?ts=1778702434
THE COURT HELD:
“Here, the district court didn’t adequately weigh the seriousness of Ramic’s crime, potential sentencing disparities, and the need to protect the public…. Because the district court’s rationale here didn’t justify such a drastic downward variance, we conclude that Ramic’s sentence is substantively unreasonable.
***
The district court attempted to justify its sentence in two primary ways. First, it stated
that Ramic didn’t engage ‘in any acts of terrorism as . . . in a more common sense’
understanding of the term…. It explained, for example, that Ramic hadn’t
engaged in any ‘random acts of violence directed at innocent populations,’ detonated any
‘bombs,’ or inflicted any ‘horrible incidents of gun violence against crowds.’ … Instead, the district court concluded that Ramic was merely a ‘fighter’ and a ‘soldier’ who joined ‘a standard army’ that wanted to ‘require strict adherence to [Islamic] law.’ … Second, the district court noted that the median sentence for terrorism defendants with the same offense level and criminal-history category was only 168 months’ imprisonment. Using that median sentence as a starting point, the district court subtracted the 67 months that Ramic spent in Turkish custody and arrived at a final sentence of 101 months.
***
In fact, Ramic openly embraced ISIS’s mission to target the United States. For example,
he posted on social media that he hoped President Obama’s teenage daughters would one day be sold as ISIS slaves.
***
What’s more, the evidence at trial indicated that Ramic fought against American forces in
the siege of Kobane.”
Legal lesson learned: 6th Circuit decision very helpful great precedence for other courts reviewing U.S. Government appeals of short sentences of terrorists.
File: Chap. 4, Incident Command
CT: WIRES CAR – STATE: ELEC. CO. 1-HR RESP TOO SLOW
On April 28, 2026, in The Connecticut Light and Power Company v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority, the Supreme Court of Connecticut held (7 to 0) that trial court properly dismissed the
Power Company’s appeal from PURA order that when responding to Priority 1 calls to shut off power, they must shorten response target time from 60 minutes to 30 minutes. Jan. 17, 2021 entrapment; power company notified at 2:21 p.m; power de-energized at 3:31 pm, and two elderly extricated and transported to trauma center. THE COURT WROTE: “In the present case, PURA exercised its supervisory authority under § 16-11 after determining that changes to the plaintiff’s operational practices were necessary in the public interest. In imposing the directive, PURA concluded that the plaintiff’s existing, sixty minute response target was insufficient, reasoning that, although it ‘understands the [plaintiff’s] hesitation with imposing response deadlines, [p]riority 1 events are life-threatening events that require the [plaintiff’s] immediate response . . . .’ Based on the evidence in the record, including the plaintiff’s response time data and the timeline of its response to the Norfolk accident, PURA determined that a response time target of thirty minutes for priority 1 calls was ‘reasonable and appropriate to better protect public safety.’”
THE COURT HELD:
“The record reveals the following relevant facts and procedural history. On January 17, 2023, at approximately 2:21 p.m., municipal first responders were dispatched to 599 East Greenwoods Road in Norfolk to respond to a motor vehicle accident (Norfolk accident). The motor vehicle left the roadway and struck a utility pole owned and maintained by the plaintiff. The collision caused the utility pole to break and resulted in downed electrical conductors in the vicinity of the vehicle, entrapping the two elderly occupants of the vehicle. First responders arrived at the scene but did not approach the vehicle to extricate the occupants due to the fallen electrical wires. At approximately 2:23 p.m., the plaintiff’s System Operations Center (SOC) received a call on the E-911 municipal emergency line from Litchfield County dispatch notifying the SOC about the accident. This call was designated a priority 1 call and lasted approximately seven minutes. During and immediately after the call, an SOC operator worked to de-energize the area through
remote operation. Once remote de-energization was achieved, the SOC notified Litchfield County dispatch that the area should be de-energized but must nevertheless be treated as energized until one of the plaintiff’s response specialists arrived at the scene and manually tested the wires.
At the time of the priority 1 call, the plaintiff had four response specialists on duty in its zone encompassing the town of Norfolk. At 2:31 p.m., SOC assigned a response specialist who was located approximately twenty-six miles away from the accident. That specialist acknowledged the dispatch at 2:32 p.m., departed for Norfolk, and arrived at the scene of the accident at 3:17 p.m. Between 3:17 and 3:30 p.m., the specialist worked with the SOC to successfully identify and de-energize the involved wires. At approximately 3:31 p.m., the Norfolk Volunteer Fire Department, Inc., began extrication efforts and removed the occupants from the vehicle at approximately 3:44 and 3:47 p.m., respectively. The occupants were then transported to trauma centers.
***
Subsequently, on April 6, 2023, PURA conducted a remote evidentiary hearing in which the plaintiff participated…. On August 9, 2023, PURA issued its final decision, finding that the plaintiff’s actions in response to the Norfolk accident were ‘imprudent’ and resulted in a delayed response. As a result of these findings, PURA directed the plaintiff to adopt a response time target of thirty minutes for all priority 1 calls and to review and revise its accident response and reporting procedures to ensure compliance with state law.”
Legal lesson learned: If your local power company has slow response to Priority 1 calls, invite them to present at meeting of FDs; if no improvement, consider contacting your state utility agency.
Chap. 6 – Employment Litigation, incl. Work Comp., Age Discrim., Vet Rights
MA: FF NOT HIRED – BACKGROUND CHECK - 3 FDs NEG
On May 26, 2026, in Paul Defarias v. Civil Service Commission and City of Gloucester, the
Appeals Court of Massachusetts held (3 to 0) that trial court properly affirmed the Civil Service Commission – the City of Gloucester had a reasonable justification to bypass DeFarias for a firefighter position (four openings posted in March 2022), even if the detectives who conducted the background only reported on negative feedback from three prior Massachusetts FDs and not positive feedback from a Florida FD. The detectives also did not run criminal history and driving history checks as part of DeFarias's background investigation, despite it being their normal practice to conduct such checks. They also didn’t request his personnel files from the FDs. THE COURT WROTE: “We agree with the commission that the evidence of concern by three of DeFarias's former employers at relevant work experiences provided the city adequate reason not to hire him. Even if the city properly considered the positive aspects of DeFarias's professional history, the negative aspects nonetheless raised legitimate doubts about his suitability for a firefighter position with the city.” https://www.mass.gov/doc/defarias-paul-v-city-of-gloucester-related-appeals-court-decision-52626/download
THE COURT HELD:
“Much of the information the detectives collected was positive. DeFarias's personal references praised him as a model student, a ‘straight arrow,’ and a hard worker. His supervisor at Zartech, where DeFarias is a fabrication shop technician, stated that DeFarias is mature, honest, and generally an ‘outstanding guy.’ In addition, the chief of the volunteer fire department of Montverde, Florida, where DeFarias served as an
on-call volunteer firefighter in early 2017, reported that DeFarias was well liked, exhibited good attendance, and had a positive work ethic.
***
DeFarias has performed EMT or firefighting work for three employers in Massachusetts: Cataldo Ambulance Service (Cataldo), Beauport Ambulance Service (Beauport), and the Lynnfield fire department (Lynnfield). Each of these employers provided the detectives with ‘partly negative reviews’ of DeFarias. It is undisputed that Cataldo terminated DeFarias, although the circumstances of the termination were ‘hazier.’ 4
Footnote 4: DeFarias was suspended pending an investigation into a complaint about an interaction with a patient. The magistrate found that DeFarias was terminated because he did not leave the premises promptly after being suspended and instead demanded documentation about his suspension.
Beauport terminated DeFarias due to his ‘repeated clinical errors’ and ‘personality conflicts’ between him and his coworkers. Similarly, a captain at Lynnfield stated that he was disinclined to hire DeFarias in the future because DeFarias had "trouble catching on" and had ‘a few issues with peers.’ Nonetheless, the captain liked DeFarias, praised his work ethic, and suggested that the city should ‘give him a shot.’
***
In the future, we expect the city to conduct a thorough and unbiased investigation and write a report that includes both positive and negative findings before the interview to allow the candidate to address negative findings during the interview. But that is not the issue before us. Although the background investigation was flawed, we must evaluate whether there was substantial evidence that (1) ‘the appointing authority had a reasonable justification on the merits for deciding to bypass’ DeFarias, and (2) ‘the flaws in the selection process are not so severe that it is impossible to evaluate the merits from the record.’" Sherman, 472 Mass. at 813.”
Legal lesson learned: Background checks are important; include both positive and negative feedback from prior FD employers.
Note: In Ohio, Fire Chiefs can obtain state and FBI criminal history records. https://codes.ohio.gov/ohio-revised-code/section-505.381
(A) The fire chief of a township or fire district may request the superintendent of BCII to conduct a criminal records check with respect to any person who is under consideration for appointment or employment as a permanent, full-time paid firefighter or any person who is under consideration for appointment as a volunteer firefighter.
(B)(1) The fire chief of the township or fire district may request that the superintendent of BCII obtain information from the federal bureau of investigation as a part of the criminal records check requested pursuant to division (A) of this section.
(2) A fire chief authorized by division (A) of this section to request a criminal records check shall provide to each person for whom the fire chief intends to request a criminal records check a copy of the form prescribed pursuant to division (C)(1) of section 109.578 of the Revised Code and a standard impression sheet to obtain fingerprint impressions prescribed pursuant to division (C)(2) of section 109.578 of the Revised Code, obtain the completed form and impression sheet from the person, and forward the completed form and impression sheet to the superintendent of BCII at the time the criminal records check is requested.
(3) Any person subject to a criminal records check who receives a copy of the form and a copy of the impression sheet pursuant to division (B)(2) of this section and who is requested to complete the form and provide a set of fingerprint impressions shall complete the form or provide all the information necessary to complete the form and shall provide the impression sheet with the impressions of the person's fingerprints. If a person fails to provide the information necessary to complete the form or fails to provide impressions of the person's fingerprints, the appointing authority shall not appoint or employ the person as a permanent, full-time paid firefighter or a volunteer firefighter.
Chap. 7 – Sexual Harassment, incl. Pregnancy Discrimination
MA: FORMER CHIEF – $1.5M – PROTESTED NIECE DISCRIM
On May 15, 2026, in Kevin C. Robinson v. Town of Mansfield, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Plymouth held (6 to 0) that the jury award of compensatory and punitive damages is affirmed, and the former Fire Chief can also apply for reimbursement of attorney fees for the appeal. Robinson began working as a firefighter for the town in 1978. In 2003, Robinson was appointed fire chief by the town's board of selectmen. THE COURT WROTE: “Both Robinson's brother, Shaun, and Robinson's son, Craig, were firefighters in the department and worked under Robinson's supervision for several years. In February 2013, the department had two vacancies. The top two candidates on the civil service examination, both women, were Jodi Corrigan and Robinson's niece, Shauna, who was a paramedic. Before Shauna was hired, Robinson met with the board to discuss potential conflicts of interest in connection with her employment. Although nieces are not immediate family members under G. L. c. 268A, Robinson nevertheless submitted the forms disclosing his financial interest and the appearance of a conflict of interest, under § 19 (b) and § 23 (b) (3), as he had done when Shaun and Craig were hired. Robinson also recused himself from the hiring process. In October 2013, the board approved Shauna's selection and Robinson's disclosure forms but set several conditions with respect to Robinson's involvement in Shauna, Craig, or Shaun's work. Specifically, as to these family members, Robinson was required to recuse himself from decisions relating to appointments or promotions; prohibited from making any discretionary assignments resulting in additional wages or overtime; and required to refer any disciplinary matters to the town administrator, Rocco Longo, who would be responsible for investigating the matter and making a recommendation to Robinson. *** Robinson alleged that the town retaliated against him for complaining that his niece … was being discriminated against because of her gender. After trial, a jury found the town liable for retaliation and awarded Robinson compensatory and punitive damages… We conclude that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the town retaliated against Robinson because he complained of gender discrimination.” https://www.mass.gov/doc/robinson-v-marshfield-sjc-f13825/download
THE COURT HELD:
“In November 2023, the Town authorized the hiring of the Fire Chief’s niece, Shauna, and another female firefighter, Jodi Corrigan. While Jodi successfully completed her one-year probationary training, by early January 2014, multiple supervisors had expressed concerns that Shauna was struggling with her training. Shauna was evaluated by two outside fire chiefs and a paramedic, none of whom recommended that she be fired. However, Town Administrator Rocco Longo recommended that she be fired. Chief Robinson spoke up for his niece. Shauna ultimately suffered a shoulder injury that prevented her from reporting to the fire academy, and she resigned on April 13, 2014…. Corrigan likewise resigned before the end of her first year and accepted employment with a different fire department because morale at the department was low and there was conflict among the union, Robinson, and other employees. On March 12, 2015, Robinson facing termination resigned. The jury awarded him $1,532,652.80. THE COURT WROTE: We conclude that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the town retaliated against Robinson because he complained of gender discrimination.
***
Finally, the evidence was also sufficient for the jury to infer causation, that is, that the town retaliated against Robinson because he complained of gender discrimination…. When Robinson began to complain about the unfair treatment of Shauna [his niece], he had been successfully employed in the department for more than three decades and had been the chief for over one decade. After his complaint, a series of interrelated actions occurred in relatively short order in a way that could be reasonably interpreted as retaliatory…. Within ten days of Robinson's reporting of Shaun's complaint that she had not been treated the same as similarly situated male employees, Longo [Town Administrator Rocco] and Clifford [John Clifford, the town's labor counsel] met with Robinson to discuss a possible conflict of interest in violation of G. L. c. 268A. Approximately three months after Robinson complained to the board that Shauna was being treated unfairly, the board voted not to renew his employment contract and not to increase his salary. Then, almost two months after he refused to retire, the Smith investigation began. Finally, about one month after Galvin notified Smith [outside legal counsel conducting Town’s investigation] about Robinson's apparent assistance in Shauna's MCAD [Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination] complaint, Robinson was escorted from the influence offenses. The timing of these events, demonstrating temporal connections between complaints of discrimination and the town's reaction, is sufficient evidence to support the jury's determination that the town retaliated against Robinson because of his protected activity.”
Legal lesson learned: A Fire Chief was required to recuse himself from discipline concerning his brother, his son and his niece; but had legal right to express concern to Town about gender discrimination to wars his niece.
Note: The niece may have had some training issues.
Footnote 4:
“For example, Cipullo [Captain Louis] was concerned that Shauna was too short for the job and that she was not able to reach the trucks’ side ladders, physically throw ground ladders, or raise a twenty-four-foot ladder. Morgan expressed concerns about Shauna's decision-making during emergency calls and indicated on most of her evaluation forms that Shauna needed retraining and her performance fell below expectations. The firefighters union president, Matthew Cohen, observed that Shauna was unable to complete ‘the stair chair of a patient down a few steps’ or interpret ‘a 12-lead [electrocardiogram]’; she failed to report a gastrointestinal bleed to hospital staff; and she did not know that all patients who accidentally received epinephrine injections had to be transported to the hospital. On January 1, 2014, two months into her one-year probationary period, Cipullo told Shauna that she was running out of time to improve her skills.”
See this article: “Former Marshfield fire chief won more than $1.5 million in retaliation lawsuit against town.” Kevin Robinson, chief of the fire department from 2003, was allegedly forced to retire from the department in 2015 when he spoke up for a female family member in the department facing discrimination. https://www.boston.com/news/local-news/2024/05/15/former-marshfield-fire-chief-won-more-than-1-5-million-in-retaliation-lawsuit-against-town/
Chap. 7 – Sexual Harassment, incl. Pregnancy Discrimination
VA: FEMALE BC – OUTSIDE FIRM INTERVIEWS - FIRE CHIEF
On May 14, 2026, in Kathleen Stanley McCaffery v. Fairfax County, U.S. District Court Judge Rossie D. Alston, Jr., United States District Court, Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandia Division, held that the Battalion Chief failed to meet her burden as to pretext, and summary judgment will be granted to Defendant on her denial of promotion claims. On June 20, 2018, Plaintiff was interviewed by William Howland from PoliHire, LLC, a third-party executive recruitment firm that was retained by the County to lead the recruitment and selection process for the Fire Chief vacancy; she was not selected as one of the three finalist. THE COURT WROTE: “Here, Plaintiff has presented no evidence, beyond her own conclusory opinion, that she was more qualified than Butler [John Butler, Fire Chief, Howard County, Maryland, Fire and Rescue Department]…. Additionally, even considering Plaintiff's inability to compete theory, based on the record before the Court, any inference of sex discrimination is undermined by: (i) the fact that Plaintiff fails to allege any sex-based bias on behalf of the third-party selection firm; and (ii) the fact that the third-party selection firm did refer Merrell [Moore Merrell, Senior Executive, IAFF]—a woman—for an interview.” https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/6a0be85df21cf013d419bfe6
THE COURT HELD:
“The undisputed facts are as follows:
1. Plaintiff was hired by the Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Department ("FRD") in January 1995 and promoted through the ranks throughout her career. Ultimately, Plaintiff was promoted to Battalion Chief in June 2011.
***
106. PoliHire independently reviewed and interviewed numerous applicants for the FRD Fire Chief position. Of the applicants initially reviewed and interviewed, Derek Baker (Division Chief of Training and Interim Training and Operations Chief, Virginia Department of Fire Programs); John Butler (Fire Chief, Howard County, Maryland, Fire and Rescue Department); Manuel Fonseca (Assistant Chief (ret.), Nashville, Tennessee, Fire and Rescue Department); Lori Moore Merrell (Senior Executive, IAFF); and Charles Ryan (Assistant Chief, FRD) were selected and referred by PoliHire to advance to a panel interview for further consideration.
***
108. Of the applicants who advanced to a panel interview, Butler, Merrell, and Ryan were selected and referred by the panel to advance to a final interview with Hill and the Fairfax County Board of Supervisors (the "Board").
109. On July 10, 2018, the Board appointed Butler to serve as the Fire Chief, effective September 1, 2018.
110. Plaintiff does not contend that she was more qualified than Butler.”
Legal lesson learned: Outside firm independently selected three lead candidates for Fire Chief position, and plaintiff did not make the cut.
Chap. 8 – Race / National Origin Discrimination
VA: BLACK FF – FIRED – THREATS VIOLENCE IN STATION
On May 19, 2026, in Brian Younger v. City of Lynchburg, U.S. District Court Judge Norman K. Moon, United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, Lynchburg Division, granted the City’s motion for summary judgment. The firefighter was fired on June 4, 2024 after an incident on July 16, 2024 where he asked a white firefighter. At start of morning shift, to move his personal items to another bunkbed, and Younger became upset it was not done immediately. THE COURT WROTE: “Younger complains that he was treated differently from his White co-workers. Younger, however, does not establish sufficient similarity between what he did on July 16, 2022, and what his White co-workers did. Specifically, several fellow firefighters were recorded using racial slurs off-duty and those firefighters were not disciplined by the LFD. In contrast, though, Younger used racialized and threatening language against a co-worker in the fire station.” https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/virginia/vawdce/6:2024cv00051/132979/41/0.pdf?ts=1779390167
THE COURT HELD:
“The City claims it terminated Younger because of events that occurred on the morning of July 16, 2022. During the early morning shift change at LFD Station 5, Younger entered the station bedroom to place his belongings on a bunkbed. However, upon his arrival, he discovered that Firefighter Brennen Lawson, who had worked the previous shift, had already placed his items on the bed Younger intended to use….Younger found Lawson and asked him to move his belongings…. Lawson agreed but did not move his
belongings as promptly as Younger expected.
Although accounts differ as to whether either party made threatening movements towards the other during the exchange, neither party disputes that Younger made several comments directed at Lawson, who is a White male, including that: (i) Lawson was ‘a racist scumbag that couldn’t keep his wife happy’; (ii) that Lawson had ‘pushed’ his wife ‘right into the embrace of another Black man’; (iii) that his wife was ‘in California’ ‘loving that black dick she was taking out West’; (iv) that Younger did not know why ‘y’all racists keep dating and marrying women who aren’t racists’; (v) that if Lawson came towards him he would ‘fuck you all up out here’; and (iv) that Lawson better ‘stay away from [Younger] or else.’”
Legal lesson learned: Threats of violence cannot be tolerated, without regard to the race of the offender.
Chap. 9 – Americans With Disabilities Act
NV: PROB. FF INJURED – NO EXT. 1-YR – CASE PROCEED
On May 12, 2026, in Matthew Gregort Vannozzi v. Clark County, et al., U.S. District Court Judge Jennifer A. Dorsey, United States District Court for the District of Nevada, denied Clark County’s motion to dismiss the case. THE COURT HELD: “Matthew Vannozzi brings Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Rehabilitation Act, and Nevada-law employment claims against Clark County, alleging that its fire department refused to preserve his probationary firefighter-paramedic position while he recovered from line-of-duty injuries and cardiac conditions, failed to engage in the interactive process, and fired him for his disability…. And because the second amended complaint plausibly alleges that Vannozzi sought a finite recovery-time accommodation and suffered adverse action after invoking ADA-protected rights, I deny the motion to dismiss, too.” https://public.fastcase.com/Jhe1Qn%2BmJndQYQU6z%2FeNm2kS7VI9AQpJ451BKRyshBDGiqezkPNA%2BJ4Mc%2Fomhxj3zuPpdWN764R4JuE3lYQbe83p1Nq1XHA6CB8LuiXwXBM%3D?utm_medium=email&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-_xBqvIlP1bgLDQ7-gr0MsyD2cqh9I-7H0nRbwq_ndvk4N-HbAk55liN5jXfY0IgeNEDhFcwLKOWXCSzt7avhQkvFQDlA&_hsmi=226712652&utm_content=226712652&utm_source=hs_email
THE COURT HELD:
“The Clark County Fire Department hired Matthew Vannozzi as a probationary firefighter-paramedic in January 2023. He completed the Clark County Fire Academy that May and began full-duty work as a firefighter-paramedic. But four months later, while responding to a fire incident, Vannozzi injured his left upper extremity, neck, and right wrist badly enough to prevent him from performing the essential functions of that job. About a month after that, he suffered a non-ST elevation myocardial infarction that required emergency stent placement. During that treatment, he was also diagnosed with an aortic aneurysm, hemochromatosis, and a hypercoagulable state.
Those cardiac and blood-related conditions required anticoagulation therapy, making the inherent risks of firefighting potentially fatal because traumatic injury could lead to dangerous bleeding Multiple doctors placed Vannozzi on disability status and complete work restrictions, leaving him unable to perform firefighting duties during his recovery period. His treating cardiologist estimated on November 8, 2023, that Vannozzi would need at least six weeks before he could return to work from a cardiac standpoint, putting that timeframe in mid-to-late December. But that estimate did not account for his orthopedic injuries, which required additional recovery time.
Clark County knew about Vannozzi's injuries, medical restrictions, and workers' compensation status. So, while still unable to perform firefighting duties, Vannozzi requested an extension of his one-year probationary period to give him time to recover and return to full duty. Vannozzi alleges that Clark County had extended probationary periods for other injured firefighters, but it refused to do so for him. It also told him that he would ‘surely fail’ probation even if the department extended his probation and he recovered. Clark County terminated him on December 27, 2023—13 days before his probationary period would have ended.
***
[T]he Ninth Circuit recognizes that medical leave or an extension of leave may be a reasonable accommodation when it would allow the employee to return to the job's essential functions in the foreseeable future…. At this pleading stage, Vannozzi plausibly alleges that he could have been a qualified individual with a finite recovery-time accommodation, so I deny the motion to dismiss on those grounds.”
Legal lesson learned: Under ADA, requests by an injured employee for a reasonable extension of recovery time can be considered a ADA-protected right; case will proceed with pre-trial discovery.
Chap. 11 – Fair Labor Standards Act, and Military Leave
NJ: OVERTIME CLASS ACTION – 24/72 – FF / CAPTAINS / BCs
On May 26, 2026, in Adrian Evans, et al. v. City of Patterson, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division held (3 to 0) that trial court properly granted the firefighters’ motion for class certification concerning alleged violation of state overtime laws. Plaintiffs claim they routinely worked over forty hours per week without receiving the statutorily required overtime payment for doing so. THE COURT WROTE: “By admitting that over forty fire fighters were employed by the City since 2017, we conclude the amount of forty fire fighters satisfies the numerosity requirement as determined by the court and there was no abuse of discretion…. plaintiffs point to the certifications submitted showing that captains and battalion chiefs regularly performed firefighting duties and were paid full-time uniformed firefighters who were subject to the terms and conditions in the CBA.” https://www.njcourts.gov/system/files/court-opinions/2026/a1218-25.pdf
THE COURT HELD:
“Under Article XII Section A of the above-referenced CBAs, the work schedule for the firefighters was as follows:
For Firefighters not assigned to the Chief's office, the
work week schedule shall consist of twenty-four (24)
hours on duty followed by seventy-two (72) hours off
duty followed by twenty-four (24) hours on duty
followed by seventy-two (72) hours off duty, etc.
Furthermore, Article XII Section C states:
Any member [o]f this bargaining unit assigned to staff
positions shall receive the same wages and benefits as
those members assigned to the forty-two (42) hour
work schedule.
***
In accordance with the deferential standard that applies, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in defining the class based on the evidence before it, including the factual bases in plaintiffs' complaint. Defendant's contentions are premature at this stage of the litigation because they venture beyond the factual assertions of the class set forth in the complaint and the submitted evidence, including the factual assertions deemed admitted based on defendant's failure to respond to plaintiffs' Requests for Admissions.”
Legal lesson learned: Case will now proceed to pre-trial discovery. FLSA class actions can include both firefighters, Captains and other non-exempt officers.
Note: The Court previously ruled on January 28, 2025 that firefighters do not need to first go to arbitration.
“We reverse the November 28, 2023 order granting defendants' motion to dismiss and compel arbitration pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(a). We also vacate the court's January 26, 2024 order denying plaintiffs' subsequent motion for reconsideration because that order was dependent on the court's initial decision to dismiss and compel arbitration.”
Chap. 13 – EMS, incl. Community Paramedicine, COVID-1
TN: MEDIC CASE PROCEED – WHISTLEBLOWER /PT REFUSAL
On May 26, 2026, in Adam Thomas v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, the Court of Appeals of Tennessee, Nashville held (3 to 0) that the former paramedic’s whistleblower lawsuit is reinstated, and will now proceed to pre-trial discovery. THE COURT WROTE: “He asserted that in violation of the Tennessee Public Protection Act he was discharged by the Nashville Fire Department because he refused to participate in or remain silent about the department forcing mentally competent inmates to undergo medical treatment without their consent…. According to the complaint, Mr. Thomas reported the illegal activity to persons outside of the fire department, including doctors, nurses, and an inmate. As to the latter, he not only informed the inmate that his legal rights may have been violated but also proceeded to document the violation…. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304 (b)) (‘No employee shall be discharged or terminated solely for refusing to participate in, or for refusing to remain silent about, illegal activities.’). https://cases.justia.com/tennessee/court-of-appeals/2026-m2025-00288-coa-r3-cv.pdf?ts=1779919242
THE COURT HELD:
“According to his amended complaint, Mr. Thomas began working for the Nashville
Fire Department in October 2023. He was not new to being a paramedic; rather, he had
eight years of experience in such a role. In his first six months with the Nashville Fire
Department, Mr. Thomas was recognized with three awards for his outstanding job
performance.
However, things turned for Mr. Thomas starting on January 23, 2024. On that date,
Mr. Thomas responded to a call indicating an inmate needed medical attention at the
Davidson County Jail. Upon arriving, Mr. Thomas was informed the inmate was refusing
medical treatment and transport to the hospital. While Mr. Thomas maintained that the
inmate had a right to refuse medical treatment, a nurse at the jail remained steadfast that
the inmate did not have a right to refuse care or medical transport because of his status as an inmate. On this occasion, Mr. Thomas relented and transported the inmate to the
hospital despite the inmate’s refusal to be treated. To fulfill his duty to medically monitor
a patient during transport, he took the inmate’s vital signs and continued to monitor those vitals until arriving at the hospital.
***
Mr. Thomas also conducted his own research. His research confirmed his understanding
that a mentally competent inmate has a right to refuse medical treatment. Mr. Thomas filed a detailed report at the conclusion of his shift. In his report, Mr. Thomas cited Tennessee Department of Correction policies and Tennessee Corrections Institute guidelines, indicating that prisoners have a right to refuse medical treatment.
Approximately a week later, Mr. Thomas was called into a meeting with several fire
department Chiefs. Mr. Thomas alleges that in this meeting, he was reprimanded
extensively for the report he filed regarding the January 23, 2024 transport of the inmate. The Chiefs indicated that he was correct that an inmate could refuse treatment, but they could not believe that he had documented the incident. In the meeting, Mr. Thomas indicated that he would not transport another competent inmate to the hospital without the inmate’s consent.
Less than a month later, Mr. Thomas, who had previously served in the Marine
Corps, was scheduled to be in Arlington. Members of his platoon annually gathered to
honor a fallen comrade who had died in Afghanistan. Mr. Thomas had been approved for
vacation time, and a coworker was going to cover his shift on February 16. The coworker,
however, was forbidden by superiors from covering his February 16 shift, which went
uncovered.
On or around February 26, 2024, Nashville Fire Department Chief Fred Smith gave
Mr. Thomas an ultimatum: “You can either resign, or I can fire you.” Metro contends this
ultimatum was the result of Mr. Thomas missing a single shift and not finding coverage to replace him. Mr. Thomas chose to resign to prevent a termination from becoming part of his record. Thereafter, Mr. Thomas alleges he received a text message from another
paramedic employed by the fire department stating that, when that employee had
previously missed a shift, the only consequence was a write-up.”
Legal lesson learned: The Tennessee Public Protection Act protects whistleblowers; case will now proceed to pre-trial discovery; a jury may ultimately reward Medic with substantial damages.
Note: The Tenn. Code provides in § 50-1-304 (2024): https://law.justia.com/codes/tennessee/title-50/chapter-1/part-3/section-50-1-304/
“(1) Any employee terminated in violation of subsection (b) shall have a cause of action against the employer for retaliatory discharge and any other damages to which the employee may be entitled, subject to the limitations set out in § 4-21-313.”
Chap. 13 – EMS, incl. Community Paramedicine, COVID-19
MI: PT GURNEY / UNLOADING – NO IMMUN. STATE MV LAW
On May 19, 2026, in Walter Winters v. City of Detroit, the State of Michigan Court of Appeals held (3 to 0) that the patient’s lawsuit may proceed, since this was an injury arising out of a accident involving a motor vehicle (ambulance); trial court improperly dismissed the case under EMS immunity statute. THE COURT WROTE: “Winters appeals by right the trial court’s order granting the City’s motion for summary disposition. Because the trial court erroneously applied the EMSA [Emergency Medical Services Act] and Winters’s complaint asserted a claim under the motor-vehicle exception to governmental immunity, MCL 691.1405, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.”
THE COURT HELD:
“In his complaint, Winters alleged that the City’s EMTs strapped him onto a gurney for
transport and negligently ‘failed to keep the gurney upright’ which caused him to fall to the ground and sustain injury while the EMTs unloaded him from the ambulance. Winters also alleged that the City had a duty to ensure that its employees safely unload patients from an ambulance and that the City was liable for its own negligence, and that of the EMTs, because the City owned the ambulance. Winters cited the owner’s liability statute, MCL 257.401. Winters’s allegations were sufficient to plead in avoidance of governmental immunity because they stated a claim that fit within the motor-vehicle exception to governmental immunity. See Mount Clemens Recreational Bowl, 344 Mich App at 245. The motor-vehicle exception requires that the governmental agency owned the motor vehicle involved in the incident and that the plaintiff’s injuries resulted from the negligent operation of the vehicle by the governmental agency’s employees. Further, as in Martin, the loading and unloading of patients is an action within the operation of an ambulance. Indeed, similar to the garbage truck in Strozier, it is impossible for an ambulance to perform its intended function absent the loading and unloading of patients. Accordingly, because Winters’s complaint stated a claim within the motor-vehicle exception to governmental immunity, the trial court erred by granting the City’s motion for summary disposition.:
Legal lesson learned: Novel decision – no immunity for an injury arising out of accident involving a motor vehicle (ambulance).
Note: See Michigan government agency motor vehicle liability statute.
“Governmental agencies shall be liable for bodily injury and property damage resulting from the negligent operation by any officer, agent, or employee of the governmental agency, of a motor vehicle of which the governmental agency is owner, as defined in Act No. 300 of the Public Acts of 1949, as amended, being sections 257.1 to 257.923 of the Compiled Laws of 1948.” https://www.legislature.mi.gov/Laws/MCL?objectName=MCL-691-1405
Chap. 13 – EMS, incl. Community Paramedicine, COVID-19
WA: COVID – FF TURNED DOWN 3 FD JOBS - NO CASE
On May 17, 2026, in Justin Jobes v. City of Bellevue, the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit (San Francisco) held (3 to 0; unpublished decision) that the trial court properly granted city summary judgment. The City offered Jobes several reasonable accommodations. First, the City offered Jobes a utilities position, which Jobes rejected. Jobes requested paid medical leave paid medical leave for stress related to the vaccine mandate, and the City granted it to him for five months. When Jobes’ medical leave was set to end, the City offered him three other potential positions, which he turned down. THE COURT WROTE: Jobes alleges religious discrimination and failure to accommodate under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq, and the Washington Law Against Discrimination.1 Because the district court correctly concluded that the City tried to reasonably accommodate Jobes, we affirm.” https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/memoranda/2026/05/27/24-6656.pdf
THE COURT HELD:
“The City offered Jobes several reasonable accommodations. First, the City offered Jobes a utilities position, which Jobes rejected. Jobes requested paid medical leave paid medical leave for stress related to the vaccine mandate, and the City granted it to him for five months. When Jobes’ medical leave was set to end, the City offered him three other potential positions—as an Emergency Management Coordinator, as an LTE Grants Coordinator, and as a Fire Prevention Program Analyst. None of these jobs required contact with patients, and the Fire Prevention position allowed Jobes to remain within the City’s Fire Department. Jobes refused these accommodations. The City contacted Jobes subsequently and offered him a Fire Prevention Officer position within the Fire Department. Jobes declined this accommodation as well.
And after Jobes voluntarily resigned and the vaccine mandate was lifted, the City later contacted Jobes through one of its Fire Chiefs and advised him there was a pathway for him to return to his old job as a Firefighter/EMT. Jobes declined this final offer as well.
***
The record shows that the City repeatedly offered reasonable accommodations to Jobes which he repeatedly declined. As such, the City carried its burden on the affirmative defense, and the district court did not err in granting summary judgment…. Moreover … the City also would have prevailed on its affirmative defense of undue hardship as the district court concluded.”
Legal lesson learned: The City was very generous in offering numerous positions that avoided patient contact.
Chap. 13 – EMS, incl. Community Paramedicine, COVID-19
ID: IMMUNITY LAW / OVERDOSE – DRUNK CAR NOT IMMUNE
On May 7, 2026, in State of Idaho v. Gannon Manuelito, the Supreme Court of Idaho held (5 to 0) that trial court improperly dismissed drug charges against the defendant; he was drunk and not suffering a drug-related medical emergency. On May 7, 2023, a Flying-J truck stop manager was informed by a customer that a person, later identified as Manuelito, “may be . . . in distress in [the] parking lot.” He thought the driver had overdosed and called 911, but police woke him up found he was intoxicated and EMS provided no treatment. THE COURT WROTE: “The only evidence offered to support that characterization is the manager’s observation that Manuelito might be overdosing or might have passed out from alcohol consumption or other drugs. Subsection (2) does not turn on a third party’s subjective belief—it turns on the defendant’s actual condition…. Further, no evidence in the record indicates that Manuelito required or even received medical intervention for a drug-related emergency. Officer Jaramillo testified that Manuelito was able to speak and repeatedly told him he was okay. Manuelito was not placed in an ambulance, was not transported to a hospital, and there is no evidence that any medical treatment was administered. The patient care record that was admitted into evidence confirms that Manuelito did not receive assistance beyond waking him up.” https://cases.justia.com/idaho/supreme-court-criminal/2026-51595.pdf?ts=1778169780
THE COURT HELD:
“Officer Jaramillo conducted a DUI investigation. Manuelito provided two breath samples, which showed that his blood alcohol content (BAC) was nearly twice the legal limit. Officer Jaramillo also searched Manuelito’s vehicle and discovered drug paraphernalia, including a grinder with marijuana residue, a smoking bowl with burnt marijuana residue, and an empty THC cartridge. In the back seat, the officer found a cooler containing a bag of marijuana weighing approximately 12.29 ounces. Inside the cooler was a backpack with more marijuana and a bag that contained the hallucinogen dimethyltryptamine (DMT). The officer also discovered a THC vape pen in Manuelito’s pocket.
***
Following Manuelito’s motion to dismiss, the district court determined that Idaho’s
overdose immunity statute, Idaho Code section 37-2739C, applied to Manuelito, thereby granting him immunity from prosecution for the possession offenses. We reverse the district court’s order because the record contains no showing that Manuelito either experienced a drug-related medical emergency or was in need of medical assistance.
***
Based on legislative intent and policy considerations, the court adopted a broad
interpretation of the statute, concluding that a ‘drug-related medical emergency’ encompasses situations where a person in good faith believes another is experiencing a drug- or alcohol-related medical issue requiring assistance. The court reasoned that this interpretation aligns with the legislature’s intent to encourage a request for emergency assistance without fear of prosecution. For those reasons, the court granted Manuelito’s motion to dismiss the three possession charges relating to controlled substances (marijuana and DMT) and paraphernalia.
***
Manuelito did not establish he was suffering a drug-related medical emergency at the time police obtained the evidence supporting his drug-related charges for immunity to apply under Idaho Code section 37-2739C(2). Therefore, the statute does not provide him immunity from prosecution on counts one through three. The district court erred in concluding otherwise.”
Legal lesson learned: Drug immunity statutes are designed to encourage third parties to call 911; Idaho’s statute only applies if the person is suffering a drug-related emergency.
Note: Idaho immunity law: https://law.justia.com/codes/idaho/title-37/chapter-27/article-iv/section-37-2739c/
37-2739C. MEDICAL ASSISTANCE — DRUG-RELATED OVERDOSE — PROSECUTION FOR POSSESSION.
(1) A person acting in good faith who seeks medical assistance for any person experiencing a drug-related medical emergency shall not be charged or prosecuted for possession of a controlled substance pursuant to section 37-2732(c) or (e), Idaho Code, for using or being under the influence of a controlled substance pursuant to section 37-2732C(a), Idaho Code, or for using or possessing with intent to use drug paraphernalia pursuant to section 37-2734A(1), Idaho Code, if the evidence for the charge of possession of or using or being under the influence of a controlled substance or using or possessing drug paraphernalia was obtained as a result of the person seeking medical assistance.
(2) A person who experiences a drug-related medical emergency and is in need of medical assistance shall not be charged or prosecuted for possession of a controlled substance pursuant to section 37-2732(c) or (e), Idaho Code, for using or being under the influence of a controlled substance pursuant to section 37-2732C(a), Idaho Code, or for using or possessing with intent to use drug paraphernalia pursuant to section 37-2734A(1), Idaho Code, if the evidence for the charge of possession of or using or being under the influence of a controlled substance or using or possessing drug paraphernalia was obtained as a result of the medical emergency and the need for medical assistance.
(3) The protections in this section from prosecution shall not be grounds for suppression of evidence in other criminal charges.
Chap. 13 – EMS, incl. Community Paramedicine, COVID-19
DC: MEDICAL DIRECTOR - EMT-I FAILED TWICE - FIRED
On April 17, 2026, in Harold Dargan v. District of Columbia Office of Employee Appeals, et al., the Court of Appeals of The District of Columbia held (3 to 0) that the EMT-Intermediate, who declined to be reclassified at lower level as an EMT-Advanced, was properly terminated on May 3, 2013. After an EMS run on June 14, 2011 where patient died and patient’s airway was unattended while he was retrieving additional equipment, he was immediately removed from the field and sent to Training Academy for six months. The Medical Director then assessed his skills on February 2, 2012 (failed to perform a cardiac life support scenario) and on February 14 (again failed). THE COURT WROTE: “As Mr. Dargan himself concedes, Dr. Miramontes, as the FEMS Medical Director, ‘must have the absolute right—short of discriminatory animus—to protect the public by designating which EMTs and Paramedics are to be permitted to practice under his licens[e].’” https://www.dccourts.gov/sites/default/files/2026-05/Dargan%20%20v.%20D.C.%20Office%20of%20Employee%20Appeals.%2024-CV-1001.pdf
THE COURT HELD:
“As such, Dr. Miramontes was responsible only for evaluating Mr. Dargan and
deciding whether to sign off on his recertification as an EMT-Intermediate based on
his evaluation of Mr. Dargan’s competency. Dr. Miramontes did just this. Following
Mr. Dargan’s extensive remediation, Dr. Miramontes administered two practical
skills assessments to determine whether Mr. Dargan could perform at the level
expected for an EMT-Intermediate. After Mr. Dargan failed the first assessment, Dr.
Miramontes gave him an opportunity for additional remediation and offered to
sponsor him at the basic life support level as an EMT-Advanced. When Mr. Dargan
failed the second assessment, Dr. Miramontes again told him that he would not
sponsor him at the EMT-Intermediate level for his DOH recertification, but that he
would sponsor him at the lower EMT-Advanced level. Despite this knowledge, Mr.
Dargan did not apply for the EMT-Advanced DOH certification, choosing instead
to submit to Dr. Miramontes his application for the EMT-Intermediate DOH certification. Dr. Miramontes refused to sign Mr. Dargan’s application, rendering it incomplete, and likewise refused to submit the application to DOH.”
Legal lesson learned: EMS Medical Directors have the “absolute right” to designate appropriate level of EMS personnel.
Chap. 15 – Mental Health, incl. CISM, Peer Support, Pet Therapy
KY: FIRE MARSHAL – NO MJ - SUICIDE ATTEMPT ADDERALL
On May 5, 2026, in Joseph Wheeling v. City of Winchester, U.S. District Court Judge Karen K. Caldwel, United States District Court for Eastern District of Kentucky, Central Division, Lexington, granted the City’s motion for summary judgment on his May 16, 2023 termination for breach of city’s drug policy - abuse of proscribed medication. The Fire Marshal had taken FMLA leave June 22-25, 2022, for in-patient treatment at the International Association of Fire Fighters Center for Excellence, and upon return he was receiving treatment Bluegrass Behavioral Health and Consulting Services. After a second FMLA, the City declined his return to work using proscribed marijuana, so he was proscribed Adderall. He returned to work on March 14, 2023; but on March 31, 2023, Wheeling attempted suicide while at work by ingesting about 9 or 11 Adderall pills. THE COURT WROTE: “Because the record conclusively reveals a nondiscriminatory reason for the termination, the City is entitled to summary judgment on the disability discrimination claim…. Here, the written job requirements, the undisputed testimony from Wheeling and his supervisors, and the duties inherent in being a first responder indicate that field inspections and fire prevention is essential to performing the Fire Marshal role. The City was not required to reassign Wheeling's fire inspection and prevention responsibilities to other employees…. Therefore, based on the record, Wheeling's request to have other employees help with ‘fire inspections’ and ‘fire prevention’ seeks an accommodation relating to the most fundamental aspects of the job. On this evidence, no reasonable jury could conclude that Wheeling's accommodation request would not eliminate or reallocate the most essential functions of his job…. Because Wheeling failed to provide a reasonable accommodation request, his failure to accommodate claim fails as a matter of law.” https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/kentucky/kyedce/5:2024cv00129/104855/29/0.pdf?ts=1778093974
THE COURT HELD:
“Wheeling identifies two potential accommodations that could have aided him in his employment: using medical marijuana and additional personnel to assist him in the office…. The City's letter explained that, ‘[Wheeling's] position of employment with the City is a heightened safety awareness level position (HSAL) that involves exceptional duties to the community citizens in the area of public safety.’ …. Because of the heightened safety level required of his position, the City explicitly prohibited his use of medical marijuana.
***
Wheeling's healthcare provider responded with a March 1, 2023, letter:
This letter is to certify that Joseph Wheeling has been released to return to work effective immediately with the following accommodation(s):
• Scheduling flexibility to allow him to continue his medical treatment which includes weekly Spravato treatment and therapy.
Please note that additional accommodations may be required in the future and are dependent on progress/status.
Please note that it is felt that the above mentioned is capable of safely performing the required functions of his job while taking his current prescribed medications: Spravato (administered in office, once weekly, and Clonazepam 0.5mg twice daily as needed.
After receipt of the letter, the City confirmed that the proposed treatment plan complied with its policies.
***
The City was not required to reassign Wheeling's fire inspection and prevention responsibilities to other employees…. Therefore, based on the record, Wheeling's request to have other employees help with ‘fire inspections’ and ‘fire prevention’ seeks an accommodation relating to the most fundamental aspects of the job. On this evidence, no reasonable jury could conclude that Wheeling's accommodation request would not eliminate or reallocate the most essential functions of his job…. Because Wheeling failed to provide a reasonable accommodation request, his failure to accommodate claim fails as a matter of law.”
Legal lesson learned: The ADA does not require an employer to allow use of proscribed marijuana for an emergency responder.
Note: Good news. The Court wrote that “Wheeling is currently employed at the Clark County Fire Department, which is also where he began his career as a firefighter in 2008.”
File: Chap. 16 – Discipline, incl. Code of Ethics, Social Media, Hazing
OH: GEORGE FLOYD UNREST / FF “STAND ON THEIR NECK”
On May 28, 2026, in Robin Garrison v. City of Columbus, et al., the Court of Appeals of Ohio, Tenth District held (3 to 0) that he was properly fired. During civil unrest in Columbus after George Floyd was killed in Minneapolis, Mr. Garrison was on duty in the Columbus FD Fire Alarm Office and told fellow firefighters (including black female firefighter) on May 31, 2020: “Just stand on their neck and wait until they get there. It will be okay.” His Lieutenant immediately took him out of the room to “deescalate the situation” and submitted a report and ordered him to counseling. THE COURT WROTE: “Upon review, we conclude that the common pleas court’s reasoning and finding that Garrison violated the City’s rules and anti-harassment policy is sound. Here, there is no dispute that Garrison made the ‘stand on their neck’ comment. Even outside the context of the protests, Garrison’s ‘stand on their neck’ comment in a room full of firefighters, one of which is African American, condones abusive or violent behavior. However, we cannot look at the statement in isolation. As aptly contextualized by the common pleas court, Garrison’s comment occurred during a period ‘when protests were breaking out all over the country, including in Columbus, and only days after the murder of George Floyd, an African-American, by a Minneapolis police officer who stepped on his neck.’… Garrison explained that he intended the statement to be heard by others as a ‘joke’ to lighten the mood during a tense period. Implicit in Garrison’s testimony is the admission that he wanted the individuals in the FAO to hear the remark. The fact that the comment was not ‘directed’ at any one person is immaterial as the comment was intended for everyone in the FAO, which includes Finnegan, at that time. Therefore, the context of the comment, i.e. during the George Floyd protests, only compounds the abhorrent nature of the remark.” https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/10/2026/2026-Ohio-1981.pdf
THE COURT HELD:
“Elizabeth Finnegan, an African American woman, worked with Garrison in
the FAO on May 31, 2020…. On the date of the incident, Finnegan recalled
there were protests all around Columbus in response to the murder of George Floyd….Finnegan commented that ‘it was hard to believe that in 2020 we were dealing with incidents like that.’ … During the May 31, 2020 shift, Finnegan was stationed
close to Garrison and recalled that an officer with Engine 15 asked for an estimated time of arrival on a row one and law enforcement…. After Garrison ended the call, he
stated, ‘Just stand on their neck and wait until they get there. It will be okay.’ …
Finnegan was interviewed by internal affairs soon after the incident.
***
Keller is a FAO lieutenant for the Columbus Division of Fire…. Keller recalled that Garrison ‘made a statement or a comment referring to standing on someone’s neck.’… After the statement, Keller removed Garrison from the room to deescalate the situation…. Keller told Garrison that the statement was offensive and unprofessional, which Garrison agreed…. Keller recalled that Garrison later apologized for the comment to the entire room…. Keller gave Garrison a ‘form PI-17’ for counseling to ‘go over the rules, show him the rules that he broke.’… Keller was not involved in the subsequent investigation or decision to discipline Garrison for the incident.”
Legal lesson learned: Court made it clear that comments that can be viewed as “abusive or violent behavior” can lead to termination.
Note: The firefighter had previously been on a “last chance agreement.”
“On redirect [at Civil Service Commission hearing], [Assistant Chief David] Baugh stated that he was aware of Garrison’s multiple disciplinary infractions prior to these two incidents…. ‘One was dishonesty regarding where he was at for work, and he served 48-hour suspension. And the other was an incident that involved him exposing himself to a civilian while in uniform. And by exposing himself, I mean exposing his genitals to a civilian while in uniform. And he was offered a last chance agreement for a certain time frame.’ … That last chance agreement had expired by the time of these new cases.
File: Chap. 16 – Discipline, incl. Code of Ethics, Social Media, Hazing
CA: ABSENCE WITHOUT LEAVE – FIRED – CASE DISMISSED
On May 22, 2026, in Jason Casillas v. Department of Forestry and Fire Protection, U.S. District Court Judge Benjamin J. Cheeks, United States District Court for Southern District of California, grated Cal Fire’s motion to dismiss. Absent without leave CAL FIRE Sandiego on September 1, 2024, and again on September 18, 2024; terminated on September 28, 2024. THE COURT WROTE: “On September 28, 2024, Battalion Chief Clays (‘Clays’) served Plaintiff with two separate adverse action documents. The first was a Notice of Termination with Cause, and the second placed Plaintiff on Administrative Time Off…. Plaintiff argues that the documentation violated CAL FIRE's Progressive Disciplinary Policy and Procedures because he did not receive a development plan to correct any mistakes before he received the Notice of Termination with Cause…. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Complaint fails to state a plausible claim for relief and grants Defendant's motion to dismiss without prejudice.” https://public.fastcase.com/Jhe1Qn%2BmJndQYQU6z%2FeNm3FkCM2jWCAdlM1JWFE9c8I4cu8UE8nnROw9g8pQru3qX50wM6VA5Q6C6W7bTimjewt8baK5LV89G9hOJ3Hoqaw%3D?utm_medium=email&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-_BuWF_rVxZJ_ThXodME56Qn02TlxXtEPZR0pM596-W86IiSz4xrEN_MpysqbI906jQkVOKXR9ddhRRIzUH7APhy4Ve8A&_hsmi=226712652&utm_content=226712652&utm_source=hs_email
THE COURT HELD:
“Plaintiff claims that on August 31, 2024, he told Fire Captain Haven (‘Haven’) that he would not be coming to work on September 1, 2024…. On September 1, 2024, Plaintiff asserts that he told [Fire Captain] Woychak that he had given Haven notice that he would not be working that day. Yet, on September 15, 2024, Woychak told Plaintiff that he would be documented as ‘absent without leave’ for the September 1, 2024, shift….
On September 18, 2024, Plaintiff informed firefighter Vincent Media that he was leaving work because of an emergency involving his spouse…. Later that day, Plaintiff claims he spoke to Division Chief Reynolds (‘Reynolds’), who told Plaintiff ‘[n]ext time, please let a supervisor know, and if there is anything that you need, let us know.’ …According to Plaintiff, Reynolds knew that Plaintiff had been on FMLA leave, yet Plaintiff claims that this critical information was never documented in the Notice of Termination with Cause.
***
Despite being advised in the Complaint for Employment Discrimination to ‘write a short and plain statement of the claim’ in which he should “state how each defendant was involved and what each defendant did” that violated his rights, Plaintiff's claims do not meet this standard. In the first claim alone, Plaintiff lists 39 separate laws or common law rights he claims have been violated, including the Firefighters Procedural Bill of Rights Act, California Evidence Code § 210, Violation of Weingarten Rights, among numerous others…. He then lists Defendant CAL FIRE and Battalion Chief J. Clays as the defendants who purportedly violated his rights, but he does not connect the conduct of CAL FIRE or Clays to the asserted legal protections in the statement of facts. As a result, Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a cause of action against either of them. Claims two through six fare no better. While the Court is required to liberally construe Plaintiff's claims, it cannot provide the elements of a cause of action for him in the Complaint.”
Legal lesson learned: Absence without leave can result in termination; it is a serious offense.
Chap. 17: Arbitration, incl. Mediation, Labor Relations
LA: IAFF SEC. – CHIEF’S NEW CAR – FIRED / CASE PROCEED
On May 22. 2026, in Jonathan Gramm v. Desoto Parish Fire District 9, et al. , U.S. District Court Judge S. Maurice Hicks, Jr., United States District Court for Western District of Louisiana, Shreveport Division, denied the FD’s motion for summary judgment. THE COURT WROTE: “Accordingly, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Gramm, the Court finds that genuine disputes of material fact remain as to whether Gramm spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern. The record contains evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Gramm contacted Commissioners as a citizen and union representative to address a public budget matter, not pursuant to his ordinary duties as a Fire Captain.” https://public.fastcase.com/Jhe1Qn%2BmJndQYQU6z%2FeNm%2FDGnkNPmF%2FGN9ENyHmXzZguwABevXHo%2FJOs4DZQ3ccvXn%2B8i7GPeSKXZ%2FJuUaa2eSmBPBV%2FroWj%2BWUiix8FppM%3D?utm_medium=email&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-9ln45T61k1McKPYzdFhYaqHVpy9H3-ipNGhojNaHNF5Osr6BUzI4NGniJzh20R42JdVxn_jn5CFBBvjphJmsP_Zy8_gA&_hsmi=226712652&utm_content=226712652&utm_source=hs_email
THE COURT HELD:
“Gramm was employed by DFD9 as a Fire Captain and also served as secretary / treasurer for Local 5138 (the ‘union’)…. In September 2023, an agenda for an upcoming Board of Commissioners meeting was posted at the fire station and included an item concerning the proposed purchase of a vehicle for Chief King. Thereafter, firefighters discussed the proposed purchase during working hours at the station and expressed concerns regarding the allocation of district funds. Gramm contends that the firefighters believed available funds would be better spent on firefighting equipment and improvements to station conditions…. Because the firefighters were unable to attend the Board of Commissioner's meeting, they allegedly elected Gramm to contact the Commissioners directly because he was the union secretary treasurer.
***
On September 18, 2023, while off duty, Gramm telephoned Commissioners Ross Tilbury and Bobby Ettredge regarding the concerns…. It is undisputed that Gramm contacted the Commissioners without first discussing the matter with Chief King. It is likewise undisputed that Memorandum 18001 prohibited DFD9 personnel from contacting Board members regarding official district business without first conferring with their immediate supervisor…. Gramm acknowledges that he reviewed Memorandum 18001 when it was issued and understood that if he failed to comply with its directives, it would be considered insubordination.
***
However, the speech at issue involved public funds and public safety. Gramm's interest in speaking to government officials about whether taxpayer funds should be spent on a new chief's vehicle or on firefighting equipment is substantial. Moreover, the present record contains little to no evidence that Gramm's speech caused any actual disruption except for his termination and this lawsuit…. Additionally, Defendants' own position that Gramm could have raised the same concerns at a Board meeting weakens the argument that the substance of the speech itself was inherently disruptive. Defendants primarily contend that the manner of communication-calling Commissioners before the meeting rather than appearing publicly at the meeting or first speaking with Chief King-created the discipline problem. That may be a legitimate consideration, but it does not conclusively outweigh Gramm's First Amendment interests at this stage.”
Legal lesson learned: Union Secretary protected from retaliation under First Amendment if court finds he communicated to Commissioners as a citizen on a matter of public concern.
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