).png){kind=small}
)_edited.png)
AUGUST 2026 – FIRE & EMS LAW NEWSLETTER
- Aug 3
- 72 min read
[NEWSLETTER IS NOT PROVIDING LEGAL ADVICE.]
38 RECENT CASE REVIEWS
UPDATING: 2017: TEXTBOOK: FIRE SERVICE LAW (Second Edition; 2017)
(ISBN 978-1-4786-3397-6); Waveland Press: waveland.com/browse.php?t=708
Eight years of case reviews posted: National Fire Academy / NETC Library Index and Catalog: usfa.bibliovation.com/app/work/255508
Chap. 1 – American Legal System, incl. Fire Codes, Investigations, Arson
Chap. 2 – Line Of Duty Death / Safety
Chap. 3 – Homeland Security, incl. Active Shooter, Cybersecurity, Immigration
Chap. 4 – Incident Command, incl. Training, Drones, Communications
Chap. 5 – Emergency Vehicle Operations
Chap. 6 – Employment Litigation, incl. Work Comp., Age, Vet Rights
Chap. 7 – Sexual Harassment, incl. Pregnancy Discrimination, Gay Rights
Chap. 8 – Race / National Origin Discrimination
Chap. 9 – Americans With Disabilities Act
Chap. 10 – Family Medical Leave Act
Chap. 11 – Fair Labor Standards Act
Chap. 12 – Drug-Free Workplace, inc. Recovery
Chap. 13 – EMS, incl. Community Paramedicine, COVID-19
Chap. 14 – Physical & Medical Fitness, incl. Heart Health
Chap. 15 – Mental Health, incl. CISM, Peer Support, Pet Therapy
Chap. 16 – Discipline, incl. Code of Ethics, Social Media, Hazing
Chap. 17 – Arbitration, incl. Mediation, Labor Relations
Chap. 18 – Legislation, incl. Public Records
________________________________________________________________________
FULL CASE REVIEWS
Chap. 1 – American Legal System, incl. Fire Codes, Investigations, Arson
KY: ARSON - ANONYMOUS 911 CALLER – NOT HEARSAY
On July 24, 2026, in Nathan McClure v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky held (3 to 0) that trial court properly allowed jury to hear an anonymous 911 caller describing the arsonist’s conduct setting fire to his houseboat. The jury found McClure guilty of both third-degree arson and first-degree criminal mischief. It recommended the minimum sentence of one year on each charge to be served concurrently and the trial court sentenced McClure as recommended.
THE COURT WROTE:
‘In the instant case, there is no dispute that McClure intentionally set a fire on the night in question. However, a key issue at McClure’s jury trial was whether McClure had wantonly caused the destruction of the Cooks’ building…. One person who called three times about the fire chose to remain anonymous and asked if he was speaking with a particular dispatcher in one call. This anonymous caller first called to report that a man was burning a houseboat and to request that firefighters come to a specific location. The second call from this same caller reported the fire was escalating, provided a location, and expressed a fear of the fire spreading to his home. In his third and last call, the anonymous caller said he was the guy who had called before about a fire, but he declined to give his name. He stated:
The guy that’s burned this place, that’s f****ing
responsible one for it, is wild as a buck. He just took off
in a ton truck with a track on the back of it and piled it,
son of a b****, right over here across from Stephens Pipe
and Steel in their parking lot. Just ditched it. I think he’s
trying to run off.
***
Like the trial court, we agree with the Commonwealth that even the third anonymous call was aimed at obtaining emergency assistance and is therefore non-testimonial. Specifically, this last anonymous call recounted observing the person who had started the fire—whom the caller identified as McClure— engaging in actions including getting in a truck and unloading it and apparently trying to get away. The caller’s reports that the person responsible for the fire
appeared to be trying to get away could be reasonably construed as an implicit request for law enforcement to be immediately sent to the scene on an emergency basis.”
Legal lesson learned: Emergency call to 911 admissible in arson trial.
Chap. 1 – American Legal System, incl. Fire Codes, Investigations, Arson
NY: LAPTOP – “THERMAL RUNAWAY” – REPLACED BATTERY
On July 23, 2026, in Carol S. Marcellin, individually and Co-Administrator of the Estate of Charles E. Hollowell, deceased, et al. v. HP Inc. and Staples, Inc., U.S. District Court Judge Geoffrey W. Crawford, United States District Court for the Western District of New York, held that the plaintiffs’ motion to exclude the expert reports of HP and Staples are denied. Those reports point to the computer owner having replaced the batteries that led to the thermal runaway fire that killed wheelchair bound resident. Case to proceed to trial. public.fastcase.com/Jhe1Qn%2BmJndQYQU6z%2FeNm41Z%2FOdo7wEiV%2BXZOn6Ck9WelihsBDHZxfns7L5Vlobe8KCYik0lEXZYSVwiLsKn0UW5%2B2VWsVkokbGOgZx52u8%3D?utm_medium=email&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-9EI0U8e9McRrVX-UJhUyqBaKFqyfeNAikLllF44Be7atxg43fyP-ODCP6rir31MZENUpzNCQwvOHRXOJumMmb9zT3Dpw&_hsmi=226712652&utm_content=226712652&utm_source=hs_email
THE COURT WROTE:
“This is a personal injury case in which Plaintiffs Carol Marcellin and Jessica Hollowell-McKay have filed suit against Defendants HP, Inc., (HP) and Staples, Inc. (Staples), the manufacturer and retailer, respectively, of an HP Pavilion DV6 Laptop computer purchased by Marcellin in 2011. Their claims concern a fire that broke out at Marcellin's Ceres, New York residence on January 24, 2020, injuring Marcellin and killing her partner Charles Hollowell…. On the night of January 19, 2020, Marcellin left the HP laptop powered on and charging on an armoire in the office of her home while it downloaded an anti-virus software update…. She testified that this was the first instance in which she had left the laptop charging overnight…. Shortly after 4:00 a.m. on the morning of January 24, she was awoken by a smoke alarm located in the hallway outside her bedroom…. She then returned the bedroom, where she discovered that Hollowell had fallen while trying to get out of the bed…. Marcellin tried and failed to lift Hollowell into his wheelchair…. She was unable to find her cell phone to call for emergency assistance.
***
Karasinski and HP's battery expert Donald Galler examined evidence collected from the scene inspection at a subsequent investigation conducted at the Fire Research & Technology (FRT) laboratory in Sodus Point, New York on October 30, 2020…. Both Galler and Dr. Steve Martin, a battery expert retained by Plaintiffs who later reviewed the evidence from the laboratory investigation, concluded that the battery installed in the HP laptop at the time of the fire was not the original battery, nor a replacement authorized by HP…. HP's BMS systems required that batteries installed in its laptops be manufactured with certain microprocessors called ‘fuel gauges.’ Eight different types of fuel gauges were approved by HP for use in authorized Pavilion batteries. Six of these fuel gauges were manufactured by Texas Instruments, and were compatible with various authentication systems…. These systems would allow the device in which the battery was installed to verify that the installed battery was authorized for use in the device. One such system, which was implemented in some portable electronic devices at the time of the HP laptop's manufacture, employed a Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA-1). Under SHA-1 authentication, the host device can automatically query the installed battery to determine whether it is authorized for use in the device. The host device can be programmed to cease operating if the installed battery is incapable of SHA-1 authentication. In this way, SHA-1 authentication reduces the risks of using unauthorized batteries in the host device…. For reasons stated above, Plaintiffs' motion to exclude those reports under Rule 702 has been denied. The cause of the fire remains an issue of genuine dispute. Plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment on this issue is DENIED.”
Legal lesson learned: Case will proceed to trial; computer replacement batteries can lead to “thermal runaway” fires.
Chap. 1 – American Legal System, incl. Fire Codes, Investigations, Arson
U.S. SUP CT – WARRANT CELL PHONE LOCATION HISTORY
On June 29, 2026, in Okello Chatrie v. United States, the United States Supreme Court held (6 to 3) that that Virginia police officers conducted an illegal “search” when they obtained a search warrant from a Virginia magistrate for “geofence” cell phone data from Google – identifying who was near credit union when it was robbed at gun point on May 20, 2019, at about 4:50 p.m.
MAJORITY – JUSTICE ELENA KAGAN: “We hold that police officers invade a cell-phone user’s reasonable expectation of privacy when they access his Location History. It does not matter if the time period scrutinized was only two hours. Nor does it matter that the materials obtained were handed over by a third-party tech company.”
DISSENT – JUSTICE SAMUEL ALITO: “The majority reaches the opposite outcome, and in doing so, it announces a new rule of Fourth Amendment law: The police must obtain a warrant every time they access any cell-phone location information from a third party, however brief the duration, however innocuous the request, and however voluntarily that information was disclosed by the user.”
Case remanded to 4th Circuit to decide if the police conduct was “reasonable” as the law stood in 2018 when they got the search warrant (“good faith exception” to the exclusionary rule). If so, then the defendant’s conviction remains; he entered a conditional guilty plea pled guilty in federal court to robbing a credit union in Virginia, and was sentenced to 12 years in prison, and 3 years supervised release. supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/25-112_0am4.pdf
THE COURT WROTE (Majority opinion by Justice Elena Kagan):
“On May 20, 2019, at about 4:50 p.m., a man robbed a credit union in Midlothian, Virginia. The robber presented a teller with a handwritten note demanding $100,000, threatening to hurt her and her family if she did not comply, and warning her that he had “boys on the lookout out side.” 590 F. Supp. 3d, at 905–906. When the teller replied that she did not have access to that amount of money, the robber brandished a firearm. He ordered everyone in the bank to the ground, and forced the bank’s manager to open a safe and put $195,000 into a bag. The robber then left on foot with the money…. On June 14, the police officers thus applied to a Virginia magistrate for a geofence warrant directed to Google…. The District Court mainly agreed with Chatrie’s Fourth Amendment analysis, but still denied the motion to exclude the Location History evidence. Even though ‘this particular geofence warrant plainly violates the rights enshrined in [the Fourth] Amendment,’ the court stated, the officers’ reliance on it was not ‘objectively unreasonable.’ 590 F. Supp. 3d, at 905, 938. And because that was so, the court concluded, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule permitted admission of the location data. See id., at 937–938; United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897, 922–923 (1984) (establishing good-faith exception).
Footnote 2: Except that in July 2025, years after the geofence warrant used in this case, Google made a change: It now stores Location History data on individual users’ devices rather than on its own servers. See Brief for Google LLC as Amicus Curiae 2. Google represents that, as a result, it is no longer capable of responding to geofence warrants that seek Location History data.
***
We granted certiorari solely on the question whether the police violated the Fourth Amendment in obtaining Chatrie’s location data, thus declining to consider the exclusionary rule issue…. The disputed Fourth Amendment question divides into two parts. First, did law enforcement officials conduct a search under the Fourth Amendment when they acquired Chatrie’s location data from Google? We hold that they did because an individual has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his cell-phone location data. Second, did the multi-step geofence warrant issued here make that search reasonable? We leave that question—which requires deciding whether the warrant satisfied the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause and particularity requirements at each stage of the search process—to the Court of Appeals to address in the first instance…. For all those reasons, we hold that police officers invade a cell-phone user’s reasonable expectation of privacy when they access his Location History. It does not matter if the time period scrutinized was only two hours. Nor does it matter that the materials obtained were handed over by a third-party tech company.
Footnote 4: In line with our grant of certiorari, we do not address whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule still allows the admission of the Location History data in this case. That question remains for the Fourth Circuit to consider anew, gleaning anything it thinks relevant from our decision on the substantive Fourth Amendment issues.
Legal lesson learned: Search warrants will be required in criminal investigations for cell phone location history. This does not prohibit Fire, EMS and Law Enforcement in emergency situations – such as search of missing hiker walk away from nursing home – to have 911 Dispatch Centers obtain location information.
Note:
Perhaps other cell phone companies will follow Google change: Majority opinion - footnote 2: “It now stores Location History data on individual users’ devices rather than on its own servers…. Google represents that, as a result, it is no longer capable of responding to geofence warrants that seek Location History data.”
***
The “good-faith exception” will likely be found by the 4th Circuit. The Fourt Circuit, on July 9, 2024, held (2 to 1) that the government did not conduct a search and therefore did not need a warrant. Chatrie “did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in two hours’ worth of Location History data voluntarily exposed to Google.” 107 F. 4th 319, 325 (2024). cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/22-4489/22-4489-2024-07-09.pdf?ts=1720549856 .After granting rehearing en banc, the Fourth Circuit affirmed in a one-sentence per curiam. See 136 F. 4th 100, 101 (2025) The court divided evenly (7 to 7) on whether a Fourth Amendment search had occurred. [U.S. Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan wrote: “Of the seven judges who thought it had, most believed the geofence warrant defective. But most also thought the exclusionary rule’s good-faith exception applied, so ruled against Chatrie anyway.”]
Dissenting Justice Samuel Alito: “So, unless he can show that this evidence should be suppressed, he cannot obtain any relief. And his chances of making the showing needed to justify suppression are virtually zero.”
Chap. 1 – American Legal System, incl. Fire Codes, Investigations, Arson
CA: HABEAS – MURDER – VICTIM SHOT TWICE OR ONCE?
On July 22, 2026, In re Marcil McCowen on Habeas Corpus, the California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, Second Division published their June 25, 2026 unpublished decision, granting the prisoner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, where trial court judge in this first degree murder case (October 8, 1998 shooting; 2001 conviction; now serving 50 years to life) can hear testimony about discrepancy in evidence, and potentially could order new trial. courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/E087834.PDF
THE COURT WROTE:
“Petitioner Marcil McCowen was convicted of first degree murder (Pen. Code,1
§ 187, subd.(a)) in 2001 and was sentenced to a term of 50 years to life in prison…. The false evidence claim pertains to the testimony of a paramedic who testified at trial that the victim of the murder had sustained two gunshot wounds, one to the chest and one to the head, from which brain matter seeped. The People’s theory of premeditated murder related to the multiple wounds, despite a pathologist’s report indicating there was but one gunshot wound, which entered through the upper chest or neck, and exited from the upper back. The pathologist did not testify at trial, and the pathologist’s report was not introduced into evidence at trial.
***
Petitioner alleges that the prosecution’s reliance on the paramedic’s testimony, which was contradicted by the actual coroner’s report of the autopsy, resulted in a conviction based on false evidence in violation of his due process rights…. In the return, the People do not dispute that the paramedic witness testified that the victim had suffered two gunshot wounds, one to the head, causing brain matter to seep from the victim’s head, which was contradicted by the coroner’s report (which was not admitted into evidence), demonstrating there was but one bullet wound to
the upper chest and no bullet wound to the head, which the coroner found to be intact. However, the People assert there is no evidence the paramedic purposely lied or that the prosecutor knowingly presented false testimony, and that the discrepancy was not material…. The bottom line here is that there is no factual dispute that there is a significant discrepancy between the paramedic’s testimony and the coroner’s report, and that the People relied on the paramedic’s false or erroneous, yet uncorrected, testimony to argue that having shot at the victim twice, the murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated first degree murder. Given the prosecutor’s arguments at trial that repeatedly emphasized the two gunshot wounds to the victim as negating any claim of accident or self-defense, we must conclude that the paramedic’s testimony was material.”
Legal lesson learned: To avoid a possible retrial many years after the shooting, the prosecutor and the paramedic at the original trial should have addressed the discrepancy by also calling the coroner to testify (perhaps his autopsy report was inaccurate).
Chap. 1 – American Legal System, incl. Fire Codes, Investigations, Arson
MI: FIRE CODE - SELF EVAC - UPPER FL CARE FACILITY
On July 15, 2026, in RMH Solutions LLC v. Charter Township of Clinton, et al., the Court of Appeals of Michigan held (3 to 0; unpublished decision) that trial court erred by approving the care facility’s evacuation plan that was not approved by Fire Marshall; case remanded for further hearing. In November 2023, Chuck Champagne, the Fire Marshal of the Clinton Township Fire-Rescue-EMS, determined operating an assisted living facility on the upper three floors violated the 2015 IFC. The letter was written after an EMS run at the facility. Plaintiff’s staff called for assistance because of the inability to lift an obese resident. Champagne also observed several wheelchairs and scooters on the same upper floor.
THE COURT WROTE:
“Notably, the Township oversaw a fire drill at the facility on May 7, 2024. Of 58 residents living on the third and fourth floors, 37 residents were ‘[n]ot capable” of self-evacuating during an emergency. …. In attempting to achieve compliance with I-1 condition 2 occupancy, plaintiff installed evacuation chairs allowing ‘for easy evacuation over the staircase,’ and an evacuation board allowing ‘for sliding over the staircase until the person is evacuated from the building[.]’ Those measures were in addition to the installation of ‘an additional set of automatic doors,’ which would split ‘a larger hallway into two.’ … Defendants maintained there were 37 residents ‘incapable of evacuating,’ and not enough staff available to assist with the
evacuations. Moreover, the time frame involved for each resident’s removal was not addressed in the record. Defendants argued Donoian’s plan constituted an admission that plaintiff was ‘housing people inappropriate [sic] for this facility.’ Frank Bayer, a certified building official in Sterling Heights, averred the facility was noncompliant with the I-1 condition 2 occupancy and the “proposed use of [six] chairs and [eight] employees for possible evacuation of 75 patients in less than [one] hour is not only impractical but extremely unsafe.” He also averred two employees would have to move each resident to an evacuation chair.
***
Because of the lack of information regarding the number of employees to attend to the respective residents and the time frame involved, it was unclear whether residents would be taking refuge in the stairwells. Moreover, the trial court did not address whether the applicable building code required the facility employees to perform the complete evacuation or whether refuge in the stairwell was permissible while waiting for first responders. Thus, further factual development is required regarding the number of residents requiring assistance to evacuate during an emergency, and the precise methods the eight staff members are to use to assist those residents in exiting the facility. That will allow a proper resolution of whether plaintiff’s plan complies with the codes for status as a I-1 condition 2 occupancy.”
Legal lesson learned: Fire code decisions involve life safety issues; case is remanded for further evidence.
Chap. 2 – Line Of Duty Death / Safety
AZ: DEATH BENEFITS - WILDLAND FF PREP TO DEPLOY
On July 6, 2026, in Adventure Medics LLC, et al v. The Industrial Commission of Arizona
; Steven Keller, Decedent, the Court of Appeals of Arizona, First Division held (3 to 0) that the Administrative Law Judge properly determined that the wildland firefighter / paramedic, having just returned from 3-week deployment, and preparing to deploy again in 106-degree day, with heavy lifting and assembling his gear for 3-hours, was a “substantial contributing cause” in his heart attack. jpr.azcourts.gov/Portals/1/OpinionFiles/Div1/2026/1%20CA-IC%2025-0025%20ADVENTURE%20v.%20KEFFER%20FINAL.pdf?ver=hx0rmccmFEWVVBJi2He9pA%3D%3D
THE COURT WROTE:
“Keffer worked seasonally as a firefighter and paramedic for Adventure Medics, a company that provides first responders to wildland fires. On a 106-degree day in August 2023, Keffer returned home from a three-week deployment fighting a wildland fire. Keffer had to prepare immediately to redeploy the next day to another fire. He was alone at the house, and his wife and teenage children were in another state. He talked to his wife on the phone at about 3:00 p.m. and was seen washing his work truck in his driveway about 3:30 p.m. He sent a text message to a
co-worker around 5:30 p.m. which was the last outgoing communication on his phone. The next day, the police conducted a welfare check and found Keffer dead, lying face down in his bedroom. The coroner conducted an autopsy and determined Keffer died of natural causes, specifically a heart attack.
Keffer was 62 years old and in good health, with no reported heart problems or any other health problems. Uncontested evidence showed Keffer's preparation routine consisted of removing, cleaning and checking, and repacking all his equipment from his work truck, including both medical and camping equipment. This preparation was done in his garage and driveway. The preparations usually took about three to four hours to complete. Adventure Medics admitted Keffer was on duty when he died…. Dr. Ehrlich, a cardiologist, provided a medical opinion about the relationship between Keffer's employment activities and his heart attack. Dr. Ehrlich testified that Keffer ‘had a heart attack from a ruptured plaque that blocked off his coronary artery’ which caused ‘cardiac arrest.’ He described risk factors that could cause a plaque to rupture such as heavy physical activity and high temperatures. He determined those factors were present on the day Keffer died, stating: ‘[I]t's the perfect setup for a man who has these really easy-to-break plaques to have one break.’ He opined that ‘the activities outside in the heat were what triggered’ the ruptured plaque, saying the rupture was ‘very, very, very probably related to’ what Keffer was doing outside before he went into the house…. The medical examiner, Dr. Hu, also testified. He opined, based on the circumstances in which Keffer's body was found, that the rupture in the artery happened sometime during the day but he could not say exactly when. He acknowledged that heavy lifting and expos’re to heat could have contributed to the heart attack. Dr. Hu testified that he could not say with a "reasonable degree of medical certainty’ that the excess lifting and heat was a substantial contributing cause of the plaque rupture because he did not know Keffer's activity before his death, but these types of activities ‘could be substantial.
***
After reviewing the evidence, the ALJ found Dr. Ehrlich's opinion ‘more probably correct and well-founded’ that the work activities Keffer was performing were a substantial contributing cause of the heart attack and death. He noted the only difference in the opinion of Dr. Hu was he was less certain than Dr. Ehrlich about causation. The ALJ issued an award finding the claim compensable.”
Legal lesson learned: Death benefits awarded based on wildland firefighting recent deployment, his pre-deployment heat, heavy lifting.
Chap. 3 – Homeland Security, incl. Active Shooter, Cybersecurity, Immigration
MA: GRANTS – “DOGE” CUTS - 20 STATES / INJUNCTION
On July 21, 2026, in State of New Jersey, et al. v. United States Office of Management & Budget, U.S. District Court Judge Indira Talwan, United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, granted the States’ motion for summary judgment; this impacts billions of federal dollars. The court declared that federal regulations do not allow terminations of awards based on new program goals or agency priorities that an agency identifies after granting the award. On January 20, 2025, President Trump issued an Executive Order creating the United States Department of Government Efficiency (‘DOGE’). Establishing and Implementing the President’s ‘‘Department of Government Efficiency,’’ Exec. Order No. 14158, 90 Fed. Reg. 8441 (Jan. 20, 2025).
THE COURT WROTE:
“Plaintiffs allege that, since January 2025, federal agencies have terminated billions of dollars in federal grant funding awarded to Plaintiffs. These terminations have affected grants for universities, initiatives to combat violent crime and hate crimes, and school lunch programs, among other programs… Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claims must wait until ‘a termination actually happens” to challenge grant terminations…. The ripeness doctrine imposes no such requirement. It is sufficient that the potential harm be imminent…. The Implementation of the President’s Vision As discussed above, Defendants’ interpretation of the Termination Clause is not clearly supported by the text of the provision, runs counter to the regulatory scheme, receives no support in the rulemaking history, and would violate the Spending Clause’s requirement that conditions be imposed unambiguously. Defendants insist, however, the Plaintiffs’ interpretation of the Termination Clause would be contrary to the function of the OMB: supporting each President in implementing ‘his or her vision across the Executive Branch.’ … (internal quotation omitted).
***
Nothing in this interpretation of the Termination Clause limits the President or Agencies from setting program goals and agency priorities before awarding new grants. The regulation, as declared by this court, demands only that grantees be apprised of those goals and priorities before grants are awarded…. Accordingly, the court finds that the Termination Clause does not permit the termination of grants based on their inability to effectuate program goals and agency priorities identified after the award was made.”
Legal lesson learned: Important decision impacting billions of dollars in federal grants
Note: See articles about this decision.
July 19, 2026: Boston judge rejects US administration’s use of agency priorities clause in funding cuts. canadianlawyermag.com/news/international/boston-judge-rejects-us-administrations-use-of-agency-priorities-clause-in-funding-cuts/394386
July 18, 2026; Federal judge bars Trump administration from using obscure clause to make huge funding cuts. kltv.com/2026/07/19/federal-judge-bars-trump-administration-using-obscure-clause-make-huge-funding-cuts/
July 17, 2026: Boston federal judge bars Trump administration from using obscure clause to make huge funding cuts. boston.com/news/national-news/2026/07/17/boston-federal-judge-bars-trump-administration-from-using-obscure-clause-to-make-huge-funding-cuts/
July 16, 2026: Hundreds of NIH grant terminations are ‘void and illegal,’ federal judge rules. statnews.com/2025/06/16/nih-research-cuts-ruled-illegal-by-federal-judge-william-young/
Chap. 3 – Homeland Security, incl. Active Shooter, Cybersecurity, Immigration
CA: PUBLIC SAFETY GRANTS – INJUNCTION TRUMP DEI
On July 9, 2026, in City of Fresno, et al. v. Markwayne Mullin, et al., U.S. District Court Judge William H. Orrick, United States District Court for the Northern District of California, granted the motions by eleven cities and counties to enjoin enforcement of DEI “Challenged Conditions” at DHS, DOJ, and DOI in grants for which plaintiffs have applied or intend to apply. In 2025, Judge Orrick likewise issued a preliminary injunction for County of Santa Clara preventing the Trump Administration from withholding federal funding to Plaintiff cities and counties unless they assist the federal government with its civil immigration enforcement responsibilities. courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/fresno-prelim-grants.pdf
THE COURT WROTE:
“The result of their imposition of the Challenged Conditions would irreparably injure plaintiffs and their ability to provide critical services, as well as would threaten public safety…. Since taking office in January 2025, President Trump has issued numerous executive orders that impose conditions on federal funding that plaintiffs believe ‘bear little or no connection to the purposes of the grant programs Congress established, lack statutory authorization, conflict with the law as interpreted by the courts, and are even at odds with the purposes of the grants they purport to amend.’ … These orders particularly attack ‘diversity, equity, and inclusion’ (‘DEI’) and ‘diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility’ (‘DEIA’) programs and policies that many government entities have adopted, as well as states and governments who, in their view, fail to comply with federal immigration and anti-discrimination laws.
***
At present, plaintiffs are forced to make a Hobson’s choice—accept funding with potentially unconstitutional or harmful conditions or forego funding altogether. I have previously found this scenario to constitute irreparable harm and do so again here. See Santa Clara, 815 F. Supp. 3d at 1041; City & Cnty. of S.F. v. Trump, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1077, 1082 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (finding ‘irreparable injury in the form of budgetary uncertainty, deprivation of constitutional rights, and undermining trust between the Cities and Counties and the communities they serve’). I find that each plaintiff has established that it is likely to suffer both short- and long-term negative consequences and injury unless I grant a preliminary injunction in their favor for programs to which it has applied or intends to apply…. As in Santa Clara, plaintiffs’ interest in ensuring that their communities receive funding for critical infrastructure, public safety, harm reduction, victim assistance, and emergency response programs far exceeds defendants’ interests. Plaintiffs represent the interests of millions of individuals, and many plaintiffs are unable to otherwise fund critical programs without these grants. They have a compelling interest in a preliminary injunction. So does the general public, which is interested in seeing its communities receive funding for critical infrastructure and public safety initiatives—funding that is paid for by their federal tax dollars. It is also interested in seeing that regulations passed by Congress are properly implemented; should relief not be granted, many grant programs will be contradicted or impermissibly overridden by the President's Executive Orders. These interests also strongly weigh in favor of granting a preliminary injunction.”
Legal lesson learned: These California cities and counties, like others nationwide, have a critical interest in receiving public safety grants that do not include unclear provisions regarding DEI.
Note: See April 24, 2025 Press Release by Santa Clara County Attorney after Judge Orrick issued a preliminary injunction in the Santa Clara, preventing the Trump Administration from withholding federal funding to Plaintiff cities and counties unless they assist the federal government with its civil immigration enforcement responsibilities. sf.gov/news-federal-court-blocks-trump-administration-from-withholding-funds-to-sanctuary-jurisdictions
File: Chap. 4, Incident Command
NJ: PROM EXAM QUEST - 2nd FL DORM FIRE – GRADED FAIR
On July 21, 2026, In The Matter Of Brian S. Morton, Fire Officer, North Hudson Fire And Rescue, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, held (2 to 0; unpublished opinion) that court upholds the New Jersey Civil Service Commission ruling denying the fire fighters appeal about the scoring of his promotional examination. In 2022, Morton completed the promotional examination for Fire Officer 1, which consisted of a written and oral examination. Morton passed with a combined score of 87.680, ranking thirty-first on the promotion list. Morton argued he received an erroneous score of two on the technical component of the "evolving scenario" section of the oral examination - hypothetical fire on the second floor of a college dormitory with the candidate serving as the first-level supervisor of the first arriving engine company. njcourts.gov/system/files/court-opinions/2026/a0803-24.pdf
THE COURT WROTE:
“The SME awarded Morton a two for ‘fail[ing] to perform the mandatory action of ordering the fire department connection (FDC) standpipe/sprinklers to be fed and miss[ing] a number of additional opportunities, including, in part, the opportunity to ensure fire doors are properly controlled.’ … In challenging his score, Morton disputed the validity of ‘requiring the first due engine to always feed the FDC as a mandatory response.’ … We discern no due process violation in the Commission's not entertaining oral argument…. Here, Morton does not dispute he had the ability to review his oral examination. Additionally, both Morton's merits brief and the Commission's written decision refer extensively to Morton's responses and the PCAs he missed. We perceive no basis to conclude Morton was denied adequate opportunity to review his oral examination results prior to his appeal.”
Legal lesson learned: The Civil Service Commission can decided an appeal based on the administrative record; no right to appear before the Commission for oral argument.
Chap. 5 – Emergency Vehicle Operations
LA: SEVERE INJURY - EMT $81M – HELP PT / NO SEAT BELT
On July 1, 2026, in Sherri Tramble v. Joshua Briscoe, et al., the Court of Appeals of Louisiana, Third Circuit held (3 to 0) that trial court judge properly excluded the testimony of defense witness about the failure of severely injured EMT to wear a seat belt while in back of the ambulance tending to the patient. The driver who ran into the ambulance was found by jury 100% at fault; the Court of Appeals did however reduce the jury award from $219,742,924.31 to $40,000,000.00 in general damages and $41,300,219.00 in future medical expenses. cases.justia.com/louisiana/third-circuit-court-of-appeal/2026-ca-0025-0423.pdf?ts=1782919449
THE COURT WROTE:
“This lawsuit arises out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred on July 8, 2021, on Louisiana Highway 182 in St. Landry Parish, Louisiana. Sherri Tramble (‘Sherri’), an EMT, was attending a patient in the back of a 2019 Ram Express ambulance driven by Margo Bellard. Joshua Briscoe, the driver of a 2019 Chevrolet Silverado, was traveling north crossing Louisiana Highway 182 in order to access the U.S. Interstate 49 entrance ramp. Plaintiff alleges that Joshua Briscoe failed to yield to the ambulance causing the ambulance to strike the rear right side of the 2019 Chevrolet Silverado. It was stipulated by the parties that Briscoe was in the course and scope of his employment with Linetec Service, LLC at the time of the subject accident, and Linetec Service, LLC is responsible for any negligence and fault of Briscoe in connection with the Accident….After a trial, the jury found the defendant driver 100% at fault for the accident and awarded the Plaintiff damages totaling $219,742,924.31.
***
We have reviewed both the record before us in this appeal and the applicable law. As before in the writ application, the evidence in the record is that there is no law requiring an EMT tending to a patient to use a seat belt, there is no evidence that expert [John B.] Everlove knew whether Sherri was standing, seated or tending to the patient at the time of the accident, and there is no evidence that Sherri was not tending to the patient at the time of the accident. Additionally, it is clear from Everlove’s deposition testimony that he did not have any knowledge of circumstances present in the back of the ambulance prior to the accident. Thus, any opinion by Defendants’ expert as to whether Sherri breached any alleged standard of care of an EMT under the circumstances present would be of no value.
Moreover, any opinion that Sherri was at fault for the accident for lack of seat belt usage is rendered meritless by the undisputed circumstances of the accident and the training Saint Landry EMS provided regarding seat belt usage. At the time of the accident, Margo Bellard was driving the ambulance while Krystle Johnson was riding in the front and Sherri was in the back with the patient, Mr. Kenneth Isles. Both Johnson and Bellard testified that while a patient is in the back of the ambulance, it is proper to be unrestrained when doing active care on the patient.
Bellard testified to the following:
Q. And Ms. Johnson told the jury that when she was trained by St. Landry EMS, they trained her on when she should and shouldn’t wear seatbelt [sic] in the back of the ambulance. Did you receive similar training?
A. Correct.
Q. And she told the jury that while she’s doing that, or while somebody in the back of the ambulance is doing active care on a patient, it’s okay for them to not be restrained while they’re providing that care. Is that the same treatment-
A. Correct.
Q. ...training that you got?
A. mm-hmm. [affirmative]
Additionally, Bellard testified that it was not possible for an EMT to provide care to a patient while buckled in the seat where Sherri was seated. Bellard also testified that the patient, Mr. Isles, iterated that Sherri was administering care to him when the wreck happened. These testimonies are undisputed. Accordingly, we find no error in our disposition of Defendants’ previous writ application and no merit to this issue raised again on appeal for review. Therefore,
we find the trial court was within its discretion to exclude the testimony of
Defendants’ expert, John B. Everlove.”
Legal lesson learned: Tragic accident, but no Louisiana law requiring EMT to wear seat belt when tending to patient in rear of ambulance.
Note: See this Nov. 14, 2025 article, “6 lifesaving seat belt tips for EMTs and paramedics. Try these tips to make seat belt use in the patient care compartment just as normal as your personal vehicle.” ems1.com/ems-products/ambulance-safety/articles/6-lifesaving-seat-belt-tips-for-emts-and-paramedics-Xz0h9ek4lqN37Hmc/
Chap. 5 – Emergency Vehicle Operations
TX: CRASH INTER - 20 MPH – SLOW DOWN “IF NECESSARY”
On June 30, 2026, in Oscar Lopez v. City of Houston, the Court of Appeals of Texas, Fourteenth District held (3 to 0) that trial court properly granted judgment for the City, under the “emergency exception” for municipal liability. The lead engine entered intersection going 20 mph, with two vehicles stopped. Video from nearby business showed he didn’t slow down; statute only requires slow down “as necessary for safe operation.” See Tex. Transp. Code §546.001(2). cases.justia.com/texas/fourteenth-court-of-appeals/2026-14-25-00343-cv.pdf?ts=1782834443
THE COURT WROTE:
“At approximately 5:00 a.m. on February 6, 2021, Houston Fire Department (‘HFD’) Station 93 received a 9-1-1 dispatch regarding a house fire. Two units from Station 93 were dispatched to address the fire, Engine 93 and Ladder 93, along with Engine 52 from Station 52. Upon receiving the dispatch orders, HFD Engineer/Operator Anthony Grizzaffi, HFD Junior Captain Erick Mikel, as well as other HFD fire fighters boarded Engine 93. Engineer/Operator Grizzaffi was the assigned driver of Engine 93, and Junior Captain Mikel rode in the front passenger seat of Engine 93…. Engineer/Operator Grizzaffi and Captain Mikel both observed two vehicles at the intersection yielding the right of way to Engine 93 and the other two HFD units; one was stopped in the designated left-turn lane and one was stopped in the middle lane. Grizzaffi stated in his affidavit that he was driving at under twenty miles per hour as he passed through the intersection. As the front quadrant of Engine 93 passed through the three lanes of the intersection, Grizzaffi heard a ‘metallic thump.’ Grizzaffi later learned that Lopez had ‘t-boned’ Engine 93 in a Nissan Sentra as Engine 93 passed through the intersection. The Sentra struck Engine 93 behind the engine’s front passenger wheel, which is located approximately seven feet behind the front of the front bumper.
***
Lopez filed deposition testimony from investigating policeman Officer Wu that surveillance video obtained from a nearby business showed Engine 93 did not slow down before crossing the intersection…. Officer Wu testified that he reviewed surveillance video of the three HFD units passing through the intersection. Wu testified that while he did not see Lopez strike Engine 93 on the video, he noticed that Engine 93 did not slow down before it passed through the intersection, whereas Ladder 93 and Engine 52 slowed down before driving through the intersection. Wu testified that he could see on the video that all three units had their emergency lights activated at the time. The excerpts from Wu’s deposition did not include any indication whether the sirens on the HFD units were audible at the time of the collision…. Under the facts presented, these fact issues preclude a conclusive showing of good faith and therefore preclude summary judgment based on official immunity.
Transportation Code section 546.001(2) applies to emergency action and is at issue here. Section 546.001(2) provides that when responding to an emergency call, an operator of an emergency vehicle may ‘proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, after slowing as necessary for safe operation[.]’ See Tex. Transp. Code §546.001(2). Slowing as necessary, however, does not relieve a driver of an emergency vehicle from “the consequences of reckless disregard for the safety of others.” Id. § 546.005(2)…. Under these facts, it was not necessary for Grizzaffi to slow Engine 93 further before entering the intersection…. because the summary-judgment evidence conclusively shows the emergency exception applies, the trial court did not err by granting final summary judgment in the City’s favor.”
Legal lesson learned: The evidence showed the FAO was driving safely when entering intersection, with lights and siren, at 20 mph.
Chap. 6 – Employment Litigation, incl. Work Comp., Age Discrim., Vet Rights
NY: NECK / SHOULDER – DEGENER - NO DISAB BENEFITS
On July 24, 2026, In The Matter Of Randy Spencer, the Supreme Court of New York, Fourth Department held (5 to 0) that the firefighter was properly denied disability benefits. The firefighter’s treating physician concluded that neck and right should injuries were a direct result of the March 7, 2019 on duty crash when he was driving the fire truck, the doctor never reviewed the firefighter’s prior medical records. The City’s physician did review the pre-accident medical history, which revealed prior chronic degeneration of neck and shoulder. public.fastcase.com/Jhe1Qn%2BmJndQYQU6z%2FeNm3BZXxMtfKvDKUuuTsV2npm66ieHwlmdQlB7eZ5vGA8QuOESb%2F3K1RQvpQEkPuEDUbGjL%2Fa81lCq0WbwpmSle%2Fs%3D?utm_medium=email&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-_5eDAf6zJHZ3x5XTDJZmK3o4KVQ_64dEa2tiItnjUQH6kGchr0D5wuvNQXhbtIIPVnIy-jvGCDQGSZmLLj65ZPiQLHfg&_hsmi=226712652&utm_content=226712652&utm_source=hs_email
THE COURT WROTE:
“At the hearing, petitioner presented evidence that he was involved in an on-duty motor vehicle accident while he was driving a City fire truck on March 7, 2019, and that he suffered neck and right shoulder injuries that rendered him physically unable to return to work as a firefighter. Petitioner's evidence included testimony from a physician who began treating petitioner for complaints of neck and right arm pain on March 28, 2019. Although the physician did not review any of petitioner's medical records from before March 7, 2019, the physician opined that petitioner's injuries were caused by the motor vehicle accident.
***
While the City did not dispute that petitioner was permanently disabled, the City's examining physician testified that petitioner's prior medical history indicated that his injuries began before March 7, 2019, and were the result of chronic degeneration. The physician thus opined that petitioner's injuries were preexisting and not caused by the motor vehicle accident. The Hearing Officer found both physicians to be credible but found the opinion of the City's expert more persuasive in light of the physician's review of petitioner's pre-accident medical history. The Hearing Officer "was entitled to weigh the parties' conflicting medical evidence and to assess the credibility of the witnesses, and [w]e may not weigh the evidence or reject [the Hearing Officer's] choice where the evidence is conflicting and room for a choice exists" (Matter of Erie County Sheriff' s Police Benevolent Assn., Inc. v County of Erie, 159 A.D.3d 1561, 1562 [4th Dept 2018] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Childs v City of Little Falls, 109 A.D.3d 1148, 1149 [4th Dept 2013]). We have reviewed petitioner's remaining contention and conclude that it does not require a different result.”
Legal lesson learned: Expert testimony is critical in workers compensation case.
Chap. 6 – Employment Litigation, incl. Work Comp., Age Discrim., Vet Rights
MA: BACK INJURY – ALSO LYMPHOMA – GETS WORK COMP
On July 24, 2026, In re Michael Gallaher, the Appeals Court of Massachusetts held (3 to 0) that the Administrative Law Judge, and the Review Board of the Department of Industrial Accidents, properly ordered the City to pay ongoing workers comp benefits. The Medic, injured back in 2019 and again in 2021, had to retire and now requires use of a wheelchair with severe neurological deficit. When medical examinations showed that the Medic also has non-Hodgkin's lymphoma; the City in 2022 filed a complaint for discontinuance of benefits, contending that any ongoing disability was no longer related to the industrial injury. The firefighter’s expert was key to the decision: while ‘lifting incident did occur in the presence of probable preexisting lymphoma. However, that lifting injury significantly worsened the back and left leg symptoms.’ public.fastcase.com/Jhe1Qn%2BmJndQYQU6z%2FeNm5P3wAYrkQ98kdLlymoB1tnqkW6UeoR3EEofjHZbRGV948hVvIxCPDS9tpBfFEcmqGTc7kKGvATMMrEucF8thr8%3D?utm_medium=email&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-8jIFUULBvOMnFFZTJscGA3kv4aE6mAq6MuaEb49Zar3qBrOzpASOYVP1MlSDLvHBN7GmUVAcOXynKq8kt28mHQPYsJ8w&_hsmi=226712652&utm_content=226712652&utm_source=hs_email
THE COURT WROTE:
“On August 18, 2019, he ‘injured his back lifting a patient,’ and experienced mid to low back pain and numbness associated with radiation down the left leg. He subsequently returned to work, and on February 20, 2021 ‘sustained further tragic injuries to his lumbar spine, responding to a call for cardiac arrest.’ [Footnote 1: While lifting a patient for transport, Gallagher ‘felt a pop in his back with immediate intense pain down his left leg.’] As a result of this accident, he did not return to work. He reported the injury to the city, which began paying for medical treatment and weekly disability benefits effective February 20, 2021…. Gallagher now requires the use of a wheelchair and ongoing medical treatment and care ‘for his now permanent, severe neurological deficits.’
***
The city offered the reports of (1) an anesthesiologist who opined that the work-related injury of February 20, 2021, was not the cause of Gallagher's symptoms, and (2) a hematologist and oncologist who opined that Gallagher ‘had an injury which resulted in some of the paraparesis, but the cauda equina syndrome was due to the evolving intravascular large B-cell lymphoma.’
The sole contention on appeal is that the board's summary affirmance of the administrative judge's decision was arbitrary, capricious, contrary to law, or an abuse of discretion because it was based on legally insufficient medical opinion evidence. We affirm. Here, there is no merit to the city's claim that the IME's causation opinions were not stated to a reasonable degree of medical certainty. Contrary to this claim, the IME wrote in his report as follows:
"it is my professional opinion, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that causally related to the industrial injury of 02/20/21, Mr. Gallagher sustained an acute injury at L4-5 resulting in a broad based disc protrusion with subsequent acute onset of back pain and left lumbar radiculopathy in the presence of non-Hodgkin's lymphoma."
He further opined that the ‘lifting incident did occur in the presence of probable preexisting lymphoma. However, that lifting injury significantly worsened the back and left leg symptoms.’ He also stated, ‘In my opinion, the industrial incident of 02/20/2021 was a major, but not necessarily predominant cause of his onset of back and left leg symptoms, as well as results of cauda equina syndrome.’ To avoid any confusion, he repeated that ‘[a]11 my opinions are stated to within a reasonable degree of medical certainty.’ Thus, this aspect of the city's argument fails.”
Legal lesson learned: The Medic’s expert was key to continuing benefits.
Chap. 6 – Employment Litigation, incl. Work Comp., Age Discrim., Vet Rights
PA: MEDIC - BACK & PTSD – NO SOC. SEC. / OTHER WORK
On July 15, 2026, in Brian Robert Bohr v. Frank Bisiganano, Commissioner of Social Security, U.S .Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson, United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, affirmed the decision of the Administrative Law Judge. His PTSD included on October 26, 2022, the claimant was voluntarily hospitalized for suicidal ideation without a plan, reporting ongoing pain and depression relating to his physical conditions and inability to work, losing his pet of fourteen (14) years, and feeling like a burden to his family. cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/pennsylvania/pamdce/1:2024cv00290/141189/15/0.pdf?ts=1784317755
THE COURT WROTE:
“A hearing was conducted in this case on March 7, 2023, at which Bohr and a vocational expert testified…. In his testimony, Bohr highlighted ongoing issues with his cervical, thoracic, and lumbar spine with the pain exacerbating his mental health symptoms…. And, while plaintiff's counsel noted that his overexertion can lead to pain, he also indicated that Bohr retained an ability to at least perform some physical activity and activities of daily living. For example, he noted instances where the plaintiff shoveled snow, fixed flashing, and helped his father repair drywall, although he stated he ended up hospitalized after each instance…. Having made these findings, the ALJ concluded that Bohr could not perform his past relevant work but that there were other jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that he could perform…. Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Bohr had not met the stringent standard of disability set by law and denied this claim.
***
In closing, the ALJ's assessment of the evidence in this case complied with the dictates of the law and was supported by substantial evidence. This is all that the law requires, and all that a claimant can demand in a disability proceeding. Thus, notwithstanding the argument that this evidence might have been viewed in a way which would have also supported a different finding, we are obliged to affirm this ruling once we find that it is ‘supported by substantial evidence, ‘even [where] this court acting de novo might have reached a different conclusion.’ Monsour Med. Ctr. v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 1190-91 (3d Cir. 1986) (quoting Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. NLRB, 804 F.2d 808, 812 (3d Cir. 1986)). Accordingly, under the deferential standard of review that applies to appeals of Social Security disability determinations, we find that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's evaluation of this case and will affirm that decision.”
Legal lesson learned: Social Security disability requires proof the claimant cannot perform any jobs, not just work as a medic; courts follow a “deferential standard of review: where ALJ decision must be upheld when there is “substantial evidence” supporting the ALJ's determination.
Chap. 7 – Sexual Harassment, incl. Pregnancy Discrimination
OH: FEMALE EMT FIRED – PORN PHOTOS MALE EMT / WIFE
On July 17, 2026, in Gertrude Crisp v. Scioto Ambulance District, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (Cincinnati) held (3 to 0) that U.S. District Court judge properly granted summary judgment to the Ambulance District in Portsmouth, Ohio; the court discussed the “craziness” conduct of a male EMT trying to put plaintiff in a trash can, and also the plaintiff’s conduct several years later sharing online pornographic images of the male EMT and his wife. cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/25-3885/25-3885-2026-07-17.pdf?ts=1784323840
THE COURT WROTE:
“According to Gertrude Crisp, an emergency medical technician, ‘the inmates run[] the insane asylum’ at her former workplace, the Scioto Ambulance District…. Part of the craziness, Crisp claims, is a time when another EMT at Scioto (Joshua Gullett) groped her and tried to stuff her into a trash can while on the job. When Crisp complained, a supervisor separated them and required that they never work the same shift, but Gullett faced no other repercussions. Crisp pursued no legal redress against Gullett or Scioto at that time. Instead, Crisp waited several years to respond, and when she did, it was in her own way crazy. One day, she recalled that there were allegedly pornographic images of Gullett and his wife online. While at work, she showed those images to several EMTs. Scioto fired Crisp for doing that, and Crisp sued, asserting that the firing was retaliatory under state and federal anti-discrimination law. The district court disagreed, and so do we.
***
Thus, to win relief from our court, Crisp is essentially left to persuade us that a jury could find her employer violated Title VII when it fired her for sharing nude images of a co-worker while on the clock. That she has not done. The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.”
Legal lesson learned: If employer had formally disciplined the male EMT, then perhaps the “craziness” would have stopped.
Chap. 8 – Race / National Origin Discrimination
IL: CHICAGO FF PROPERLY FIRED – SEVERAL RACIST POSTS
On July 16, 2026, in Sam Inendino v. Annettee Nance-Holt, the United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit (Chicago) held (3 to 0) that trial court properly grated summary judgment to the City based on the firefighter’s 13 racist Facebook posts. cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/24-2908/24-2908-2026-07-16.pdf?ts=1784221283
THE COURT WROTE:
“For sixteen years, Sam Inendino worked as a firefighter for the Chicago Fire Department (‘CFD’). He was fired following a workplace investigation into his public Facebook account, which contained several racially charged and offensive posts…. Inendino prominently identified himself as a CFD firefighter on his Facebook page. On October 29, 2019, the Chicago Office of Inspector General (‘OIG’) received a complaint from a member of the public concerning a Facebook comment made by Inendino in which he told individuals to ‘take your ass back over the border where ya belong … gotta go I have a real job.’… In other words, we must decide whether Inendino’s thirteen Facebook posts constituted speech protected by the First Amendment. Making this determination, as we have noted, requires us to apply the Supreme Court’s holding in Pickering and balance the government employer’s interest in efficiency against the employee’s speech interests.
***
Firefighters too occupy a place of immense trust and authority. Residents place their faith in firefighters, often without question, because they believe these dedicated public servants will come to their aid without fear or favor. By posting disparaging remarks of Black people, Inendino undermined that trust by demonstrating that he, though a firefighter, did not view all residents as equals but rather looked upon certain communities with racial disdain…. On balance, we conclude that the City’s interests in ensuring that the CFD succeeds in performing its public safety mission substantially outweigh Inendino’s interest in posting the contested memes and comments on Facebook.”
Legal lesson learned: The Court said it best: “Firefighters too occupy a place of immense trust and authority.” Racist posts can lead to termination under the U.S. Supreme Court’s “balancing test” in Pickering v. Board of Education (June 3, 1968), www.oyez.org/cases/1967/510.
Chap. 9 – Americans With Disabilities Act
MA: ADA - DEAF CAN’T BE AMBULANCE DRIVER
On July 15, 2026, in John Buccieri v. Brewster Ambulance Service, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for 1st District (Boston) held (3 to 0) that the jury properly found that it would have been an “undue hardship” to Brewster Ambulance to hire a deaf person to be a “Chair Car Driver.” ca1.uscourts.gov/sites/ca1/files/opnfiles/25-1732P-01A.pdf
THE COURT WROTE:
“The jury had returned a verdict for Brewster on Buccieri's claim of failure to hire for a Chair Car Driver position, finding that Brewster had ‘prove[d] by a preponderance of the evidence that providing Mr. Buccieri with the requested accommodation(s) would have been an undue hardship to Brewster Ambulance and/or posed a direct threat to Mr. Buccieri or others.’
***
We hold that no reasonable jury could conclude that there was a reasonable accommodation that would have allowed Buccieri to perform the essential communications functions of the driver positions without undue hardship to Brewster…. Buccieri presented no evidence to rebut that his proposed tablet-based or any cell-phone-based accommodation for communicating with dispatch, even if it was available at the relevant time, would pose safety risks to all concerned of the driver's eyes being taken off the road, risks the ADA did not require Brewster to undertake. Brewster's radio system for dispatch communications has safety advantages over Buccieri's alternative accommodation of tablet-based communications, because the radio system allows drivers to connect instantly to dispatch with the press of one button on the radio and without taking their eyes off the road. Brewster established that distracted driving is the number one cause of accidents involving Brewster vehicles and that cell phone use is the number one cause of distracted driving.”
Legal lesson learned: Employers may refuse to hire disabled applicants who would create an “undue hardship.”
Chap. 9 – Americans With Disabilities Act
OR: HEART / LIGHT DUTY 1-YR – BUT 3 OPEN CITY JOBS
On May 8, 2026, in Christopher Rampley v. City of Newport, U.S. Magistrate Judge Amy E. Potter, United States District Court, D. Oregon, Eugene Division, issued a Report and Recommendation that city’s motion for summary judgment should be denied since there were three other city jobs that may have been a reasonable accommodation. In 2015, Plaintiff experienced heart palpitations which would ultimately be diagnosed as was hospitalized with atrial fibrillation. In May 2022, he was temporarily reassigned to a light duty position as a fire inspector. He received workers comp, and FD extended his light duty assignment until July 21, 2023 when he was terminated. There were three other open jobs in the city – but there was apparently no discussion with the plaintiff about those: an administrative project support position, a building attendant, and a janitorial position. public.fastcase.com/Jhe1Qn%2BmJndQYQU6z%2FeNm%2BBAkVyVw7qfp1FLZhLRneZoYclJ%2FVT7s6PXMIJoJS6%2B?utm_medium=email&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-8PpRuVev0Ah_XktOEuEmMt0agUMxrVPAo9u5l7IUNDD8PU7k6rzhxTWeOW-diGg6ug4Y_W0mxcgZfTt2tSbUoxEpMhGQ&_hsmi=226712652&utm_content=226712652&utm_source=hs_email
THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE WROTE:
“Of course, for the failure to offer a vacant position to be actionable, Plaintiff had to be able to perform the essential functions of that job with or without accommodations. See Snapp v. United Transportation Union, 889 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that liability for failing to engage in interactive process only attaches if a reasonable accommodation is possible). Defendant contends it reviewed other city-wide vacant positions and determined that Plaintiff could not safely fill them or was not qualified…. Plaintiff disagrees and offers three positions—an administrative project support position, a building attendant, and a janitorial position—that he contends he was qualified for and could safely perform…. Even with Defendant's evidence regarding the positions, there remains a dispute of fact on this issue.”
Legal lesson learned: To avoid ADA litigation, have a thorough discussion with the employee about other possible positions in the city and document whether employee could safely perform those jobs.
Note: On July 8, 2026, U.S. District Court Judge Mustafa Taher Kasubhai accepted the Report and Recommendations. casemine.com/judgement/us/6a52586871db26a4e922f540
Chap. 11 – Fair Labor Standards Act, and Military Leave
AZ: CAPTAIN TRANS AFTER OT ISSUE - POSS RETALIATION
On July 21, 2026, in David Johnson v. City of Phoenix, et al., U.S. District Court Judge Krissa M. Lanham held that City is granted summary judgment regarding the Captain’s overtime claim but case proceeds regarding retaliation for his job transfer after filing internal grievances (which he lost). On Oct. 19, 2021 he was home on standby shift ($1.50 hour), and then responded to hospital for pathogen-exposure incident; returned home in 3 hours, and made some follow up calls to hospital. He claimed overtime for the total of 12.75 hours passed between the incident's beginning and the end of Johnson's shift (grievances denied). In February 2022, after grievances were denied he was transferred to an Operations position. U.S. Department of Labor investigation found this was retaliation.
THE COURT HELD:
“David Johnson, a Phoenix Fire Department (‘PFD’) employee, worked as the captain of PFD's Car 959 unit (‘C959’) until he filed multiple grievances regarding overtime compensation and was then transferred. He filed a lawsuit against PFD and individual PFD-affiliated defendants, alleging they violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (‘FLSA’) by transferring him in retaliation for his grievances and refusing to pay overtime…. The parties agree Johnson worked for PFD for over 27 years, serving as a captain since 2007 and captain paramedic for C959 beginning in 2018…. During that time, he received positive performance evaluations and no documented complaints or disciplinary actions … though Phoenix alleges his behavior was unprofessional … (notes from meetings with hospital coordinators who criticized Johnson's behavior). In October 2021, C959 transitioned from a 56-hour workweek to a 40-hour workweek, a change that reduced Johnson's overtime opportunities…. Employees could work standby shifts where they were paid $1.50 per hour to remain on call; if called out to a job, they would be paid overtime rates (one-and-a-half-times pay) for the duration of that call…. On October 19, 2021, Johnson was working a standby shift when he was called out to manage a pathogen-exposure incident…. He drove to the hospital and worked for around three hours, then returned home and made short phone calls to the hospital every few hours…. A total of 12.75 hours passed between the incident's beginning and the end of Johnson's shift, and PFD determined he had worked overtime for 5.5 of those hours (for the hospital visit and phone calls) but was in standby status for the remainder…. Johnson later filed two grievances alleging he was owed overtime for the entire 12.75-hour period…. Those grievances were unsuccessful…. Shortly afterwards, in February 2022, Johnson was notified he would be removed as C959 captain and reassigned or demoted into Operations due to unprofessional conduct…. The parties agree Operations (a ‘roving pool’) offered more overtime opportunities than the 40-hour C959 schedule, and Johnson subsequently took other roles on a 56-hour schedule…. The next month, he filed a charge of retaliation with the Department of Labor (‘DOL’), which investigated and found PFD had wrongfully removed Johnson from his captaincy because of his overtime grievances…. During that investigation, PFD claimed it had removed Johnson due to business needs and prior complaints against him…. The DOL investigation found no corroboration for those rationales and further determined PFD did not follow its disciplinary process during Johnson's removal…. The report calculated his damages from that retaliation were $0.
***
Johnson has raised a dispute of material fact whether he suffered any monetary harm from his removal, so Phoenix's motion for summary judgment on that issue is denied as to Count 1. However, Johnson cannot pursue emotional distress damages on that count because he offered no facts supporting such damages. Summary judgment is granted as to Count 3, Johnson's overtime claim, and the court accepts Johnson's voluntary dismissal of Count 2.”
Legal lesson learned: The retaliation claim will now proceed with pre-trial discovery.
Chap. 12 – Drug-Free Workplace, inc. Recovery
CA: POSITIVE DRUG – ARMY - NOT DISAB IF ACTIVE USER
On July 21, 2026, in Roger E. Greer v. Christine Wormuth, Secretary, U.S. Department of the Army, et al., the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (San Francisco) held (3 to 0; unpublished decision) that the trial court judge properly dismissed his lawsuit. He filed the case pro se [no attorney] and was fired for “testing positive for illegal substances’ [drugs not identified]. cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/memoranda/2026/07/21/24-6425.pdf
THE COURT WROTE:
“Rehabilitation Act discrimination claim. Greer also failed to state a disability discrimination claim under the Rehabilitation Act. To bring a successful claim under the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must show that he (1) has a disability; (2) is otherwise qualified for employment; and (3) was discriminated against because of his disability…. Greer's claim fails to allege the threshold requirement that he is ‘disabled’ because the FAC [First Amended Complaint] does not describe the nature of his impairment with sufficient particularity. Greer merely alleges that he was ‘perceived to have an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment’ without any additional factual details….
***
[Footnote 3] Even if we infer that Greer's ‘disability’ was a perceived substance-use impairment, the Rehabilitation Act expressly states that ‘the term 'individual with a disability' does not include an individual who is currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs, when a covered entity acts on the basis of such use.’ 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(C)(i).”
Legal lesson learned: Current users of illegal drugs are not “individuals with a disability.”
Chap. 12 – Drug-Free Workplace, inc. Recovery
NJ: OFF-DUTY MJ USE – PD – LAWFUL 2021 STATUTE
On May 1, 2026, in two combined cases – In The Matter Of Norman Mansor, Jersey City Police Department; and In The Matter Of Omar Polanco, Jersey City Police Department – the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, held (3 to 0) that the Civil Service Commission properly upheld the decision of two Administrative Law Judges reinstating the police officers (including back pay and reasonable attorney fees). [See note below - Maryland has now enacted a similar law, effective October 1, 2026]. njcourts.gov/system/files/court-opinions/2026/a3876-23a3886-23.pdf
THE COURT WROTE:
“In her decision, the ALJ summarized the facts that led to the charges against Mansour. The ALJ also recognized, ‘In April 2022, [the] JCPD Police Director and Deputy Chief issued an order stating that officers were prohibited from using cannabis on or off duty as it is illegal under federal law for cannabis users to possess, carry or use firearms.’ The ALJ further observed when Mansour was tested ‘[i]n September 2022[,] regulated marijuana, cannabis was legal in New Jersey and available for purchase from in[-]state cannabis dispensaries.’ She further noted the JCPD did not allege Mansour used cannabis or was impaired while on duty, or used unregulated cannabis…. The ALJ recognized in August 2021, prior to Mansour's random drug screening, ‘N.J.S.A. 24:6I-52 became operative’ and states, in relevant part:
No employer shall refuse to hire or employ any person
or shall discharge from employment or take any adverse
action against any employee with respect to
compensation, terms, conditions, or other privileges of
employment because that person does or does not
smoke, . . . or otherwise use cannabis items, and an
employee shall not be subject to any adverse action by
an employer solely due to the presence of cannabinoid
metabolites in the employee's bodily fluid from
engaging in conduct permitted under [CREAMMA].
***
In summary, we conclude the JCPD may comply with both the GCA [federal Gun Control Act (GCA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-934] and CREAMMA [PA Cannabis Regulatory, Enforcement Assistance, and Marketplace Modernization Act, N.J.S.A. 24:6I-31 to -56.] Because the GCA does not preempt CREAMMA, we discern no error in the CSC's decision that Mansour's and Polanco's use of regulated cannabis, off duty, could not sustain the JCPD's removal decisions. We therefore affirm the CSC's July 24, 2024 decisions in both matters.”
Legal lesson learned: Fire & EMS departments, in states where marijuana may be purchased lawfully, should carefully review there policy; in states kike New Jersey where legislature has enacted a statute prohibiting employer discipline, the policy may need to be modified.
Note: See the new Maryland statute for public safety employees, effective Oct. 1, 2026.
Here are some key provisions of the bill: mgaleg.maryland.gov/2026RS/bills/sb/sb0439T.pdf
See this video with fire union members celebrating passage of the law. facebook.com/watch/?v=2023629185244531
Chap. 13 – EMS, incl. Community Paramedicine, COVID-1
WA: COVID – 26 SEATTLE FF – GOT LOUDERMILL HEARINGS
On July 24, 2026, in Jeffrey Vale, et al. v. City of Seattle, U.S. Magistrate Judge Theresa L. Fricke denied the former firefighters’ motion for summary judgment claiming city violated their Free Exercise Clause claim of religious discrimination, and also granted the City’s motion for summary judgment on providing due process prior to termination. The firefighters each received pre-termination Loudermill hearing; and 9th Circuit later held in another case that Loudermill hearings were not required in Covid cases where firefighters receive notice of need to vaccinate). decision are not required). cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/washington/wawdce/2:2023cv01095/324497/258/0.pdf?ts=1785113252
THE COURT WROTE:
“This matter concerns thirty Plaintiffs challenge their separation from the SFD due to their non-compliance with the COVID-19 vaccination mandate of defendant City of Seattle (hereinafter the ‘City’). On August 9, 2021, Mayor Jenny Durkan issued Mayoral Directive No. 9, which required City employees to be vaccinated against COVID-19 by October 18, 2021….The directive allowed employees to seek medical or religious exemptions from the vaccination mandate…. For [the 26] employees who were granted exemptions, the City later issued final determination letters stating that it was unable to identify any reasonable accommodation that would allow the employees to perform the essential functions of their positions while unvaccinated…. The City states employees who remained unvaccinated and were recommended for separation were provided an opportunity to participate in Loudermill hearings before separation from employment.
***
[FREE EXERCISE CLAIM] Plaintiffs assert that evidence concerning non-City firefighters and emergency personnel (such as those from Boeing, South Snohomish County, Central Pierce, and South Pierce) shows the City applied its mandate in an underinclusive manner…. But, defendants assert that from October 2021 to February 2023, the City did not use automatic-aid responses or agreements to supplement or replace its unvaccinated employees from neighboring cities…. Defendants also point to the City’s contractor mandate and attestation requirements for covered onsite or in-person City work…. Plaintiffs also rely on public events and gatherings, including SFD Neighbor Day events, station tours, a King County Fire Chiefs Association event, and a summer potluck…. Plaintiffs argue these events exposed SFD personnel to unvaccinated members of the public while religious- objector employees were denied accommodations….Viewing the record in the light most favorable to defendants, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that transient public contact at events is not comparable to unvaccinated firefighters working regular shifts, sharing station living spaces, using City vehicles, responding to emergency calls, and providing patient care.
[DUE PROCESS CLAIM] The Court thus finds defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on plaintiffs’ due process claim under the above-described authorities. On the same day however, the Ninth Circuit issued its decision in Bacon v. Woodward, No. 22-35611, 2024 WL 3041850 (9th Cir. Jun. 18, 2024) (hereinafter “Bacon II”). The matter addressed Washington’s Proclamation that “required firefighters in Washington State to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19.” Id. at 1. The Bacon II Court affirmed the dismissal of the firefighters’ due process claim. Id. at 1-*2. The Court rejected the firefighters’ reliance on Loudermill to assert “their
due process rights were violated when they were denied religious and medical accommodations after what they considered to be sham hearings.” Id. at 1-2”
Legal lesson learned: FD followed due process procedures prior to termination.
Chap. 13 – EMS, incl. Community Paramedicine, COVID-19
OR: DEF. CONV. INTERFERING EMS - NO CIVIL COMPROMISE
On July 22, 2026, in State of Oregon v. Roberto Hernandez, the Court of Appeals of Oregon held (3 to 0) that trial court properly found defendant guilty and refused to drop the misdemeanor charges, since the offense of interfering with emergency medical service (EMS), ORS 162.257, is an offense against the public at large. Under Oregon’s “civilly compromise” statute a misdemeanor can be privately resolved if the injured party has a civil cause of action for the injury, and “the injured party acknowledges in writing before trial that they have received satisfaction for their injury, and (4) the defendant pays the cost of any incurred expenses.” The EMT had signed that he had received satisfaction. cases.justia.com/oregon/court-of-appeals/2026-a185059.pdf?ts=1784734294
THE COURT WROTE:
“Defendant was charged with interfering with EMS providers after he prevented EMS from rendering aid to an injured woman following a vehicular accident. The woman had been driving, and defendant was a passenger. At the crash site, defendant lay on top of the woman and continuously screamed that she needed help. However, when EMS providers tried to render her aid, defendant refused to move and punched an EMS provider once in the chest—though no injury resulted. Defendant was subsequently detained. [Footnote 2: Prior to the accident, defendant and the woman had been drinking. When EMS providers arrived, the woman was lying on the ground profusely bleeding and screaming for help. She was later transported to the hospital. Her injuries required four surgeries and being airlifted to an intensive care unit.]
Before trial, defendant wrote the EMS provider an apology, and the EMS provider acknowledged in writing that he had received satisfaction for his injuries and agreed to a civil compromise. Defendant moved to dismiss the charge pursuant to that civil compromise, but the trial court denied the motion, reasoning that civil compromise requires that the injured party have a civil cause of action against the defendant for the conduct prohibited by the criminal statute and that no such civil cause of action existed for the conduct prohibited by the offense of interfering with EMS providers. Defendant was convicted at trial. [Footnote 1: Defendant was also charged with second-degree disorderly conduct, ORS 166.025, but was acquitted of that charge at trial.]
***
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss pursuant to a civil compromise. Defendant argues that the EMS provider had a civilly actionable battery claim, and therefore, the acknowledgement of satisfaction of injury between defendant and the EMS provider satisfied the statutory requirements for a civil compromise. In response, the state argues that the public at large, not the EMS provider, is the “injured person,” and therefore, an individual EMS provider does not have a civil cause of action for the criminal conduct prohibited by the offense of interfering with EMS providers. We agree with the state that the public is the ‘injured person’ under ORS 162.257 and, thus, affirm…. ORS 162.257 is an offense that primarily injures the public at large and, therefore, cannot be civilly compromised. The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion.
Legal lesson learned: Interfering with EMS is not subject to civil compromise between the EMS and the offender.
Chap. 13 – EMS, incl. Community Paramedicine, COVID-19
NJ: EMS SUPER SUED BY EMT – TOLD OTHERS EMT CONV
On July 21, 2026, in L.R. Jr. v. J.R.B., the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division held (2 to 0; unpublished decision) that the former EMT Supervisor (initials J.R.B.) is entitled to a new hearing, before a new judge; the original judge issued a final protective order against him to stop his publicly sharing EMT’s conviction, without first advising him of right to counsel and the consequences of a final protective order.
THE COURT WROTE:
“Plaintiff pled guilty to endangering the welfare of a child in 2001 and was subject to Megan 's Law and parole supervision for life (‘PSL’). In 2011, plaintiff and defendant worked together as volunteer emergency medical technicians (‘EMTs’). Plaintiff served as defendant's supervisor. After plaintiff filed a complaint, defendant received a thirty-day suspension. Defendant then voluntarily left his position. Plaintiff claimed that his record was expunged in April 2016. Plaintiff moved to Florida in 2018. In 2019, defendant discovered plaintiff's LinkedIn account and saw that plaintiff worked as an EMT in Florida. Defendant then submitted an Open Public Records Act (‘OPRA’) request to the State Parole Board and obtained plaintiff's judgment of conviction, which included Megan's Law and PSL requirements. After receiving these documents, defendant notified Florida authorities that plaintiff resided in Florida and was required to register under Megan's Law. In November 2019, Florida law enforcement officers visited plaintiff's residence and informed him that he must register as a sex offender because of his New Jersey conviction. Plaintiff subsequently returned to New Jersey and started to work here again as an EMT. In February 2020, defendant posted the documents obtained through the OPRA request on Facebook. Plaintiff testified that defendant then made additional posts about his past but plaintiff ‘let it go, cause I was hoping if I let it go it would just stop.’ In November 2024, defendant emailed the New Jersey State Emergency Medical Services Task Force (‘EMSTF’), stating that he knew of an employee with a child endangerment conviction. That same month, defendant posted on the New Jersey Forest Fire Department's webpage, ‘[w]hy does the Department allow sex offenders on the crew?’ He also linked plaintiff's payroll information from the State Department of Treasury. In December 2024, defendant posted on the EMSTF webpage, ‘[w]hy does the [EMSTF] have people who pled to endangering the welfare of a child?’
***
As noted above, the record neither demonstrates that the judge informed defendant of his right to be represented by legal counsel in advance of trial, nor that defendant voluntarily and knowingly waived his right to counsel. Guided by the noted principles, we conclude the court mistakenly applied its discretion by its failure to instruct defendant of his right to be represented by legal counsel in advance of trial and by not taking testimony concerning whether defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. Although we can appreciate the need for the court to have control over management of its trial list, we discern there would have been no undue prejudice to plaintiff if defendant sought an adjournment to obtain counsel as the TPO protections would have remained in effect. Therefore, we are constrained to vacate the FPO, reinstate the TPO, and remand for a new trial.”
Legal lesson learned: The EMT’s conviction is a public record, but posting documents on Facebook can lead to “cyber harassment” litigation.
Chap. 13 – EMS, incl. Community Paramedicine, COVID-19
MI: PT TOLD MEDIC DEF HURT HER - HEARSAY EXCEPTION
On July 16, 2026, in People of the State of Michigan v. Robert A. Hollon, the Court of Appeals of Michigan held (3 to 0; unpublished decision) that prior to trial court allowing Medic and ER doctor to testify in murder trial, court should first hold hearing on defendant’s motion to exclude evidence. The patient [identified by her initials “WP”], who later died, told Medic in ambulance and ER doctor that her boyfriend had pushed her down the stairs. cases.justia.com/michigan/court-of-appeals-unpublished/2026-377838.pdf?ts=1784293205
THE COURT WROTE:
“Therefore, on remand, if the prosecution continues to seek to elicit testimony at trial from the paramedic or ER doctor as to WP's statements identifying her assailant (either by name or otherwise), the trial court must first hold an evidentiary hearing at which the prospective witness testifies, and the trial court must apply this evidence to the Meeboer factors to determine its possible admissibility under MRE 803(4)…. In People v Meeboer (After Remand), 439 Mich. 310, 322; 484 N.W.2d 621 (1992), the Michigan Supreme Court held that a child sexual assault victim's hearsay statement identifying the child's assailant made to a physician-as opposed to a psychologist- was admissible under MRE 803(4). Instead, Meeboer held that, when deciding the admissibility of a hearsay statement of identification under MRE 803(4), courts look to the trustworthiness and necessity of the statement in light of MRE 803(4)'s underlying rationale: ‘(1) the self-interested motivation to speak the truth to treating physicians in order to receive proper medical care, and (2) the reasonable necessity of the statement to the diagnosis and treatment of the patient.’ Id. at 322-30.”
***
Concurring Judge: “The urgency of her medical condition, that the statements were made in the back of an ambulance, and while receiving emergency medical care at a hospital align well with the trustworthiness factor to be considered under Meeboer.” cases.justia.com/michigan/court-of-appeals-unpublished/2026-377838.pdf?ts=1784293205
Legal lesson learned: Patient’s comments to EMS while receiving emergency medical care can be admissible at trial. EMS should document the comments in the run report
See Michigan Rule of Evidence 803(4). law.cornell.edu/rules/fre/rule_803
Exceptions to the Rule Against Hearsay:
The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay, regardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness: ***
(4) Statement Made for Medical Diagnosis or Treatment. A statement that:
(A) is made for — and is reasonably pertinent to — medical diagnosis or treatment; and
(B) describes medical history; past or present symptoms or sensations; their inception; or their general cause.
Chap. 13 – EMS, incl. Community Paramedicine, COVID-19
WA: COVID – CHRISTIAN FFs – ADMIN DUTY 4 MOS / FIRED
On July 14, 2026, in Erik Gustafson, et al. v. City of Kirkland, et al., U.S. District Court Judge Robert S. Lasnik, United States District Court, Western District of Washinton (Seattle) granted City’s motion to dismiss. The city implemented the Governor’s COVID vaccination requirement; City granted temporary administrative positions from August 20, 2021 until Dec. 31, 2021, and then terminated unvaccinated firefighters of all religious faiths. cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/washington/wawdce/2:2025cv00367/345154/49/0.pdf?ts=1784314094
THE COURT WROTE:
“Plaintiffs ‘are devout, practicing Christians’ who allege they ‘were terminated from their employment by the City of Kirkland Fire Department, after exercising their rights to religious freedom and declining to receive the COVID-19 vaccine.’ … After submitting requests for religious exemptions to a vaccination requirement that was in effect for firefighters beginning Aug. 20, 2021, plaintiffs allege that their “requests for religious exemptions were approved by their employers, the Defendants, based on Plaintiffs’ sincerely held religious beliefs.’ … With their religious exemptions approved, plaintiffs were offered accommodations through Dec. 31, 2021…. After that, plaintiffs’ employment with the City of Kirkland Fire Department was terminated.
***
Plaintiffs allege that ‘day shift’ accommodations, in which accommodated firefighters were allowed to perform ‘administrative functions’ that didn’t require contact with the public, were given ‘only’ to those firefighters who requested a vaccination exemption on religious grounds…. But exhibits attached to plaintiffs’ complaint only support a claim that day shift accommodations were given to a broader category of individuals: ‘unvaccinated firefighters.’ …Even taking as true plaintiffs’ claim that day shift accommodations were given only to those requesting religious exemptions … those claims do not support a specific inference that animus against Christians motivated the implementation of defendants’ vaccination policy.”
Legal lesson learned: No animus shown to Christian firefighters; no obligation to continue to offer administrative positions with no patient contact.
Chap. 13 – EMS, incl. Community Paramedicine, COVID-19
WA: COVID – 15 FF – DUE PROCESS – NOTICE / NO HEARING
On July 10, 2026, in Monroe Hill et al. v. Washington Department of Natural Resources, the United States Court of Appeals for Ninth Circuit (sitting in Seattle) held (3 to 0; unpublished decision) that the trial court judge properly dismissed the lawsuit by 15 firefighters, who refused to be vaccinated on account of their religious beliefs and were subsequently terminated. They were provided due process through the vaccination notice and response process and were not entitled to a Loudermill pre-termination hearing. cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/memoranda/2026/07/10/25-3863.pdf
THE COURT WROTE:
“Defendants-Appellees Washington Department of Natural Resources (‘WDNR’) and Commissioner of Public Lands Hilary Franz (‘Franz’) (together, ‘Defendants’) enacted a department-wide policy requiring employees to be vaccinated against COVID-19. Plaintiffs-Appellants (‘Plaintiffs’) WDNR firefighters declined to be vaccinated on account of their religious beliefs and were subsequently terminated. Plaintiffs appeal the district court’s order dismissing with prejudice three claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of the Free Exercise Clause, Equal Protection Clause, and Due Process Clause…. The vaccine mandate was rescinded on or about May 11, 2023.
***
Plaintiffs point to Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) to support a clearly established right to a pre-termination hearing. In Loudermill, the Court determined that ‘[t]he essential requirements of due process . . . are notice and an opportunity to respond.” 470 U.S. at 546. WDNR’s accommodation and exemption process, in itself, provided as much notice and process as the law required. WDNR notified employees that they would be terminated if they did not get vaccinated and the exemption and accommodation process provided an opportunity for employees to present their reasons for noncompliance. We affirm the district court’s dismissal of their Due Process claim with prejudice.”
Legal lesson learned: The notice and opportunity to respond was adequate due process.
Note: The U.S. Supreme Court in Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) held (6 to 3) that the Board was required to provide a pre-termination hearing before firing a security guard about an undisclosed felony. supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/470/532/#top
Chap. 13 – EMS, incl. Community Paramedicine, COVID-19
NY: PRIVATE AMBUL CO – DENIED LICENSE – NO “NEED”
On July 10, 2026, in Blue Care, Inc. v. The New York State Department of Health, Judge John P. Collins, Jr., the Supreme Court, Rockland County held (unpublished opinion) that the State’s Emergency Medical Services Council properly denied an ambulance service certificate for Rockland County, New York; there was no “need” for another ambulance service per 2024 hearing before the Hudson Valley Regional Emergency Medical Services Council. The Ambulance company presented testimony at the hearing about hospitals and nursing facilities needing more services, but failed to present any statistical evidence. public.fastcase.com/Jhe1Qn%2BmJndQYQU6z%2FeNm1ngVbZVwfb9i9nq%2ByxsJt7eYa6Yri%2FXr9veF2mIoPRbBYalWXjl02DPpQ9AYC5%2BzkBbUV9CJV65Gz31ZPaNAhA%3D?utm_medium=email&_hsenc=p2ANqtz--v_X0_ty2KgZc4cuUGDg0UHRgKtD60M90IuqE8DpMJ6uO5aXr8LyUQmZOmsR5mb8hE3f734Ge27BP-t9ynHj9iUX7jKQ&_hsmi=226712652&utm_content=226712652&utm_source=hs_email
THE COURT WROTE:
“The Petitioner was informed on January 27, 2026, that the State Emergency Medical Services Council voted to uphold the Hudson Valley Regional Emergency Medical Services Council's decision to deny Petitioner's application for new service…. Petitioner commenced the instant Article 78 proceeding within sixty (60) days of the January 27, 2026, determination, as required by Public Health Law § 3002.
***
Petitioner contends the question before the Court is whether it established a need for ambulance services in Rockland County and whether he Respondent's determination that the Petition failed to prove ‘need’ of services through ‘quantifiable date’ was arbitrary and capricious. Specifically, the Petitioner challenges the requirement that a Petitioner can only establish ‘need,’ as it is defined in Department of Health Policy 06-06, through statistics instead of through testimony and written support from affected hospitals and nursing homes. Petitioner contends that there is no statute, regulation or policy that requires use of statistics as a means of establishing ‘need.’ Petitioner notes that neither Public Health Law § 30, 29 NYCRR Part 800 nor Department of Health Policy 06-6 require an applicant to submit statistics from hospitals and nursing homes of the need for additional ambulance services. According to Petitioner, these types of statistics are not required -- as the records that would support these statistics are not maintained by the hospitals and nursing homes. Instead, Petitioner contends that this ‘need’ is determined through anecdotal testimony from representatives of the hospitals and nursing homes, which is sufficient. Also, Petitioner asserts that there is no requirement that statistics are the only method of establishing ‘need.’… Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the Declaratory Judgment action pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 3001 is dismissed consistent with the foregoing Decision; it is further ORDERED that the Article 78 action is transferred to the Appellate Division, Second Department pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 7804(g).”
Legal lesson learned: Statistical evidence of a need for another ambulance company can be important in a hearing; you would expect the company had conducted some survey of need in its business plan prior to submitting its petition.
Chap. 13 – EMS, incl. Community Paramedicine, COVID-19
CO: CRISIS RESP - MEDIC TACKLED PT / DIED - IMMUNITY
On July 6, 2026, in Estate of Kevin Dizmang v. Sean Reed, a Colorado Springs Police Officer, and Nick Fischer, a Colorado Springs Fire Department Paramedic, the United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit (Denver) held (3 to 0) that trial court properly held both members of crisis response unit are entitled to qualified immunity. cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/25-1118/25-1118-2026-07-06.pdf?ts=1783359113
THE COURT WROTE:
“On November 15, 2022, CSPD received reports that Dizmang was displaying symptoms of schizophrenia and post-traumatic stress disorder, damaging his residential vehicle, and walking in traffic. CSPD dispatched Reed, Fischer, and a clinician named Andrea Alban to the scene…. Reed eventually got ahold of Dizmang, walked him towards the sidewalk, and attempted to handcuff him. Dizmang broke free and walked away from the sidewalk, towards the middle of the road. Reed again got ahold of Dizmang, moved him onto the sidewalk, and attempted to handcuff him a second time. Dizmang again broke free, but this time he fled toward a line of trees in front of a mobile-home park. As Reed caught up and attempted to handcuff Dizmang for a third time, Alban told Fischer to help restrain Dizmang. [Per the plaintiff’s complaint] Fischer then ‘suddenly and violently tackled’ Dizmang and drove him into the ground, where Dizmang landed on his right side…. Fischer then put Dizmang in a chokehold for approximately 30 seconds. During this time, Dizmang ‘quit moving.’ … Then, Fischer ‘rolled [Dizmang] face down onto the ground, . . . placed his hands on the back of [Dizmang's] neck and dr[ove] his body weight downward, pushing [Dizmang's] neck and face into the ground. At this point, [Dizmang] remained completely motionless.’ … Fischer maintained this position for approximately 45 seconds, long enough for Reed to finish handcuffing Dizmang. Fischer and Reed then rolled Dizmang onto his back and seated him upright…. By this time, Dizmang was unresponsive. Fischer noted that Dizmang was not aspirating and stated that he wanted to ‘attempt a nasal airway,’ and Reed called for an ambulance…. Once the ambulance arrived, Fischer and other medical professionals tried to resuscitate Dizmang en route to a hospital. These efforts continued once Dizmang arrived at the hospital. However, Dizmang was pronounced dead in the emergency room.
***
These facts do not support the Estate's theory that Fischer used ‘totally unnecessary’ force to restrain Dizmang and differ substantially from the unnecessary force applied in Weigel. Id. at 1154. Thus, Weigel did not place Fischer on notice that his use of force would subject him to constitutional liability…. Fischer's conduct was not particularly egregious, at least when compared to the incidents in Weigel, Teetz, and Estate of Booker; we certainly cannot say he committed an obvious constitutional violation by restraining Dizmang so that Reed could apply handcuffs. Therefore, the Estate has not overcome Fischer's assertion of qualified immunity.”
Legal lesson learned: There was no proof of “unnecessary force” being applied.
Chap. 13 – EMS, incl. Community Paramedicine, COVID-19
NY: TOWN – USE NEW COUNTY-WIDE EMS – OLD SINCE 1949
On June 29, 2026, In the Matter of the Application of Western Wayne Ambulance, Inc d/b/a Walmorth Ambulance v. Town of Walworth, Judge Arthur B. Williams, Supreme Court, Wayne County, granted the Town’s motion to dismiss the petition to set aside the Town’s decision to change EMS provider. On November 6, 2025 the Town recognized newly formed county-wide Wayne County Emergency Medical Services as the Town's primary provider of emergency medical services; this effectively removed Petitioner from that role which it provided since 1949. At the Board meeting of November 6, 2025, it was discussed that WWA would still be available to provide second call out ambulance services. public.fastcase.com/Jhe1Qn%2BmJndQYQU6z%2FeNm6ju%2Bd0XMiKIQG0dYFr7cgUzgsifv99YXHK%2BxnD66TJoHk4g2WwtQKDS%2BvASTYn2UbNIVhBuboQ2Vfvy9hViY%2Bk%3D?utm_medium=email&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-8NHhkkKcWj0_qee_n9oiHaTk7VwtWB_afCW5GLhqKW_ltr3Dza-rNcLPsWMOqNw3cx9q-xKyAAVyV_SrzeJvBmwADJtg&_hsmi=226712652&utm_content=226712652&utm_source=hs_email
THE COURT WROTE:
“Respondents state that between 2022 and 2025 they were made aware of numerous complaints of exorbitant bills submitted to individuals receiving services from WWA. The Town further states that they repeatedly requested certain detailed financial information from WWA which was only partially provided. Petitioner asserts that at a regular Town Board meeting it did provide information regarding WWA's coverage statistics, payments and staffing. Petitioner claims that on multiple occasions it was assured that the Town would continue to support WWA. During this time there was also discussion regarding the costs and rationale for WWA expanding its services from providing basic life support services (BLS) to include advanced life support services (ALS). In 2023 WWA approached the Walworth Town Board for the purpose of seeking approval for construction of an addition to the ambulance base which was approved by the Town and funded exclusively by WWA. All during this time there was discussion throughout Wayne County regarding the establishment of a county-wide EMS service. Wayne County EMS became operational during 2023. Thereafter on October 17, 2024 citing a lack of information from WWA, the Town Board voted to not provide financial support for WWA for the year 2025. On November 6, 2025, the Town Board resolved to recognize Wayne County EMS as the primary provider of emergency medical services for the Town of Walworth.”
***
Likewise, at the Town Board meeting held on November 6, 2025, wherein the Board named Wayne County EMS as the primary ambulance provider discussion was had in support of the Board's decision. The relevant minutes read as follows:
Discussion - Councilman Kelly stated that we have been having conversations for a couple of years now with our ambulance provider and the county is opening on November 15th, it's going to be the best choice for the Town and the protection of our citizens. But just so everyone knows Western Wayne is not going away, they are still an ambulance agency within the Town of Walworth, they will still be providing services, they will just be second out. So if there is a second emergency with the Town of Walworth and they are available they will come and assist you.
There was also public discussion at the November 21, 2024, Town Board meeting wherein the difference in the fee structure between WWA and Wayne County EMS was considered as reflected in the following minutes:
Councilman Linson wanted to discuss Western Wayne Ambulance and their charges. She would like to see an Ambulance provide quality service to our residents. Councilman Kelly received some information regarding pricing for Western Wayne charges around $2,000 whereas the County charges around $400.00for basic services.
The Court finds that the decisions of the Town Board regarding continued funding for WWA and the designation of Wayne County EMS as a primary ambulance service provider were rationally determined on the facts and were thus not arbitrary and capricious…. Given the issues leading up to the Town Board's decisions in this matter, albeit abrupt, the Court does not find that the actions of the Town Board give rise to a prospective enforceable contract right nor does it find a basis for which declaratory judgment can be granted.”
Legal lesson learned: Town had lawful right to switch primary EMS provider.
Chap. 15 – Mental Health, incl. CISM, Peer Support, Pet Therapy
TX: PTSD – EXPLOSION - OSHA REPORTING REG. SET ASIDE
On July 21, 2026, in Exxon Mobil Corporation v. Occupational Safety And Health Review Commission, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (New Orleans) held (3 to 0) that Exxon properly did not report on OSHE 300 /301 forms that an employee suffered PTSD after helping firefighters turn off fuel valves after massive explosion, setting aside the $691 citation. “OSHA exceeded its statutory authority in promulgating 29 C.F.R. § 1904.5(b)(2)(ix) to require employers to record employee-reported work-related mental illnesses.”
OSHA Regulation. “You are not required to record injuries and illnesses if . . .
(ix) The illness is a mental illness. Mental illness will not be considered work-related unless the employee voluntarily provides the employer with an opinion from a physician or other licensed health care professional with appropriate training and experience (psychiatrist, psychologist, psychiatric nurse practitioner, etc.) stating that the employee has a mental illness that is work-related.” customsmobile.com/regulations/expand/title29_chapterXVII_part1904_subpartC_section1904.5
THE COURT WROTE:
“ExxonMobil (Exxon) operates a large petroleum refinery in Baytown, Texas. The facility contains ‘27 distinct units, including the hydro-desulfurization unit (HDU), which mixes hydrogen, sulfur, and naphtha.’ During repairs to the HDU in December 2021, one of its component pipes ruptured. The subsequent hydrocarbon release caused a large explosion and major fire, which burned for eight hours. Multiple workers who were working on the HDU at the time of the explosion were injured. A significant emergency response was required to evacuate the injured, combat the blaze, and shut off fuel to the HDU. The destruction caused by the incident took Exxon five months to remediate…. Employee 2 was an Exxon process technician1 who responded to the explosion and ensuing fire to assist emergency response efforts…. Once there, though not a member of the facility’s emergency response team, Employee 2 volunteered to enter the burning HDU alongside Exxon firefighters and guide them to several valves which needed to be closed to shut off fuel to the fire. The firefighters helped Employee 2 don firefighting gear, and they entered the HDU. Inside, Employee 2 led the firefighters to multiple valves, which they closed before exiting the inferno. While Employee 2 was recovering from this harrowing ordeal in the back of an ambulance, the emergency team was told that there was still at least one bypass open and feeding the fire. Employee 2 was asked to suit back up and again accompany the firefighters into the burning HDU to ‘ensure no bypasses were open or valves were open or leaking.’ He did so and helped the firefighters close several more valves. After surviving this second hellish trip into the HDU, Employee 2 left the facility, though the fire would continue to burn for hours.
***
Based on Joppich’s opinion [Dr. Heather Joppich, psychiatrist], Exxon concluded that Employee 2 did not have a recordable work-related mental illness.The union representing Exxon’s Baytown employees informed OSHA of Exxon’s decision. Following an investigation, OSHA issued a Citation and Notification of Penalty to Exxon in June 2022. The citation ($691) alleged an ‘other-than-serious ‘ violation of the Act’s recordkeeping standard for failing to record Employee 2’s PTSD diagnosis as a work-related mental illness on Forms 300 and 301.”
Legal lesson learned: Employer reporting on mental health of its employees needs clear regulations.
Note: OSHA Regulation. “You are not required to record injuries and illnesses if . . .
(ix) The illness is a mental illness. Mental illness will not be considered work-related unless the employee voluntarily provides the employer with an opinion from a physician or other licensed health care professional with appropriate training and experience (psychiatrist, psychologist, psychiatric nurse practitioner, etc.) stating that the employee has a mental illness that is work-related.” customsmobile.com/regulations/expand/title29_chapterXVII_part1904_subpartC_section1904.5
Chap. 15 – Mental Health, incl. CISM, Peer Support, Pet Therapy
NJ: PSYCH EXAM / ADHD - FAILED 1, PASSED 2 - APPROVED
On July 6, 2026, In The Matter Of T.T., Fire Fighter, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division held (2 to 0) that the New Jersey Civil Service Commission properly reinstated T.T. to the firefighter eligibility list, following a protracted dispute. The Court used his initials to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings and the privacy interests of the party. He undertook three psychiatric reviews – passing 2nd and 3rd after the first found him unsuited for fire service including ADHD history and “negative legal interactions, his motor vehicle accidents [‘several motor vehicle accidents … two of which were his fault’] as well as the negative background recommendations [including ‘past resignation in lieu of termination’].” njcourts.gov/system/files/court-opinions/2026/a0161-24.pdf
THE COURT WROTE:
‘T.T. applied to be a firefighter in the Township. In July 2022, T.T.'s name was included on the list of eligible candidates for the title of firefighter. After the list was certified, the Township extended a conditional offer of employment to T.T., subject to completion of medical and psychological evaluations and a background check. In December 2022, the Township referred T.T. for a psychological evaluation with Han Zhang Liang, Ph.D. Dr. Liang did not recommend T.T. for the firefighter position. He concluded that T.T. was not psychologically suited for the position and recommended that he be removed from the certified list of candidates. On March 16, 2023, the Township sent a notice to T.T. advising that he had been removed from the firefighter eligibility list for failing to meet psychological standards. T.T. requested an appeal before the Medical Review Panel (MRP) pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:4-6.5, which the CSC granted. He also requested the opportunity to undergo another psychological evaluation with ‘a different psychiatrist.’ The CSC advised T.T. to provide any additional information he wished to have considered. On June 28, T.T. submitted to the MRP a psychological evaluation by Karin Gepp, Psy.D., who recommended him for the appointment of a firefighter…. The MRP concluded:
Taking into consideration Dr. Liang's and Dr. Gepp's evaluations, [T.T.'s] presentation, the psychological test results, and the behavioral record when viewed in consideration of the job specifications for Fire Fighter it indicates that [T.T.] should have an independent evaluation to further explore the issues noted above by the MRP…. T.T. and the Township objected to a third evaluation. On January 17, 2024, the CSC issued a decision, accepting the MRP's recommendation and ordering T.T. to undergo an independent psychological evaluation with Robert Kanen, Psy. D…. On February 12, 2024, Dr. Kanen issued a written report, finding T.T. to be ‘functioning within normal ranges,’ and that ‘no psychopathology or personality problems that would interfere with [his] work performance.’ According to the personality testing administered by Dr. Kanen, T.T. ‘scored in the category of likely to be recommended for employment in a public safety/security position,’ and ‘likely to meet expectations.’ Thus, Dr. Kanen concluded that T.T. ‘is psychologically suitable for employment as a firefighter for the Town[ship].’
***
We reject the Township's assertion that Dr. Liang's report was adequate and that the CSC gave ‘short shrift’ to the disqualifying factors noted in his report. The MRP recognized T.T.'s negative factors, including his negative legal interactions, his motor vehicle accidents as well as the negative background recommendations. The MRP considered all relevant factors and other relevant information, and concluded:
Taking into consideration Dr. Liang's and Dr. Gepp's evaluations, [T.T.]'s presentation, the psychological test results, and the behavioral record when viewed in consideration of the jobs specifications for Fire Fighter, it indicates that the applicant should have an independent evaluation to further explore the issues noted above by the MRP.
Contrary to the Township's assertions, Dr. Kanen noted that T.T. had ‘been involved in several motor vehicle accidents[,]’ two of which were his fault. He also noted that ‘[a]t present, there are no points on his license.’ He also took note of T.T.'s ADHD history but concluded that T.T. had improved: his ‘[t]hought processes were logical and coherent. There was no evidence of mental illness[,] . . . [and] [h]e is not currently taking medication for mental health problems.’ Dr. Kanen considered T.T.'s prior employment history, including his past resignation in lieu of termination, and his prior evaluations, noting that he "failed [a prior] psychological evaluation" in 2021. The Township's assertion that Dr. Kanen failed to address the concerning factual issues is not supported by the record.’
Legal lesson learned: The applicants passed two out three psychological exams.
Chap. 16 – Discipline, incl. Code of Ethics, Social Media, Hazing
PA: EMT – FIRED / REMOVED FD ROUTER – NO UNEMP COMP
On July 24, 2026, in Malvin Ray Gross v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania held (3 to 0; unpublished decision) that the Board properly denied the plaintiff unemployment; he was fired for willful misconduct. public.fastcase.com/Jhe1Qn%2BmJndQYQU6z%2FeNm84TSwxTK6G3n62PkU8179htaq5wGjVaUGYSJZSOVzdWyhegWgMqWmHwKwmFy%2BjUN%2FGu5ej6EThZiUJZJf%2FCENA%3D?utm_medium=email&_hsenc=p2ANqtz--F9WEozIdQ7a7aHBPLqx4N-sY1B7PgbJLvKD0e3ZvBos8ijqQnFOLSe1dlkTtitVjG_F048kZlc8yI0LMoiTGsCqcSQA&_hsmi=226712652&utm_content=226712652&utm_source=hs_email
THE COURT WROTE;
“Evangelical Community Hospital (Employer) employed Claimant as an Emergency Medical Technician from August 15, 2016, through May 21, 2024,… at which time Employer discharged him for violating Employer's User Account Access Policy, Information Systems Software and Hardware Installation Policy. Deputy Chief Baker testified Claimant admitted to removing the router and replacing it with his own to print from the fire department computer to one of the hospital's printers…. On March 14, 2024, [E]mployer became aware that [C]laimant had been observed removing a router from his locker and connecting it to existing information technology equipment. During the investigation, [E]mployer['s] witnesses observed [C]laimant on video provided by the Milton Fire Department removing a device from his locker, manipulating cables and equipment, and then leaving the area with a device in a plastic grocery bag.
***
[C]laimant failed to address these assertions [that the router was his personal property that he loaned to Employer and that he had a receipt regarding his purchase of the router in question] during the hearing despite having the opportunity to do so. The Referee explicitly asked the [C]laimant why he moved the router; despite this, the [C]laimant did not assert ownership of the equipment or produce any documentation, such as the receipt, to support his claim at that time. The Board is limited to the evidence presented during the hearing when making its decision, and therefore, it cannot consider the receipt submitted after the hearing…. Because he did not present any evidence at the hearing, Claimant did not establish good cause existed for violating Employer's Policies. Consequently, we are constrained to hold the Board did not err in concluding Claimant was ineligible for benefits under Section 402(e).”
Legal lesson learned: The EMT was fired for willful misconduct and is therefore not entitled to unemployment.
Chap. 16 – Discipline, incl. Code of Ethics, Social Media, Hazing
NY: FF FIRED / REFUSED COVID - NO UNEMP COMP
On July 23, 2026, In the Matter of the Claim of Jack Lin, the NY Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department held (5 to 0) that the claimant was properly denied unemployment since he voluntarily left his employment without good cause. nycourts.gov/reporter/current/3dseries/2026/2026_04537.shtml
THE COURT WROTE:
“In October 2021, the New York City Commissioner of Health and Mental Hygiene mandated that all city employees, with exceptions not relevant here, obtain a COVID-19 vaccine by October 29, 2021. Claimant, an emergency medical technician for the New York City Fire Department, sought a religious exemption from the mandate. The employer denied claimant's request…. Nevertheless, claimant acknowledged that he received the yellow fever vaccine prior to performing missionary work in Kenya in 2015, and that he probably would get a COVID-19 vaccine if it was required to perform missionary work in the future, explaining that we know more about the vaccines than when the mandate was first imposed. When asked to explain the difference between participation in a mission and performing his job as an emergency medical technician, claimant again explained that we now know more about the COVID-19 vaccines. Claimant also testified to, at times, taking over-the-counter and prescription drugs, including muscle relaxers and pain medication. Although claimant had expressed concerns regarding the use of fetal stem cells in the COVID-19 vaccines, he testified that he had never researched whether any of the prior vaccinations or medications he had taken had been developed using fetal stem cells.
***
Given claimant's inconsistent testimony and admission to taking vaccines in the past and willingness to take them in the future, it was reasonable for the Board to conclude that his refusal to comply with the vaccination mandate was for personal and secular reasons, including safety concerns, rather than for sincerely held religious beliefs and, therefore, that he voluntarily left his employment without good cause.”
Legal lesson learned: No unemployment compensation if you leave employment without good cause.
Chap. 16 – Discipline, incl. Code of Ethics, Social Media, Hazing
OH: CHIEF INDICTED / SECRET RECORDINGS - REHIRED
On July 8, 2026, in State Ex Rel. Brandon Montgomery v. Judy Ruckman, the Court of Appeals of Ohio, Seventh District, Jefferson County held (3 to 0) that the Fire Chief’s case is moot – after Feb. 14, 2025 termination, he was reinstated on September 15, 2025 Council members of Village of Mingo Junction (vote 3 to 2). He remains on administrative leave pending outcome of a felony indictment; Court declined to hear his complaint Mayor cancel his paid leave Nov. 3, 2025. supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/7/2026/2026-Ohio-2671.pdf
Press Report May 1, 2025: “Brandon Montgomery, the village fire chief who was on administrative leave until his Feb. 14 termination, has been indicted by a special Jefferson County Grand jury. Montgomery, 37, was ordered Wednesday to stand trial on charges he illegally intercepted wire, oral or electronic communications over a 4.5 year period -- beginning in January 2020 and continuing through June 24.” heraldstaronline.com/news/local-news/2025/05/former-mingo-fire-chief-indicted-by-grand-jury/
THE COURT WROTE:
“Montgomery’s motion for summary judgment asserts that on November 3, 2025, [Mayor] Ruckman placed him on unpaid leave (while maintaining his benefits) on the ground that it was not sustainable for the Village to continue paying his full salary while ensuring that the Fire Department remained properly managed and staffed. Montgomery contends that this action violates Article 33, Section I of the CBA, which provides: ‘Any employee charged with or under indictment for a felony that is not disciplined or discharged by the employer, shall be place [sic] on a leave of absence with pay until resolution of the court proceedings.’…
***
Whatever obligations Article 33, Section I may impose on [Mayor] Ruckman as a consequence of those later events present a different controversy, on a different theory, requiring a properly pleaded claim and a properly developed evidentiary record.”
Legal lesson learned: Felony indictment of a Fire Chief will generally result in being placed on administrative leave. Whether that is paid or unpaid leave is separate issue – in this case needing further evidence.
Note: See Sept. 15, 2025 article: Former Mingo Junction fire chief reinstated after hearing [includes TV video]. wtov9.com/news/local/former-mingo-junction-fire-chief-reinstated-after-hearing
Chap. 16 – Discipline, incl. Code of Ethics, Social Media, Hazing
CO: CHIEF FIRED NEW B0ARD – NO 1st AMEND / DUTIES
On July 7, 2026, in Erik Holt v. Florissant Fire Protection District, the United States Court of Appeals for Tenth Circuit (Denver) held (3 to 0) that the newly elected Fire Board (5 new members) had legal right to fire the Fire Chief (only full-time member) for allowing insurance to lapse. The Chief claimed he was fired in retaliation - an incumbent Board member filed a complaint of Election Violations in Teller County District Court, and the Chief provided investigator with video of the voting at the station to the criminal investigator. First Amendment protection does not apply to comments or actions performing official duties.
THE COURT WROTE;
“Erik Holt was employed as Fire Chief by the Florissant Fire Protection District (‘FFPD’)…. FFPD employed Holt as Fire Chief from April 2022 until June 22, 2023…. During Holt's tenure as Fire Chief, he was the only full-time employee at FFPD. Holt managed the closed-circuit security system, which was operated by a third-party vendor. Holt also controlled physical access to the fire station. Indeed, the record indicates Holt had the power to prevent even members of the board from accessing the firehouse. On May 2, 2023, an election was held for the FFPD Board, which resulted in the election of five non-incumbent candidates. On the day of the election, Holt was acting in his capacity as Fire Chief. He did not, however, have any official duties as to the conducting of the election. The election took place, with Holt present, at Fire Station 1 at 2606 W. Highway 24, Florissant, Colorado, and by mail-in ballot. On May 15, 2023, Starla Thompson, the incumbent FFPD President, filed a Complaint of Election Violations in Teller County District Court, alleging election fraud against the non-incumbent candidates and election workers. Holt was contacted by an investigator from the Teller County District Attorney's Office, Clint Kramer, who requested that Holt provide footage of the election recorded on FFPD's closed-circuit security system. Holt, with no other individuals present, met with Kramer and provided him with the election-day surveillance video from the fire station. Kramer viewed the videos in Holt's presence, but did not consult Holt as to which portions of the video Kramer should watch. Holt provided oral statements in response to Kramer's questions about the video, questions such as ‘[h]ow far do you think these people were from this position?’ Holt also identified individuals appearing on the surveillance video. Furthermore, pursuant to his control of physical access to the fire station, Holt allowed the investigator to view the scene and take measurements…. On June 27, 2023, the Teller County District Court dismissed Thompson's Complaint of Election Violations with prejudice.
***
The new FFPD board terminated Holt's employment on June 22, 2023, ostensibly because Holt's failure to timely renew FFPD's insurance led to a lapse in coverage. Holt asserts the lapsing of the FFPD's insurance is a pretext and his termination was, in fact, undertaken in retaliation for his cooperation with a criminal investigator about the new Board's alleged conduct during the May 2, 2023, election…. The district court granted summary judgment to FFPD on the first element of the five-element Garcetti/Pickering test… That is, the district court concluded Holt's speech was not protected by the First Amendment because the speech was uttered pursuant to Holt's official duties as Fire Chief…. Holt appeals. Based on the record before the district court, Holt failed to demonstrate his speech was not made pursuant to his official duties. [Footnote 4: The other four elements a public employee must establish to prevail on a First Amendment claim, none of which are at issue in this case, are as follows: (2) the speech involved ‘a matter of public concern’; (3) the government's interests as an employer in promoting the efficiency of the public service did not outweigh the plaintiff's interests in free speech; (4) ‘[t]he protected speech was a motivating factor in the adverse employment action’; and (5) the public employee would not have ‘made the same employment decision in the absence of the protected speech.’ Timmins v. Plotkin, 157 F.4th 1275, 1277 (10th Cir. 2025).]”
Legal lesson learned: First Amendment protection is limited; speech involving matters of public concern, not official duties.
Chap. 17: Arbitration, incl. Mediation, Labor Relations
LA: UNION FF OFF CIVIL SER BOARD – ETHICS CASE MOOT
On July 17, 2026, in Local 1374, Jefferson Parish Firefighters Association v. LaKoshia R. Roberts, in her official capacity as Chairwoman of the Louisiana Board of Ethics, et al., the United States Court of Appeals for Fifth Circuit (New Orleans) held (3 to 0) that since Fire Captain / IAFF VP has resigned from Jefferson Parish Civil Service Board, the state’s Board of Ethics ruling prohibiting union from hiring lawyers to represent union members appealing discipline before the Board while their VP is on the Board is a moot issue. cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-30305/25-30305-2026-07-17.pdf?ts=1784331031
THE COURT WROTE:
“Craig Burkett, a fire captain, was on the Jefferson Parish Fire Civil Service Board (‘CSB’) and served as the Vice President of the Jefferson Parish Firefighters Association, Local 1374 (‘the Union’), a union representing Burkett’s fire department. Before Burkett’s election to the CSB, the Union would pay to retain legal counsel for Union members appearing before the CSB. The Union stopped paying for legal counsel in 2018 because the Louisiana Board of Ethics issued an advisory opinion stating that such an arrangement violated state law so long as Burkett served on the CSB…. The Union appealed to the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal, asserting that the declaratory opinion misinterpreted the relevant provision of Louisiana law; the Union then sued in federal court, asserting that the declaratory opinion violated its First Amendment rights. The district court granted the Union a preliminary injunction on First Amendment grounds … The state appealed, claiming that the district court erred in failing to abstain and that the court abused its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction…. On the eve of oral argument, this court was informed that Burkett had resigned from the CSB. That factual development moots the appeal and the entire case.
***
We vacate the injunction and remand to the district court to dismiss for want of jurisdiction….At a minimum, there is no reasonable expectation that the Union will be subjected to the same action again. There is no evidence in the record that an officer of the Union ever held office on the CSB before Burkett, and there has been no indication that an officer of the Union intends to serve on the CSB again. On these facts, all that the Union has shown is a theoretical possibility that it will be subject to the same governmental action.”
Legal lesson learned: Union VPs election to Civil Service Board that hears disciplinary appeals raises ethics issues.
Chap. 17: Arbitration, incl. Mediation, Labor Relations
CA: UNION FF – CRASH / 2 DAY SUSP – 1st APPEAL BOARD
On July 8, 2026, in Corey Schwartz v. City of Compton, the California Court of Appeals, Second District, Fourth Division held (3 to 0; unpublished decision) that trial court properly dismissed his “whistleblower” retaliation complaint until he first exhausts his administrative remedy by filing a charge with the state’s Public Employment Relations Board. In 2022, he helped IAFF Local 2216 write a report on needed Station Repairs, and then led union picketing, and in March 2023 contacted city officials about working conditions. The following month, the City issued Schwartz a Notice of Intent to Suspend Schwartz for two shifts without pay in relation to a traffic
collision involving a Fire Department vehicle. courts.ca.gov/opinions/nonpub/B347429.PDF
THE COURT WROTE:
“Schwartz next argues PERB does not have jurisdiction over his action because PERB ‘does not enforce other independent statutory schemes,’ such as Labor Code section 1102.5 [whistleblower statute]. This argument misses the point. The question is whether the factual allegations underlying Schwartz’s claims could arguably support a claim under the MMBA [unfair labor complaints - Meyers-Milias-Brown Act, Government Code section 3500 et seq,] not whether PERB specifically enforces claims under Labor Code 1102.5…. Schwartz lastly argues that filing a charge with PERB would be futile because PERB is “not equipped to deal with interpretations of ‘independent statutory schemes’ such as Labor Code section 1102.5 and, therefore, Schwartz will be left with ‘inadequate remedies.’ But PERB has jurisdiction to hear claims under the MMBA; thus, Schwartz has an effective remedy before PERB for retaliation for participation in protected union activities even if the same alleged conduct may support a claim for whistleblower retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5. If PERB ultimately concludes the allegations do not, in fact, state a prima facie case of retaliation under the MMBA, the complainant may then file a complaint in the superior court. He must first, however, exhaust his administrative remedies.”
Legal lesson learned: The Union officer must exhaust his administrative remedies before going to court claiming retaliation as a whistleblower.
Comments