2026: FIRE & EMS - POLITICAL & LEGAL APPLICATIONS FOR EMERGENCY SERVICES (3 Author text for National Fire Academy / FESHE online course): https://doi.org/10.7945/av8d-c920
2026: Fire & EMS - EMS POLITICAL & LEGAL APPLICATIONS FOR EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES (4 Author text for National Fire Academy / FESHE online course): https://scholar.uc.edu/concern/documents/ht24wm15r?locale=en
2026: FIRE & EMS - RECENT CASE SUMMARIES: Case summaries since 2018 from monthly newsletters (supplement my 2017 Textbook, Fire Service Law): https://doi.org/10.7945/j6c2-q930
2026: FIRE & EMS - CURRENT EVENTS & AMERICAN HISTORY: https://doi.org/10.7945/0dwx-fc52
2026: INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES: Fire Service, Legal Issues, American History (new UC course starting Fall 2026)
https://scholar.uc.edu/show/ks65hd707
2017: TEXTBOOK: FIRE SERVICE LAW (Second Edition) (ISBN 978-1-4786-3397-6); Waveland Press: http://www.waveland.com/browse.php?t=708 (First Edition – Prentice Hall, 2008).
2006: CHIEF FIRE OFFICER’S DESK REFERENCE: Jones & Bartlett, Chap. 4: U.S. Legal System.
2005: FIRE & EMS LAW FOR OFFICERS: Fire Protection Publications, Okla. State: Employment Best Practices (2005); Safety (2004).

________________________________________________________________________

Chap. 1 – American Legal System, incl. Fire Codes, Investigations, Arson

MN: CHINA PHONE BATTERY - $3.8M FIRE – AMAZON SUED

On April 27, 2028, in Berkly Regional Insurance Company, et al. v. John Doe Battery Manufacturer; Yishda; et al., the United States Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit (St. Louis) held (3 to 0) that the lawsuit against Amazon cannot proceed in federal court until state law is clarified. When Rochelle Zappa’s cellphone would not hold a charge, she searched Amazon for a replacement battery. She picked one sold by a Chinese company named Yishda that the website advertised as “Amazon’s Choice.” When she plugged her phone in at work to charge the battery, it fizzled, sparked, and then burst into flames. Smoke soon enveloped the office. By the time firefighters put out the fire, it had caused $3,881,280 in damage. The employer’s insurance company sued Amazon in state court; Amazon removed it to federal court. The 8^th Circuit is sending following question to the Minnesota Supreme Court to answer following question:

“Under Minnesota law, if an e-commerce company allows an unrelated party to sell a defective product through its website and provides order-fulfillment services for the sale, is it strictly liable for any harm caused by the defect?”

https://ecf.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/26/04/242159P.pdf

THE COURT HELD:

“When Rochelle Zappa’s cellphone would not hold a charge, she searched Amazon for a replacement battery. She picked one sold by a Chinese company named Yishda that the website advertised as ‘Amazon’s Choice.’

The company took part in the “Fulfillment by Amazon” program, a service that allows sellers to use Amazon’s infrastructure, including its website, its warehouses, and its delivery drivers. For a fee, Amazon handled storage, order fulfillment, returns, and customer service. See Pickard v. Amazon.com, Inc., 387 So.3d 515, 518 (La. 2024) (describing Amazon’s order-fulfillment service). Here, it resulted in an Amazon driver delivering a Yishda battery inside an Amazon bag to her doorstep.

***

We need to know whether, under Minnesota law, Amazon is strictly liable for a defective product it offered, stored, and shipped, even though someone else was the seller. The Minnesota Supreme Court ought to be the one to decide this novel legal issue, so we give it the right of first refusal… Finally, the legal question we have is about as clean as it gets. Whether Amazon is strictly liable for Yishda’s batteries depends on undisputed facts. The record is clear that, as the seller, Yishda listed the batteries online, sent them to warehouses around the country, and left the rest to Amazon.”

Legal lesson learned: Battery fires are becoming all too common; the question here is whether the insurance company for the $3.8 million loss can recover from Amazon and was Amazon aware of prior fires with this product.

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Chap. 1 – American Legal System, incl. Fire Codes, Investigations, Arson

WV: ARSON - SIGNED CONFESSION / NO NEED PD TO VIDEO

On April 21, 2026, in State of West Virginia v. Harry Lee Steele, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, held (5 to 0) that trial court properly denied motion to suppress written confession, which was given voluntarily; jury convicted him of first-degree arson for light couch on fire on front of house, and sentenced him to 20 years. He confessed to lighting a couch on the front porch, which led to structure fire; he turned himself in the next day and admitted he started the fire out of personal animosity with the owner of the house. Deputy Martin stated that he recorded only part of the interview because his bodycam needed to charge.

https://www.courtswv.gov/sites/default/pubfilesmnt/2026-04/24-79%20Memorandum%20Decision.pdf

THE COURT HELD:

“Here, the circuit court considered the evidence presented at the suppression hearing and found that the petitioner did not appear intoxicated; that his signatures on both the Miranda waiver form and the written statement matched; and that the petitioner affirmed the accuracy of the statement as observed in the recorded portion of the interview—all of which led the court to conclude that the petitioner’s confession was voluntary and not made under duress.

While the petitioner argues that the voluntariness of his confession cannot be proven because his initial statement to Deputy Martin was not recorded, we have previously declined to ‘establish an absolute rule requiring such recording,’ noting that ‘requiring police agencies to record interrogations is impractical and does not offer any greater safeguards for protecting the accused’s rights than would be afforded by writing the statements affords.’ State v. Kilmer, 190 W. Va. 617, 628-29, 439 S.E.2d 881, 892-93 (1993).

Further, to the extent that petitioner claims the voluntariness of his statement cannot be proven because Deputy Martin drafted it on his behalf, we have previously held that [a] confession or statement made by a suspect is admissible if it is freely and voluntarily made despite the fact that it is written by an arresting officer if the confession or statement is read, translated (if necessary), signed by the accused and admitted by him to be correct.”

Legal lesson learned: If PD drafts the confession document, it would be helpful to video the draft being read to the defendant prior to his signature.

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Chap. 1 – American Legal System, incl. Fire Codes, Investigations, Arson

TX: BATTERY STORAGE PLANT– INJUNCTION – RISK PLAN

On April 9, 2026, in Jim Clements, et al. v. Jason McBroom, et al., the Court of Appeals of Texas, Third District, Austin held (3 to 0) reversed trial court and held that landowners are entitled to an injunction to temporarily halt the construction of a planned 200-megawatt Battery Energy Storage System (BESS) on the McBrooms' property until the McBrooms ensure the implementation of a “Court-approved hazard mitigation plan, including specific measures for fire containment, contamination prevention, and emergency response.”

https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/tx-court-of-appeals/118277713.html

THE COURT HELD:

“In their live petition, filed November 26, 2024, Landowners asserted a claim against the McBrooms for private nuisance based on negligence to support their request for injunctive relief and damages. Landowners' factual allegations include the following:

Construction on the planned BESS facility could begin as early as “the fourth quarter of 2025,” with operations beginning in 2026;
The planned BESS relies on lithium-ion battery technology, which is prone to ‘thermal runaway,’ a self-sustaining process triggered by overheating that can lead to the rapid release of flammable gases, high-temperature fires, and even explosions; …
The phenomenon of thermal runaway is well-documented in federal research and has been observed in multiple large-scale BESS incidents, underscoring the immediate risks posed to nearby residents;
Despite these substantial hazards, Texas currently lacks adequate regulations for BESS facilities, leaving the burden of risk entirely on local residents;
Fayette County is ill-equipped to address the unique and severe dangers associated with BESS fires. The County relies on a volunteer firefighting force that lacks the specialized training, personnel, and resources—such as water supplies and hazardous-material-response capabilities—necessary to manage such incidents;
Fire Chief Eddie Schneider confirmed at a local town hall that the County's emergency response infrastructure is insufficient for handling BESS fires, noting that the County lacks both the resources and an emergency plan tailored to the hazards posed by lithium-ion battery fires;
The County's unpreparedness directly endangers Landowners, as the County cannot effectively contain a BESS fire or prevent its resulting contamination from spreading through the environment….

***

Similarly here, we conclude that Landowners have sufficiently alleged facts that, if proven, would support their request for injunctive relief to redress a prospective nuisance that plausibly will be caused by the McBrooms' and Staccato's imminent actions that will likely cause irreparable harm for which they would have no adequate remedy at law. Viewing the allegations liberally and making all reasonable inferences in Landowners' favor, as we must, we conclude that they have sufficiently pleaded that the McBrooms will indeed engage in the activity sought to be enjoined—allowing Staccato to construct and operate a BESS on their property without sufficient hazard-mitigation plans and measures in place, highlighted by Staccato's alleged demonstrable intent to construct and operate the BESS in such manner—to entitle Landowners to the relief sought and pass the hurdle of a Rule 91a motion. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a. Landowners' allegations are sufficient to state a cognizable claim for the court to exercise its equitable power to enjoin a prospective nuisance, if proven, see Huynh, 694 S.W.3d at 679, and the trial court erred in determining otherwise.”

Legal lesson learned: Texas currently lacks adequate regulations for BESS facilities; hazard-mitigation plan needed to address thermal runaway and other safety hazards.

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Chap. 2 – Line Of Duty Death / Safety

IL: CATASTROPHIC INJURY – ADDED BENEFITS REMOVED

On May 1, 2026, in Benjamin Carter v. Fox Lake Fire Protection District, the Court of Appeals of Illinois, Second District held (3 to 0) that trial court properly held that while state’s Public Safety Employee Benefits Act required FD to pay premiums for health insurance for his lifetime, the FD can remove “supplemental benefits” offered to him (and all current firefighters) for past six years - vision, dental, and life insurance, and the HRA benefit [Health Reimbursement Arrangement plan] to help pay the high medical expense deductibles and co-pays under the Blue Cross / Blue Shield. https://ilcourtsaudio.blob.core.windows.net/antilles-resources/resources/865bbd6b-111a-42c0-93b7-0362e44b14c7/Carter%20v.%20Fox%20Lake%20Fire%20Protection%20District%202026%20IL%20App%20(2d)%20250374.pdf

THE COURT HELD:

“Carter was a firefighter with the District from March 16, 2012, until August 9, 2017. On

October 20, 2014, he suffered a catastrophic injury while responding to a motor vehicle crash. On August 9, 2017, Carter was awarded a duty-related disability pension. Further, under section 10 of the Public Safety Employee Benefits Act (Benefits Act) (820 ILCS 320/10 (West 2016)), Carter became entitled to receive certain health insurance benefits for the remainder of his life at no cost.

Since 2012, the District had provided all its employees with a high-deductible group health insurance plan through Blue Cross/Blue Shield. The District also provided all its active members with a Health Reimbursement Arrangement plan (HRA), through Employment Benefits Corporation (EBC), to help pay the high medical expense deductibles and co-pays under the Blue Cross/Blue Shield plan. The HRA benefit was provided in the form of a debit card funded by the District that employees could use to pay non-covered medical expenses.

***

From August 2017 through December 31, 2023, the District continued to provide the same benefits to Carter that it provided to its active employees. That is, the District paid the premium for Carter’s coverage in the Blue Cross/Blue Shield group health insurance plan and provided Carter with the HRA benefit. The District also provided Carter with vision, dental, and life insurance.

On September 28, 2023, the District notified Carter that it had determined that he was

receiving benefits beyond those he was entitled to receive under the Benefits Act. Specifically, the District informed Carter that he was not entitled to receive vision, dental, or life insurance or any HRA benefits. The District indicated that those benefits would cease on January 1, 2024.

***

The language of the Benefits Act is clear— the District must continue to provide its injured employees with health insurance coverage by paying the entire premium associated with its health insurance plan…. The Benefits Act also plainly states that ‘[t]he term ‘health insurance plan’ does not include supplemental benefits that are not part of the basic group health insurance plan.’ … There is no indication in the District’s health insurance plan that HRA benefits are part of this plan. Thus, HRA benefits are supplemental benefits that are not mandated by the Benefits Act.”

Legal lesson learned: The statute needs to be amended; hard to understand why the Fire District removed benefits they were proving to an injured firefighter for six years.

Note: See benefits

Section 10(a) of Public Safety Employee Benefits Act:

(a) An employer who employs a full-time law enforcement, correctional or correctional probation officer, or firefighter, who, on or after the effective date of this Act suffers a catastrophic injury or is killed in the line of duty shall pay the entire premium of the employer’s health insurance plan for the injured employee, the injured employee’s spouse, and for each dependent child of the injured employee until the child reaches the age of majority or until the end of the calendar year in which the child reaches the age of 25 if the child continues to be dependent for support or the child is a full-time or part-time student and is dependent for support. The term “health insurance plan” does not include supplemental benefits that are not part of the basic group health insurance plan. If the injured employee subsequently dies, the employer shall continue to pay the entire health insurance premium for the surviving spouse until remarried and for the dependent children under the conditions established in this Section. (Emphases added.) 820 ILCS 320/10(a) (West 2016).

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Chap. 2 – Line Of Duty Death / Safety

NY: LODD – NURSING HOME – PRIOR INSPECTIONS RPTS

On April 22, 2026, in Sabrail Davenport, as Administrator of the Estate of Jared Calvin Lloyd v. Evergreen Court Home for Adults SP LLC, et al., Judge John P. Collins, Jr., Supreme Court, Rockland County, quashed subpoenas by the firefighters’ family that seek a Wisconsin based commercial insurance company’s post-fire claims files which include privileged information, but may issue a “narrowly tailed subpoena” concerning pre-loss inspection reports by the insurance company. “A liability insurer's claim file, created in connection with its defense of third-party claims against its insured, is conditionally immune from disclosure as material prepared in anticipation of litigation.” Firefighter Jared Calvin Lloyd was killed on March 23, 2021 structure fire at Evergreen Home for Adults when a rabbi and his son used a blowtorch for a pre-Passover cleaning process. https://public.fastcase.com/Jhe1Qn%2BmJndQYQU6z%2FeNm1Wc0BhwXqbgUcnfM0G%2F8LGBWKhbC8yUkIyVwLGd8HWj?utm_medium=email&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-85mlG7bjjwBnXQBs8DYGyySvCPBDEvbYyrF7EMhR5VCH2hTuoCLWnOKD3mejXOTkKYawSsNFXD_QLidauQN_0-kPfmHA&_hsmi=226712652&utm_content=226712652&utm_source=hs_email

THE COURT HELD:

“[The Court held that family may now issue] “narrowly tailored subpoena … seeking specifically: (i) any pre-loss inspection reports, hazard assessment reports or written communications between Church Mutual [insurance company] and the insured concerning the physical condition of the premises at 65 Lafayette Street, Spring Valley, New York, generated in connection with the underwriting or renewal of any policy covering those premises; and (ii) any written requirements or recommendations made by Church Mutual to the insured concerning fire safety, building conditions or hazard remediation at the premises.

***

This is a wrongful death and conscious pain and suffering action arising from a catastrophic fire on March 22-23, 2021, at the Evergreen Court Home for Adults, located at 65 Lafayette Street, Village of Spring Valley, Rockland County. Plaintiff decedent, Jared Calvin Lloyd, was a volunteer firefighter with the Spring Valley Fire Department who was killed when he became trapped inside the burning building, which ultimately collapsed. A resident of Evergreen Home for Adults, Oliver Hueston, also perished in the fire. The premises were owned by defendant SPJJ LLC and operated by defendant Evergreen Court Home for Adults SP LLC. Church Mutual Insurance Company, S.I. (‘Church Mutual’) is a Wisconsin-based commercial insurer that issued liability and property insurance policies to the facility.

The fire prompted investigations by at least five governmental agencies, including the New York State Department of Public Service (‘DPS’), the New York State Office of Fire Prevention and Control (‘OFPC’), the Rockland County Sheriff's Office, the Spring Valley Police Department, and the United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (‘ATF’). Criminal charges were brought against certain defendants and ultimately resolved by plea agreement.

***

Defense counsel documented that, in 3.7 hours of standard internet research, he was able to locate and download the complete 117-page DPS report, the 12-page OFPC report (originally submitted to the District Attorney with a non-disclosure request), and a 202-page criminal omnibus motion containing color photographs, a detailed kitchen blueprint, the complete 44 Control call detail report and a 19-page expert fire analysis report prepared by John Lentini of Scientific Fire Analysis, LLC. Five governmental agencies participated in the on-site investigation; the identities of whose investigators are specifically named in the record. With all criminal proceedings resolved, FOIL requests will yield the complete investigative record compiled by public agencies with unlimited access to the scene. Plaintiff has not rebutted this showing in any meaningful way.”

Legal lesson learned: Pre-trial discovery may include prior inspection reports about the building.

Note: See TV report, five years after the fire. https://www.newsbreak.com/news-12-2283883/4553774051867-today-is-the-fifth-anniversary-of-a-rockland-county-fire-that-killed-two-including-a-local-firefighter

July 1, 2021: Massive blaze in adult care home which killed a resident and a firefighter 'was caused by rabbi and his son who used a BLOWTORCH in pre-Passover kitchen cleaning ritual. https://www.dailymail.com/news/article-9746389/Fatal-assisted-living-fire-linked-cleaning-ritual.html

National Fallen Firefighters Foundation - Roll of Honor: https://www.firehero.org/fallen-firefighter/jared-c-lloyd/

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Chap. 2 – Line Of Duty Death / Safety

MO: THYROID CANCER / TURNOUT GEAR – STATE COURT

On April 7, 2026, in Jason Crady and Nicole Crady v. 3M Company, U.S. District Court Judge John A Ross, United States District Court for Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern Division, granted the firefighter’s motion to return the case to state court. The plaintiff has been a firefighter since 2005, and in March 2024, Crady was diagnosed with thyroid cancer. He and his wife filed suit against 3M in state court, claiming his turn out gear caused his cancer (not exposure to AFFF foam). 3M removed case to federal court so it could assert the “federal contractor defense” – that 3M manufactured and sold to the U.S. military in accordance with the military's specifications (“MilSpec AFFF”). The firefighter’s attorneys, to avoid that defense, wisely only sued 3M regarding turn out exposure, not AFFF foam exposure. The plaintiff’s deposition was taken in the federal case showing very limited exposure to foam:

“Crady testified that in one instance during firefighting training, he was in a group that handled a hose used to discharge foam…. He ‘was probably the fourth person on the hose’ and approximately ten to twenty feet from the nozzle…. He did not mix, load, wade in, or touch the foam during that training…. At another training session, Crady learned how to load foam into a truck, but he did not personally load any foam or open any foam container…. He confirmed that he never loaded foam himself…. Crady testified that he did not believe he had ever been exposed to foam…. Plaintiffs state that Crady testified ‘no less than ten times he was not exposed to foam, and he didn't train anyone on the use of foam.’

The case is now returned to state court for pre-trial discovery. https://public.fastcase.com/Jhe1Qn%2BmJndQYQU6z%2FeNm2HEaeCCWkcBCeUCujqGNVlbyw33GV3OIPoGmz91llGj?utm_medium=email&_hsenc=p2ANqtz--_2koWPJH8aNw9hArqKJahBiDeDbHde9hJY14uLqxi48R0NPU4q8g0_WpBiId9hecTh5LabDNFfk8DSpNZX48Jer-K6w&_hsmi=226712652&utm_content=226712652&utm_source=hs_email

THE COURT HELD:

“Based on the insufficiency of the facts in this particular case, the Court finds that 3M has failed to establish a colorable federal defense….

The Court finds that Plaintiffs' statement that they have effectively disclaimed AFFF exposure and their additional confirmations that they are not claiming AFFF exposure are sufficient to serve as an express disclaimer of the right to claim damages relating to, or arising out of, exposure to, or injuries suffered as a result of MilSpec AFFF.

***

On September 16, 2025, 3M filed a notice of removal in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442, the federal officer removal statute. In its notice of removal, 3M alleges that the cancer-causing chemicals to which Crady was exposed consisted of per- and poly fluoroalkyl substances (‘PFAS’), which are contained in AFFF that 3M manufactured and sold to the U.S. military in accordance with the military's specifications (‘MilSpec AFFF’).

***

On September 26, 2025, 3M moved to stay all proceedings until the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (the “JPML”) rendered a final decision on 3M's motion to transfer this action to the District of South Carolina for inclusion in the multidistrict litigation proceeding captioned In re Aqueous Film-Forming Foams (AFFF) Products Liability Litigation (MDL No. 2873) (the ‘MDL’)…. On December 11, 2025, the JPML denied 3M's motion to transfer.

***

3M maintains that Plaintiffs are attempting to use state law to attack design choices dictated by the military to impose tort liability on 3M for alleged injuries that were caused in whole or in part by 3M's compliance with military specifications. According to 3M, its status as a government contractor grants that the federal officer defense precludes such an attack. See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 509 (1988). 3M argues that this defense asserted by 3M and other MilSpec AFFF manufacturers presents genuine issues of fact for trial based on an extensive factual record in the MDL. See In re AFFF Prods. Liab. Litig., 2:18-mn-02873, 2022 WL 4291357, at *12, 15 (D.S.C. Sept. 16, 2022). 3M submits that a defense that presents triable issues is colorable and that it has satisfied the remaining element required for federal jurisdiction.”

Legal lesson learned: The case is back to state court where pre-trial discovery will proceed.

Note: Military contractor defense was addressed by U.S. Supreme Court in Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988). Military equipment that meets prior requirements set by the federal government cannot have a design defect sufficient to hold its manufacturer liable. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/487/500/

“This case requires us to decide when a contractor providing military equipment to the Federal Government can be held liable under state tort law for injury caused by a design defect…. [Plaintiff’s] broadest contention is that, in the absence of legislation specifically immunizing Government contractors from liability for design defects, there is no basis for judicial recognition of such a defense. We disagree.

***

On April 27, 1983, David A. Boyle, a United States Marine helicopter copilot, was killed when the CH-53D helicopter in which he was flying crashed off the coast of Virginia Beach, Virginia, during a training exercise. Although Boyle survived the impact of the crash, he was unable to escape from the helicopter, and drowned…. At trial [in federal court], petitioner presented two theories of liability under Virginia tort law that were submitted to the jury. First, petitioner alleged that Sikorsky had defectively repaired a device called the servo in the helicopter's automatic flight control system, which allegedly malfunctioned and caused the crash. Second, petitioner alleged that Sikorsky had defectively designed the copilot's emergency escape system: the escape hatch opened out instead of in (and was therefore ineffective in a submerged craft because of water pressure), and access to the escape hatch handle was obstructed by other equipment. The jury returned a general verdict in favor of petitioner, and awarded him $725,000…. [U.S. Court of Appeals reversed; just as Federal Government cannot be sued for defective design, Sikorsky as military contractor is not liable.]

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Chap. 2 – Line Of Duty Death / Safety

NH: FIRE POLE – VISITOR “PHOTO” – IMMUNITY / AIR BASE

On March 31, 2026, in Celena Nixon v. United States of America, U.S. District Court Judge Paul J. Barbadoro, United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire, held that a visitor at the fire station Pease Air National Guard Base in Newington, New Hampshire cannot sue the government for most of her claims under Federal Tort Claims Act, but further briefing on “failure to train invitees” claim. On Easter Sunday in April 2022, the fire department invited the families of its on-duty firefighters to visit the fire station for a holiday gathering. Plaintiff’s husband was on duty, and gave his wife, two sons and daughter a tour, including second floor; he and two boys then entered the gated pole and safely went down the pole. Mrs. Nixon asked her daughter to take her photo by pole – fell down the hole. The Court describes what happened:

“Upon entering the pole room, Nixon was struck by the pole’s ‘timeless’ ‘beauty[y]’ and ‘wanted [her] picture taken.’ … After handing her phone to her daughter, she says that she walked over to the pole, where the gate into its surrounding cage was open…. In her telling, she stepped inside and placed her weight onto ‘another platform’ (ostensibly the hatch) that ‘gave way.’ … Because she ‘wasn’t like hanging on’ as she tried to get a picture, she fell through the hatch to the ground and was injured.”

https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/new-hampshire/nhdce/1:2024cv00213/63777/56/0.pdf?ts=1775080109

THE COURT HELD:

“Nixon filed this lawsuit against the United States in July 2024…. She asserted claims for negligence and premises liability based on the fire department’s failure to: ‘safely secure the premises for invitees’ (‘Theory 1’); ‘train invitees in the proper use”’ of the pole (‘Theory 2’); ‘restrict access to the pole and the pole room’ to individuals without such training (‘Theory 3’); ‘post signs warning invitees not to approach the pole’ (‘Theory 4’); ‘post signs’ warning that the floor plate ‘was not solid footing and would give upon

placement of any weight’ (‘Theory 5’); ‘secure’ the hatch ‘such that it did not immediately allow individuals to fall through’ or remove it altogether (‘Theory 6’); and ‘install barriers to prevent’ someone from ‘approaching the pole’ and hatch beneath (‘Theory 7’)…. Nixon demanded damages for physical and mental suffering, medical treatment, and loss of earning capacity.

***

Because Nixon’s failure-to-warn claims are inextricably reliant on the fire department’s alleged failure to communicate information, they are subject to the misrepresentation exception. And, because her remaining claims are barred by the discretionary-function exception, I lack jurisdiction over those claims as well.

***

Nixon asserts that the government is liable in part because it failed to ‘train invitees in the proper use’ of the fire pole (Theory 2)….Although it is likely that any claims based on this theory are also barred by the discretion-function exception, I do not presume as much, as the government has not challenged this theory of liability in its motion for

summary judgment. And as applied to this theory, the government’s alternative arguments concerning the scope of the fire department’s duties, the foreseeability of danger posed by the fire pole, and Nixon’s comparative fault present triable disputes of material fact. I therefore deny the government’s motion for summary judgment as to Theory 2 without prejudice to any motion addressing this Court’s jurisdiction over those claims.”

Legal lesson learned: During tours of station, tell all visitors to stay away from fire pole hole.

Note: Court commented on NFPA 1500:

“In relevant part, section 10.1.8 of the NFPA 1500 directs that:

Stations utilizing poles to provide rapid access to lower floors shall ensure that the area around the pole hole is secured by means of a cover, enclosure, or other means to prevent someone from accidentally falling though the pole hole.

***

Phrased disjunctively, this provision does not require the department to use a cover if it uses an enclosure, which is what it did in this case.”

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Chap. 3 – Homeland Security, incl. Active Shooter, Cybersecurity, Immigration

U.S. SUP. CT – TALIBAN BOMB - SOLDIER SUE CONTRACTOR

On April 22, 2026, in Winston T. Hencely v. Fluor Corp, et al., the U.S. Supreme Court held (6 to 3) that former U.S. Army specialist Winston T. Hencely, can sue a military contractor under South Carolina state law for negligent supervision of an Afghanistan employee at Bagram Airbase. Hencely, age 20, suffered a fractured skull and brain injuries on Veteran’s Day 2016 when the Afghan activated a suicide vest, which killed 5 and wounded 17. Hencely heroically saved many more because the Afghan employee was trying to reach a large crowd at Veteran’s Day 5K race at the airfield. The Federal Government has sovereign immunity, so Hencely cannot sue the government for alleged negligence in conducting background checks under its “Afghan First” program at the base where military contractors like Fluor were directed to hire Afghan employees (government knew he was former Taliban). Fluor hired him to work in nontactical vehicle yard, and plaintiff alleges in a lawsuit brought in Federal court in South Carolina that under state law Fluor was negligent in supervising and managing the Afghan’s movements around the base. The U.S. District Court judge in South Carolina dismissed the lawsuit; military contractors under prior case law have immunity arising out of combatant. The U.S. Court of Appeals for 4^th Circuit (Richmond, VA) agreed. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-924_3d9g.pdf

THE COURT HELD (opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas):

“Nayeb [the bomber] worked as a ‘Local National’ contractor at Bagram as part of the military’s ‘Afghan First’ program…. That program sought to stimulate the local economy and stabilize the Afghan Government by requiring contractors to hire Afghans “‘to the maximum extent possible.’ … The military interviewed and screened potential employees. During this process, it learned that Nayeb had been involved with the Taliban in the past. Nonetheless, it approved him for employment.

***

The Army’s investigation found Fluor primarily responsible for the attack. Interviews of Fluor personnel ‘reveal[ed] a poor understanding by Fluor supervisors as to who was responsible for Nayeb’s supervision’ and ‘an unreasonable complacency by Fluor to ensure Local National employees were properly supervised at all times, as required by their contract.’

***

The Fourth Circuit’s decision held Hencely’s claims preempted even though the conduct complained of was neither ordered nor authorized by the Federal Government. No provision of the Constitution and no federal statute justifies that preemption of the State’s ordinary authority over tort suits. Nor does any precedent of this Court command such a result. Therefore, we vacate the judgment of the Fourth Circuit and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

ALITO, J., dissenting

“Among those injured when Nayeb detonated his bomb was petitioner, former Army Specialist Winston Tyler Hencely, who suffered severe and permanent injuries. Barred by sovereign immunity from suing the Federal Government, petitioner brought this diversity suit against Fluor and asserted tort claims under South Carolina law. Like all members of the military wounded in the service of our country, petitioner deserves a full measure of support from the American people, who owe him a debt that can never be fully repaid. But this state-law tort suit is not the way to give petitioner what he is due.

***

In sum, we have long recognized that the Constitution itself may demand preemption when a state law intrudes upon an area of exclusive federal authority. And because the Constitution gives the Federal Government exclusive authority over foreign affairs and the conduct of wars, federal law preempts all state law that substantially interferes with the Government’s exercise of those powers.”

Legal lesson learned: The plaintiff suffered terrible, lifelong injuries; he has now been given opportunity to seek damages from a military contractor.

Note: Bagram Airbase was a very dangerous place [from Dissenting Opinion]:

“In February 2007, a suicide bombing on the base killed 23 and injured 20 more. A June 2009 rocket attack killed two soldiers and injured at least six others. In May 2010, insurgents wearing U. S. Army uniforms killed an American contractor and wounded nine service members. A November 2013 rocket attack killed two civilian contractors, and a December 2015 suicide bombing killed six American service-members.”

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Chap. 3 – Homeland Security, incl. Active Shooter, Cybersecurity, Immigration

NY: IRAN LIABLE - FF DIED CANCER - 9/11 – $7 MILLION

On March 17, 2026, In Re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001; Knight et al v. Islamic Republic of Iran, U.S. District Court Judge George B. Daniels, United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, held that plaintiffs who developed fatal medical conditions after 9/11-related environmental exposures are entitled to a default judgment against the Iran (which has never replied to any of the plaintiffs’ lawsuits). Iran is liable under the 2016 terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act [FSIA]; 28 U.S. Code § 1605A - Terrorism exception to the jurisdictional immunity of a foreign state. https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/1605A. One of the plaintiffs is the Estate of Albert Filosa, FDN, seeking recovery for his latent injuries and subsequent death at age 70. The Judge held that U.S. Magistrate Judge Netburn correctly determined that the Filosa Estate is entitled to a baseline award of $7,000,000 in damages based on “severe” injuries stemming from his role as a first responder to the 9/11 attacks. Family has no way to collect unless can find Iran assets. https://public.fastcase.com/Jhe1Qn%2BmJndQYQU6z%2FeNm525CuDWbNdyVkYCPMsZ0T5YpmzSSkpneXijYslIbSF5OmudrAoxw3Ae8PMhEMNZsP67fNH%2FZ%2FwnrBtLVmm5SAU%3D?utm_medium=email&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-9semzM2ZQJ5MEhp_UWNRAg9Ejc_wupFqaRucLy6fQyzUPCHHSZ-OwHACqIjxggJtdwV9jTjO8a6Rf4TL88Oco6y4mJgQ&_hsmi=226712652&utm_content=226712652&utm_source=hs_email

THE COURT HELD:

“This Court has previously granted partial default judgment motions for plaintiffs who developed fatal medical conditions after 9/11-related environmental exposures…. This Court has not yet, however, addressed recovery for claims by living plaintiffs who developed non-fatal latent conditions after 9/11-related environmental exposures.

Before this Court are two Reports and Recommendations issued by Magistrate Judge Netburn recommending that this Court grant the Knight, Rodriguez, Johnson, and Gaston Plaintiffs' motions for non-fatal latent injuries, and recommending the amounts in which each Plaintiff should be awarded pain and suffering damages…. No party objected to the Nonfatal Latent Injury Reports. This Court ADOPTS the Non-fatal Latent Injury Reports in full.

***

It is immaterial that some Plaintiffs were only present at the World Trade Center (‘WTC’) after September 11, 2001, or that some Plaintiffs participated in processing debris from the WTC site in a different borough…. Because the Plaintiffs were exposed to the toxins, carcinogens, and debris as a result of the 9/11 Attacks, Magistrate Judge Netburn properly concluded that the Plaintiffs are entitled to recovery.

***

The Filosa Estate seeks recovery for the latent injuries and subsequent death suffered by firefighter and first-responder Albert Filosa, and provides to the Court a VCF eligibility letter that reflects the agency's conclusion that Filosa's injuries were a ‘direct result of the 9/11 Attacks.’ … Based on the evidence provided by the Filosa Estate, Magistrate Judge Netburn properly concluded that the Filosa Estate sufficiently establishes causation.”

Legal lesson learned: Unless family can locate Iran assets, they will not be able to collect this judgment.

Note: See the National Fallen Firefighters Foundation Roll of Honor for firefighter Albert Filosa: “He died of cancer, a cancer caused from digging through the rubble in the days following 9/11, searching for remains. He died at 70 years old, and in his last year of life he was painfully sick, which was difficult to witness. The cancer had metastasized to his lungs. He required constant care; he couldn’t breathe. He died at home the way that he wished, surrounded by his family.” https://www.firehero.org/fallen-firefighter/albert-a-filosa/

See my article about this decision, and another decision allowing lawsuits to proceed against Saudi Arabia. April 20, 2026: 9/11 Litigation Is Building A New Legal Framework For Foreign Terrorist Accountability https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/counterterrorism/9-11-litigation-is-building-a-new-legal-framework-for-foreign-terrorist-accountability/

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Chap. 5 – Emergency Vehicle Operation

TX: AERIAL – GROCERIES / BACKED CAR – FD “ON DUTY”

On March 24, 2026, in The City of Houston v. Hollis F. Holmes, the Court of Appeals of Texas, First District held (3 to 0) that trial court properly held that the four firefighters were on duty when picking up groceries for their shift, and therefore the City can be sued for damage to plaintiff’s car when they backed into her. https://cases.justia.com/texas/first-court-of-appeals/2026-01-25-00359-cv.pdf?ts=1774367002

THE COURT HELD:

“On September 11, 2022, at approximately 11 a.m., Houston firefighter Eugene Schifani drove a Houston Fire Department (‘HFD’) ladder truck to an H-E-B grocery store in Houston, Texas with three other firefighters on board. Schifani and firefighter Troy Dornak waited in the fire truck with its engine running while the two other firefighters went inside the grocery store to purchase groceries for the fire station's crew to eat during their twenty-four-hour shift. According to Schifani, the fire truck's engine remained running during the forty-five minutes the two firefighters were in the store ‘just in case we got an emergency call for a ladder truck while on our grocery run.’

***

The groceries were purchased ‘to be prepared at the station for lunch, dinner and breakfast the next day. We have twelve firefighters at Station 62 for the shift. Each firefighter chips in $25.00, so we [have] $300.00 to buy groceries for three really substantial meals.’

***

The City pled in its answer, among other things, that governmental immunity barred Holmes’ claims…. In its summary judgment reply, the City argued that ‘[c]o-workers tasked by other co-workers to buy groceries during the shift and every shift does not make the errand in the scope of employment;’ going to purchase groceries in a HFD

ladder truck does not turn the errand into a ‘scope of employment endeavor;’ the

City does not derive benefit from the grocery run; and the grocery run was not in

furtherance of the City’s business.

***

The grocery trip was not made to purchase Schifani’s own personal groceries, or even just for those four firefighters with him at the store, but for the entire on-duty crew. Given that he was required to remain ready and able to cover any emergency that arose during the grocery run, there is at least a fact question as to whether he was acting in the course and scope of his employment when the fire truck struck Holmes’ car…. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the City of Houston’s motion for summary judgment.”

Legal lesson learned: Grocery runs are part of the “course and scope of duties” of the engineer who back the aerial into her vehicle; the City’s motion for summary judgement was properly denied.

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Chap. 6 – Employment Litigation, incl. Work Comp., Age Discrim., Vet Rights

NY: FF FOOT INJURED ON FIRE BOAT – CASE PROCEED

On April 30, 2026, In Re: In the Matter of the Complaint of Verplanck Fire District, et al. v. Troy Dyckman, the United States Court of Appeals for Second District (New York City) held (3 to 0) that the firefighter lawsuit seeking damages for breach of “warranty of seaworthiness may proceed under federal maritime law. He was a volunteer firefighter while aboard 25-foot Marine I, owned by the Verplanck Fire District on August 9, 2020 to the reported site of a boat fire on the Hudson River, when he extended his leg to fend off a collision with West Chester County police vessel. His foot was crushed between the boats; he has since undergone two surgeries. Under the New York State Volunteer Firefighters’ Benefit Law, his medical expenses are paid by the FD, plus he is paid $500 every two weeks for loss of income while injured. Under the New York Volunteer Fireman’s statute, workers comp is his sole remedy, but federal maritime law allowing lawsuits for breach of “warranty of seaworthiness” may override that state law – case remanded for discovery. https://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/23-1218/23-1218-2026-04-30.pdf?ts=1777566611

THE COURT HELD:

“[Footnote 1.] “Dyckman testified in his deposition that he went to the front of the boat to ‘get the ropes ready to tie off in the front,’ either on the instruction of a colleague or his own initiative, purportedly to secure the boat by tying it to a mooring or vessel.

***

Nothing in the logic of Sieracki [U.S. Supreme Court - Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946] or its progeny has suggested that, while workers employed by an independent stevedoring contractor may recover from the shipowner for unseaworthy conditions, workers employed by a shipowner in its own land-based stevedoring operation may not.

***

The relevant issue for us is whether Dyckman was covered by the Act. Dyckman, as explained below, is not covered by the Act [Limitation of Liability Act of 1851, 46 U.S.C. § 30523.] because he is a governmental employee. Because he is excluded as a governmental employee, the fact that he is neither an independent contractor nor employed by one is of no significance as to whether he is or is not covered under the Act.

Footnote 2: The Limitation of Liability Act limits the liability of the owner of a vessel to the ‘value of the vessel and pending freight’ so long as the damage, loss, or personal injury was incurred ‘without the privity or knowledge of the owner.’

***

We leave it to the proceedings in the district court on remand to determine whether this evidence should be believed and whether Dyckman was doing seaman’s work and incurring a seaman’s hazards.”

Legal lesson learned: Workers’ comp is normally only remedy for firefighter seeking claims against his FD.

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Chap. 7 – Sexual Harassment, incl. Pregnancy Discrimination

IL: CHICAGO - LACK FEMALE BATHROOMS – NO CASE

On April 23, 2026, in Lee Ann McKay v. City of Chicago, U.S. District Court Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer, United States District Court for Northern District, Eastern Division granted the City’s motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff Fire Engineer-EMT filed a lawsuit pro se [no attorney] referencing that only 32 out of 96 total firehouses in Chicago have dedicated women's facilities. However, “McKay identifies no evidence of that, or anything else that could support a jury finding that her use of a bathroom that was also used by male firefighters created a hostile work environment.” https://public.fastcase.com/Jhe1Qn%2BmJndQYQU6z%2FeNm28hiR351dlql3mVrX%2BsW%2FImhVx6LSAbrfZ7R6LP8TbVpSsTp59uwiaa1M%2BxYMu%2FQBeMVJpWoOyQUcFN4LagzoA%3D?utm_medium=email&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-_AWahbnWxhCpMGQYhqfNcYdYivaiXkQGNq4hyWsJQjqDO6KUeS-ltttGyoOKYk2fjuNkb2NzSqvCRrJD1Iyf-ei7DoTw&_hsmi=226712652&utm_content=226712652&utm_source=hs_email

THE COURT HELD:

“She first cites to an affidavit submitted by Marek Wisniewski, Deputy Commissioner of the City's Department of Fleet and Facility Management, who states as of January 9, 2026, only 32 out of 96 total firehouses in Chicago have dedicated women's facilities…. The court presumes Plaintiff contends that the lack of a bathroom available only to women is a violation of Title VII. But the lack of a gendered bathroom, without more, is not discriminatory. There is no indication that women were not allowed to use any restroom, only that the firehouse did not have a women-only restroom on site. Ms. McKay was not being treated differently because of her sex simply because she was asked to share a gender-neutral restroom with her male colleagues. McKay might be able to proceed to trial on a hostile work environment theory if she could show that she was regularly forced to use the toilet or shower in view of her male colleagues, for example, or if the situation in the restrooms led to sexual harassment by coworkers. But McKay identifies no evidence of that, or anything else that could support a jury finding that her use of a bathroom that was also used by male firefighters created a hostile work environment. See Swyear v. Fare Foods Corp., 911 F.3d 874, 880 (7th Cir. 2018) (observing that a plaintiff asserting a hostile work environment claim must show the ‘conduct was so severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of employment and create a hostile or abusive working environment).

***

McKay appears to argue that the City's policy of advantaging members of minority races in making promotion decisions constitutes discrimination on the basis of race….

Footnote 8: The court observes that McKay was eventually offered the promotion more than once, but the offers down out of fear of retaliation.

The problem with this claim is that the city has offered a lawful justification for its actions: the Albrecht consent decree. As the City explains, a consent decree entered into between the United States and the City of Chicago in the case United States v. Albrecht, 80 C 1590 (N.D. Ill. March 31, 1980), required the use of limited racial preferences in promotion decisions at the Chicago Fire Department. McKay does not dispute that the consent decree was in place at the time the promotion decisions at issue were made, or that those individuals promoted before her were promoted due to the consent decree…. Since she has offered no alternative basis to hold the City liable under Title VII for its compliance with Albrecht, summary judgment is warranted on her race discrimination claim….

Footnote 5: The United States and the City of Chicago later jointly moved to terminate the Albrecht consent decree. On June 16, 2022, this court granted that motion in a separate case. (See Order Granting Joint Motion to Dissolve in Albrecht, 80 C 01590 (Pallmeyer, C.J.).)

Legal lesson learned: The lack of a “gendered bathroom” without more is not discriminatory.

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Chap. 7 – Sexual Harassment, incl. Pregnancy Discrimination

OH: FEMALE EMT – SHOWED PHOTOS NAKED MALE - FIRED

On September 30, 2026, in Gertrude Crisp v. Scioto Ambulance District, U.S. District Court Judge Jeffery P. Hopkins, United States District Court for Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, granted summary judgment to the Ambulance District. The female paramedic, who has been harassed by Joshua Gullett, complained to management in Fall 2018, and the Board responded by directing that Crisp and Gullett would no longer be scheduled together. Thereafter they had limited contact with one another. But “on June 9, 2022, Crisp showed two new Scioto Ambulance District employees—Marissa Campbell and Sandra Thacker—a profile that Gullet maintained on the website Fetlife.com, a sex-solicitation site that Gullet and his wife, Crystal Gullet, used to seek sexual partners. The profile included several pictures of himself, as well as pictures of his wife, and pictures of his erect penis.” Gullett learned of this a complained to management. Eric Lutz, a Scioto Ambulance District board member, conducted an investigation that led to her termination on July 3, 2022.

https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/ohio/ohsdce/1:2023cv00273/279746/32/0.pdf?ts=1759344788

THE COURT HELD:

“The details—including that the photos were from Fetlife.com—came out in Lutz’s

investigation, which he undertook shortly after receiving the report. In his report, Lutz

summarized his interview with Crisp as follows:

She [Crisp] stated without reservation and without apology that she had shown nude photos of co-worker Josh Gullett to other employees while on duty and while on premises. Her reported reason for doing so was that (paraphrased) She (Ms. Crisp) did show the nude photos of Mr. Gullett to the other employees to “warn” them about “perverted and predatory” men in EMS, that there is a “list” of males in EMS who act inappropriately toward other women in EMS, that those men may make professionally inappropriate statements or make inappropriate requests of them . . . . In short, it is Ms. Crisp’s contention that she showed the photos with the legitimate intention of “warning” the other employees about alleged and potential male behavior, and that this nude photo somehow “showed a pattern of behavior,” justified, and verified her allegations about the other employees.

Lutz concluded the report by stating:

Showing these photos while on duty, regardless of justification, is inappropriate and unprofessional. . . Her actions increase the potential for undesirable work

environments and disagreeable work relationships at [Scioto Ambulance District].

Further, spreading rumors among employees about another staff member being

“perverted” or “being a predator” are inflammatory and unprofessional. Furthermore, there have been no reports or accusations of any employee engaging in this type of behavior while on duty or with other employees at any time.

***

Crisp’s statements to Campbell and Thacker about Mr. Gullett did not, however, amount to reporting sexual misconduct, as they were made to co-workers and did not advocate for any particular action by Scioto Ambulance District. Instead, her reporting was intended to encourage her coworkers—not Scioto Ambulance—to take particular action, such as avoiding Gullett and being on-guard against his advances.

***

The Court further notes that while the category of protected activity for purposes of

Title VII is not tightly constrained, it also is not unlimited…. To summarize, it would stretch the facts of this case too far to conclude that by showing other employees Gullett’s Fetlife.com profile in the course of warning them about possible sexual harassment by him,9 she was “opposing a[] practice,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), of the Scioto County Ambulance District. Further, nothing in the record before the Court suggests that Scioto Ambulance District ignored Crisp’s complaints about Gullet at the relevant time period, given that Crisp chose to make those complaints to coworkers, not to their employer. For these reasons, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Crisp’s retaliation claims (Counts II and IV).”

Legal lesson learned: The plaintiff may have been motivated to “warn” co-workers, but it was not a “protected activity” to show a web profile and nude photo of the male.

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Chap. 8 – Race / National Origin Discrimination

U.S. SUP. CT: VOTING - “RACIAL GERRYMANDERING”

On April 29, 2026, in Louisiana v. Phillip Callais, et al., the U.S. Supreme Court held (6 to 3) that the Louisiana Legislature improperly created a second majority-black congressional voting district. It is predicted that the decision will result in a new map that likely will cost Democrats at least one seat in Congress.

In 2022, a federal judge in Louisiana held 5-days of hearing on a new congressional map written after the 2020 census. He determined that the new map improperly kept in place only the one majority-black district [created in 1983], and ordered a new map be drawn per the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The second map created a second majority-black district, which stretches “some 250 miles from Shreveport in the northwest corner of the state to Baton Rouge in southeast Louisiana, slicing through metropolitan areas to scoop up pockets of predominantly Black populations from Shreveport, Alexandria, Lafayette, and Baton Rouge.” A three-judge court found the second map was unconstitutional “racial gerrymander.” The U.S. Supreme Court’s six majority Justices agreed with three-judge court. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-109_21o3.pdf

THE COURT HELD: (opinion by Justice Samuel Alito):

“Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 U. S. C. §10301 et seq., was designed to enforce the Constitution— not collide with it. Unfortunately, lower courts have

sometimes applied this Court’s §2 precedents in a way that forces States to engage in the very race-based discrimination that the Constitution forbids…. {A]llowing race to play any part in government decision making represents a departure from the constitutional rule that applies in almost every other context…. Compliance with §2 [of Voting Rights Act] thus could not justify the State’s use of race-based redistricting here. The State’s attempt to satisfy the [federal judge’s] ruling, although understandable, was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander….” https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-109_21o3.pdf

JUSTICE THOMAS [Concurring opinion]:

“I join the Court’s opinion in full. This Court should never have interpreted §2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to effectively give racial groups ‘an entitlement to roughly proportional representation.’…. Today’s decision should largely put an end to this

“disastrous misadventure” in voting-rights jurisprudence…. As I explained more than 30 years ago, I would go further and hold that §2 of the Voting Rights Act does not regulate districting at all.”

DISSENT [opinion by Justice Elena Kagan]:

“The State’s District 2 has had a Black majority since 1983, when a vote-dilution suit forced its creation. If Louisiana were tomorrow to slice up District 2, dispersing its Black residents among the rest, it is hard to see how the now judicially amended Section 2 could stand in the way. The State presumably would assert as its ‘political goal’ an

all-Republican congressional delegation; in other words, it would announce a partisan gerrymander…. And because of the severe racial polarization in the State, that

goal would be incompatible with maintaining District 2 as is. So those advocating for its majority-minority composition would almost surely lose at the first Callais requirement (and, as above, at the others as well). Repeated often enough across the country, the same districting practice— really, hinging only on the partisan ambitions (or restraint) of state legislatures—could destroy most of the majority- minority districts that in the past 40 years the Voting Rights Act created.”

Legal lesson learned: This is a “landmark” decision, with lots of potential political impact.

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Chap. 9 – Americans With Disabilities Act

FL: FF REFUSED TAKE TB TEST – ADA CASE TO PROCEED

On April 24, 2026, in Nathaniel Griffin v. City of South Pasadena, U.S. District Court Judge Wiiliam F. Jung, United States District Court for Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division, held that the firefighter’s ADA retaliation case may proceed with pretrial discovery. “Plaintiff denies ever asking the Life Scan staff to lie about whether a TB test had been done.” In his Amended Complaint he alleges that he “subjectively believed” that portions of the CBA’s annual physical examination requirement violated the ADA and he made his concerns known to Fire Chief prior to the annual physical. After discovery is completed, the City may then file a motion for summary judgment based on a “business-necessity” defense. https://ecf.flmd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2025-02787-49-8-cv

THE COURT HELD:

“A statutorily protected activity for an ADA retaliation claim is ‘oppos[ing] any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter.’ 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a)…. However, the plaintiff is not required to prove that the alleged discriminatory conduct was actually unlawful;

rather, the opposed conduct need only be “close enough” to support the objectively

reasonable belief.

***

The Amended Complaint is also clear that Plaintiff subjectively believed that portions of the CBA’s annual physical examination requirement violated the ADA … and these objections about being forced by an employer to undergo an (allegedly) unlawful medical

examination are objectively reasonable in light of the controlling substantive law.

***

On August 2, 2022, Plaintiff was scheduled for an annual physical examination at Life Scan Wellness Center (‘Life Scan’)…. While at Life Scan, Plaintiff complained to the staff about the intrusive nature of the examinations, but still ‘made himself immediately available . . . for evaluation, and at no point refused any portion.’ … Life Scan staff member eventually told Plaintiff that it was too late to coordinate an accommodation and that he would have to reschedule his exam.

***

Plaintiff attended a rescheduled physical examination on August 12, 2022…. Plaintiff denies ever asking the Life Scan staff to lie about whether a TB test had been done.

***

On August 17, 2022, Fire Chief Mixson delivered a Notice of Discipline, asserting a ‘failure to complete annual physical in an efficient manner, creating additional expense to [Defendant]. Disrespectful and unprofessional interaction with members of the public (Life Scan staff). Violations of Employee Handbook Sections 7-4 B (9), 7-4 В (7), 7-4 В (8), 7-4 С (17).’ … Plaintiff was then suspended without pay for 24 hours…. On August 24, 2022, Plaintiff appealed this adverse employment action to Fire Commissioner Thomas B. Reid, which was denied.

***

On September 13, 2022, the City terminated Plaintiff’s employment…. The same day, Plaintiff appealed his termination to Fire Commissioner Reid … and during the appeal, Plaintiff was permitted to provide objections, case law, and scholarly articles…. In sum, Plaintiff was not only informed of the termination hearing and allowed to testify on his own behalf, but was also permitted to appeal his termination and (again) present evidence on his behalf.”

Legal lesson learned: Pre-trial discovery will now proceed; city has a strong defense.

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Chap. 9 – Americans With Disabilities Act

AK: RIGHT ANKLE – DISABLED – NO RIGHT “LIGHT DUTY”

On March 31, 2026, in Christopher Mackey v. City of Pine Bluff, U.S. District Court Judge Kristine G. Bake, United States District Court for Eastern District of Arkansas, Central Division, granted the City’s motion for summary judgment. On July 31, 2022, Mackey (firefighter / engineer) suffered an ankle injury as his shift began by stepping into a pothole in the parking lot of Station 1 in Pine Bluff, and MRI revealed “complete rupture of the peroneus brevis tendon” which required surgery. After surgery he was without feeling in the right side of his foot. The FD denied his two requests for light duty – as Engineer with no firefighting, or instructor in EMS school with no heavy lifting - but his physician could not provide FD with letter that he could eventually return to full duty. Mackey resigned from FD on November 9, 2023. https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/arkansas/aredce/4:2024cv00350/143122/28/0.pdf?ts=1775058402

THE COURT HELD:

“Mackey's first purported reasonable accommodation fails as a matter of law. The Court finds that Mackey's request to continue as ‘an engineer but without the firefighting - without having to be inside fighting the fire’ is not a request for a reasonable accommodation because that accommodation necessarily eliminates the essential functions of the engineer position.

***

Mackey's second purported accommodation also fails. Mackey requested to be moved to a trainer position as an accommodation, but Mackey is incapable of performing the essential functions of a trainer.

***

Accordingly, the Court grants Pine Bluff's motion for summary judgment as to Mackey's ADA and ACRA failure to accommodate claims.

Legal lesson learned: ADA only requires reasonable accommodation if employee can still perform the essential functions of the job.

Note: The FD does provide light duty.

“After Mackey resigned, another employee, E’Leecia Clark, was offered temporary light duty work….However, she had received hip replacement surgery and had run out of sick days, so the department offered her a temporary light duty job until her doctor cleared her to return to full duty…. Clark was only on light duty work for four to five days before she was able to return to full duty.”

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Chap. 9 – Americans With Disabilities Act

OH: FF 15-YRS HEARING AIDS – NFPA 1582 REQ. - FIRED

On February 23, 2026, in Jeffrey Kibler v. Genoa Township, Ohio, U.S. District Court Judge Sarah D. Morrison, United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, granted the Township’s motion for summary judgment. The firefighter, who worked for the Township from 2001 until his terminated April 21, 2022, wore a hearing aid in right ear since 2002, and left ear since 2006, with Fire Chiefs knowledge. During his August 19, 2021 annual physical, Dr. William Cann reviewed the firefighter’s hearing loss records and advised the Fire Chief that his hearing fell below the NFPA 1582 unaided threshold, back to at least 2011, and his hearing has worsened over time. The firefighter suggested several possible ADA accommodations, including carrying a second set of hearing aids, or working as just an engineer, but they were not accepted. The Court referenced the testimony of Dr. Stanely C. Haimes, who served on the NFPA 1582 technical committee: “hearing aids are not designed for operation in structural firefighting environmental conditions of elevated heat, water deluge, and humidity and therefore being subject to unpredictable failure under those conditions.” https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/ohio/ohsdce/2:2023cv02466/282351/63/0.pdf?ts=1771088328

THE COURT HELD:

“Mr. Kibler argues that these accommodations are nevertheless reasonable because he used hearing aids in both ears while working as a Firefighter/EMT for 15 years without issue, even though he did not meet the NFPA threshold for the majority of that time [since at least 2011]. But, in light of the evidence that Mr. Kibler’s hearing has worsened over time, Mr. Kibler’s prior performance is not dispositive of his continued ability to meet the essential qualifications of the Firefighter/EMT role.

***

Mr. Kibler argues that there are three accommodations that are reasonable and would allow him to perform the essential job functions: that Genoa (1) allow him to work with his hearing aids; (2) require Mr. Kibler carry a second pair of hearing aids as a backup; or (3) allow him to only work as an engineer and not perform other firefighting duties at scenes. With respect to the first two proposed accommodations, neither addresses that the NFPA threshold is a threshold for unaided hearing.

***

Further, Genoa has offered evidence that the risk of Mr. Kibler’s hearing aids failing in an IDLH environment is not merely speculative. Dr. Stanely C. Haimes (a physician who works on the technical committee that established the NFPA threshold) testified that the NFPA 1582 Standard does not permit firefighters to use a hearing aid to meet the minimum hearing threshold because hearing aids are not ‘designed for operation in structural firefighting environmental conditions of elevated heat, water deluge, and humidity and therefore being subject to unpredictable failure under those conditions.’ (Haimes Rep., PAGEID # 2076.) Dr. Haimes says that carrying a spare hearing aid would not alleviate these safety concerns because ‘it would be extremely dangerous - if not life threatening - to have the firefighter remove his personal protective equipment” to replace his hearing aids while on a call.

***

Mr. Kibler’s proposals to continue wearing hearing aids and/or carry a backup pair were thus unreasonable in light of a firefighter’s reliance on his hearing in low visibility situations and the testimony that hearing aids can unpredictably fail in an IDLH environment. Mr. Kibler effectively argues that Genoa should ignore its own policy and application of a national standard, recommendations from a medical professional, and the danger posed by the potential and ‘unpredictable’ failure of hearing aids in an IDLH environment, in favor of hoping that nothing goes wrong in the future. The law does not require Genoa to assume this risk.”

Legal lesson learned: The case has been appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6^th Circuit (Cincinnati); that decision may provide more guidance on obligations of a fire department to accommodate a firefighter that has long worn hearing aids without incident.

Note: See IAFC Guidance on NFPA 1582 (6.5 Ears and Hearing – Candidates/New Hire): https://www.iafc.org/docs/default-source/1safehealthshs/vws_rrkit_nfpa-1582.pdf?sfvrsn=ca9b9f0d_4

August 16, 2023: Understanding NFPA 1582 Medication Disqualifications: A Comprehensive Guide. https://acuityinternational.com/blog/nfpa-1582-medication-disqualifications/

June 2024: Knowledge and Attitudes Towards Usage of Hearing Protection in

Volunteer Firefighters. https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6894&context=gc_etds

“Despite most firefighters acknowledging exposure to noise during firefighting activities,

only one individual reported wearing hearing protection while firefighting, with an additional five occasionally doing so, leaving 64 firefighters who do not utilize hearing protection.”

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Chap. 11 – Fair Labor Standards Act, and Military Leave

CA: FLSA - EMS VARIOUS BONUSES – NO CLASS ACTION

On April 21, 2026, in Adam N. Martinez v. Sierra Lifestar, Inc., the California Court of Appeals, Fifth District held (3 to 0) that trial court should reconsider allowing lawsuit to proceed as a class action on behalf of 135 paramedics and EMTs who received various types of bonuses. Plaintiff, for example, received a $100 bonus given to all EMTs employed during Emergency Medical Services Week (3^rd week of May, 2025). Under state law and the FLSA, only “nondiscretionary” bonuses must be calculated into employee regular rate of pay for overtime pay. https://cases.justia.com/california/court-of-appeal/2026-f089576.pdf?ts=1776802194

THE COURT HELD:

“Accordingly, in general terms, the legal theory for Martinez’s claim is the same as the legal theory for the class members’ claims—that is, the regular rate of pay used to

calculate overtime, double time, and premium pay owed to each employee was

understated because the rate of pay did not include one or more nondiscretionary bonuses paid to the employee.

***

Martinez proposed a ‘regular rate class’ consisting of current and former employees who were paid overtime and premium pay and also were paid nondiscretionary bonuses described as (1) Bonus, (2) Clerical Bonus, (3) Clerical Training Bonus, (4) EMS Bonus, (5) Lead Bonus, (6) Manager Bonus, (7) Paramedic Bonus, (8) Preceptor EMT Bonus, (9) Preceptor Paramedic Bonus, and (10) Sign-On Bonus.

***

We conclude the trial court committed legal error in its analysis of whether a unique defense defeated the typicality of Martinez’s claim. Lifestar’s arguments that

Martinez’s EMS Bonus was properly excluded from his regular rate of pay because it was

in the nature of a gift, was discretionary, or both, are not unique to Martinez. Those

arguments apply to all EMS Bonuses paid to Lifestar’s other employees for National

Emergency Medical Services Week and, therefore, are not unique to Martinez.”

Legal lesson learned: The trial court judge must now re-consider plaintiff’s motion for class certification; bonuses that are “discretionary” do not impact regular rate of pay.

Note: See U.S. Department of Labor, Wage & Hour Division - Fact Sheet #56C: Bonuses under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA); December 2019. https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/fact-sheets/56c-bonuses

“Discretionary bonuses are excludable from the regular rate of pay. A bonus is discretionary only if all the statutory requirements are met:
The employer has the sole discretion, until at or near the end of the period that corresponds to the bonus, to determine whether to pay the bonus; The employer has the sole discretion, until at or near the end of the period that corresponds to the bonus, to determine the amount of the bonus; and
The bonus payment is not made according to any prior contract, agreement, or promise causing an employee to expect such payments regularly.”

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Chap. 11 – Fair Labor Standards Act, and Military Leave

WA: USERRA - 5 YRS RE-EMPLOYMENT / IF RETURNING

On April 17, 2026, in Travis Bearden v. City of Ocean Shores, U.S. District Court Judge Benjamin H. Settle, United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, Tacoma held that the firefighter not entitled to summary judgment since no evidence he ever intends to return to FD. He last worked at FD in August 2020, and under USERRA he has reemployment rights if on leave max of 5 cumulative years. The firefighter claims he is entitled to 21-day military pay for each fiscal year from 2020 “through the present day.” The city disputes that Bearden is entitled to paid military leave for the following fiscal years, 2021-2026, arguing he cannot establish as a matter of law that he remained and remains a City employee. The firefighter claims he is still employed by the City. Judge Settle doubts this claim - “the record contains no statement or assertion that he currently is an employee. Bearden provides no evidence supporting the conclusion that due to his active-duty military commitments, he was unable to work for the City, at all, over the past five years…. The parties should work in good faith to resolve the damages owed for the conceded period (August 20, 2020 to May 2021).”https://public.fastcase.com/Jhe1Qn%2BmJndQYQU6z%2FeNm2MBH8jjZypB1KxY%2B3GJWtt3pU7LQ0HG1TD%2BuEAPjcSSqkB%2F2Yca8lDVABp6qaMHSj5ZnKz4h2BUwQ71QZi85m8%3D?utm_medium=email&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-_R5GvzVgy1X05e_vCvuMC9Q5e35U1J1WERhCn0fZcvatolnFVOIwTcjgpntEVG0Zn0QYI5aNrPmOIXD_9eLdzthe8Iwg&_hsmi=226712652&utm_content=226712652&utm_source=hs_email

THE COURT HELD:

“There is no evidence or argument explaining why these military orders precluded Bearden from working as a City employee during the 140 days that he was not ‘on orders’ or on active duty in 2022, or at any time after. There is no evidence that Bearden worked for, or even contacted, the City during this or any other period dating back at least five years.

***

There is no evidence in the record that Bearden has ‘remained’ a City employee, since at least 2021. Bearden's motion does not even contend that he remained or remains an Ocean Shores employee. Instead, the declaration he filed in support of his motion attests only that he still has 215 days before he reaches the ‘USERRA 5-year limit, at which time I intend to return to the City of Ocean shores.’ Dkt. 61-1 at 3. But the record contains no statement or assertion that he currently is an employee. Bearden provides no evidence supporting the conclusion that due to his active-duty military commitments, he was unable to work for the City, at all, over the past five years.”

Legal lesson learned: Under USERRA, employees have reemployment rights if “cumulative length of service” does not exceed five years, but a best practice to let employer know you plan to return. https://www.dol.gov/agencies/vets/programs/userra/USERRA-Pocket-Guide#ch1.

Note: See State of Washington Supreme Court June 26, 2025 opinion that he is entitled to 21 days pay for his third leave. https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/1031211.pdf FIRST LEAVE: annual training from October 16 to October 30, 2019. SECOND LEAVE: active duty next nine months, from November 5, 2019, to August 27, 2020. THIRD LEAVE: while still on the Second Leave, he received orders for 273 more days active duty (August 2020-May 2021.

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Chap. 11 – Fair Labor Standards Act, and Military Leave

MN: FLSA - HOSP REMOVES EMS “ON CALL” PAY / OVERTIME

On April 6, 2026, in Michael Peters, et al. v. Sheridan Memorial Hospital, et al. U.S. District Court John Johnson, United States District Court for the District of Montana, Great Falls Division, denied the 26-named plaintiffs’ motion for TRO and preliminary injunction; hospital in response to their complaint re-classified them as hourly, too away their “on call” pay, reduced their hours, eliminated overtime, and no more consecutive shifts. Court found no retaliation - the “new policies were implemented in retaliation as opposed to remedy the issues Plaintiffs alleged in their Complaint.” https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/montana/mtdce/4:2025cv00051/81302/85/0.pdf?ts=1775663905

THE COURT HELD:

“Plaintiffs urge the Court to grant their Motion for a TRO, arguing that although Defendants, in response to their lawsuit, announced they would correctly reclassify staff as hourly and eliminate the $4/hour rate for ‘on call’ pay, so that they are paid properly for on duty time, they also implemented retaliatory changes….These retaliatory changes included mandatory 12-hour shifts only (no consecutive shifts allowed); reduced hours from 40 to 36 per week with no overtime opportunity; required on-site presence for entire shifts (eliminating previous 5-minute radius flexibility); unrealistic staffing plans; and threats of insubordination against the EMS Director (Mr. Peters) for not immediately implementing changes.

***

SMHA and [Hospital CEO Kody] Nelson further argue the policy changes SMHA made are not retaliatory but rather address the Plaintiffs' complaints to ensure compliance with federal and state law….Also, SMHA and Nelson argue Plaintiffs have no right to dictate their legal working conditions…. Given these arguments, SMHA and Nelson conclude Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on the merits.

***

SMHA and Nelson also argue there is no irreparable harm as Plaintiffs will receive what they requested in their Complaint (proper compensation for hours worked)….SMHA and Nelson also argue the balance of equities do not tip in Plaintiffs' favor as they are trying to have it both ways by demanding on-duty pay while maintaining on-call privileges…. Finally, SMHA and Nelson argue Plaintiffs have not established public interest support because they have no legitimate interest in preventing SMHA from making reasonable changes to Plaintiffs' schedules and pay structure to ensure compliance with applicable laws and SMHA's policies and practices applicable to all other employees.

***

Finally, the court is unpersuaded by Plaintiffs' argument that compliance with wage and hour law establishes the public interest factor because the question of whether Defendants new policies bring them into compliance with the FLSA and Montana Wage Act remains in dispute.”

Legal lesson learned: Employers can remove “on call” pay and other workplace policies since no collective bargaining agreement; case can no proceed to pretrial discovery.

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Chap. 12: Drug-Free Workplace

LA: CAPT PTSD – 2^nd POSITIVE MJ – TERMINATION UPHELD

On April 23, 2026, In Re Appeal of Todd David, the Court of Appeals of Louisiana, First Circuit held (3 to 0) that the Fire & Police Board had reasonable basis for the termination, and trial court judge improperly reversed the Board. On September 14, 2022, the firefighter tested positive for marijuana; at the pre-termination hearing he stated that a doctor gave him the marijuana recommendation because he experienced issues during his sleep due to PTSD. This was his second positive for marijuana; 1999 he testified positive and signed a rehabilitation agreement that under Board’s ordinance, police and firefighters, as ‘safety-sensitive” employees, can only have one positive in their employment. The City of Baton Rouge has more lenient policy. https://cases.justia.com/louisiana/first-circuit-court-of-appeal/2026-2025cw0332.pdf?ts=1776975731

THE COURT HELD:

“The district court exceeded its authority by reversing the board's decision in this

matter…. [T]he evidence in the administrative record establishes the reasonableness

of the board' s determination. After all, David' s attorney did not dispute that there was a

“positive test" at the hearing. Instead, David argued that he did not know his use of

marijuana under these circumstances would jeopardize his employment.

***

Chief Kimble' s termination letter did not find David's actions were justified, stating:

“particularly since you [ David] previously acknowledged to me [ Chief Kimble] that you

were aware [ taking] medical marijuana would place me in the difficult position to have

to make a decision regarding your employment."

***

David suggested that it would be unfair to terminate him for violating a rule that he was unable to find-- either on his employer's website, the State Examiner's website, or in the BRFD policy manual. In response, BRFD pointed out that the rehabilitation agreement David signed in 1999 specifically cited the Fire and Police Board' s Drug -Free Ordinance. BRFD also pointed out that its policy manual was implemented in 1997, when there were no valid recommendations for medical marijuana.”

Legal lesson learned: Fire Boards can implement tougher drug-free policy than city policy; it would also be helpful to update FD policy manual with the policy.

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Chap. 13 – EMS, incl. Community Paramedicine, COVID-1

NY: EMT DISCIPLINE - STATE DPT HEALTH - NO JURY TRIAL

On April 23, 2026, in Justin Ball v. New York State Department of Health, the Supreme Court of New York, Third Department held (5 to 0) that a Supreme Court Judge for Schoharie County improperly held the EMT was entitled to a civil jury trial in a pending administrative license revocation proceeding. He is under investigation for a complaint that on a call to help a 63-year-old man who was allegedly unable to get up after having fallen down, the EMT “believed that the patient was faking his condition and, rather than providing any meaningful assistance to the patient, plaintiff ridiculed him and offered minimal, rough aid.” https://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/current/3dseries/2026/2026_02494.shtml

THE COURT HELD:

“Defendant argues that Supreme Court improperly disregarded binding precedent from the Supreme Court of the United States that the Seventh Amendment does not apply to the states. We agree. The Seventh Amendment to the US Constitution preserves the right of trial by jury in suits at common law where the value of the controversy exceeds $20 (see US Const, 7th Amend). Longstanding precedent from the Supreme Court of the United States holds that the Seventh Amendment "applies only to proceedings in courts of the United States, and does not in any manner whatever govern or regulate trials by jury in state courts, or the standards which must be applied concerning the same"(Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v Bombolis, 241 US 211, 217 [1916]; see Walker v Sauvinet, 92 US 90, 92 [1875]).

***

Indeed, the right to a trial by jury provided in the NY Constitution does not extend to those proceedings concerning professional licensure ‘where the object is not the punishment of the offender, but to purge of an unworthy member a profession in which purity of conduct and character are all important’ (Matter of Smith, 10 Wend at 454). The fact that plaintiff's alleged conduct may also form the basis for common-law claims sounding in tort does not alter the fact that this proceeding arises through defendant's statutory obligation to regulate EMT licenses. Accordingly, because plaintiff has failed to establish that a regulatory revocation proceeding for an EMT license is analogous to common-law cases traditionally entitled to trial by jury before 1777, plaintiff is not entitled to a jury trial under the NY Constitution (see Matter of DES Mkt. Share Litig., 79 NY2d at 304-305; Matter of State of New York v Myron P., 86 AD3d at 29-30).”

Legal lesson learned: EMS are entitled to a hearing before the state board, but not a civil jury trial in state court. If license is revoked, can then appeal to court.

Note: For example, see Holycross v. State Board of EMS (2005): https://www.studicata.com/summaries/court-of-appeals-of-ohio/holycross-v-state-board-of-emergency-med-2005-oor7s1/ “We agree with Holycross that the board's decision to revoke his license is not supported by the probative, credible evidence in the record. We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this cause, without reaching his constitutional claim, which we find to be moot.”

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Chap. 13 – EMS, incl. Community Paramedicine, COVID-19

PA: MOTORCYCLE PT TO NON-TRAUMA HOSP - IMMUNITY

On April 23, 2026, in Kristin Claypoole and Melissa Knepp as Co-Administrators of the Estate of Glenn M. Noel v. Altoona-Logan Township Mobile Medical Emergency Department Authority d/b/a AMED, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania held (3 to 0) that trial court judge properly dismissed the lawsuit; the local EMS agency enjoys broad immunity under state law, unless proof of gross negligence or willful misconduct. Accident was on October 25, transported at 6:49 a.m. to local hospital (7 minutes); not to Level II trauma hospital !9 minutes). Approximately 3 1/2 hours later was transferred by ground transport (Air Care not available due to weather) to UPMC Altoona, where he died at 2:04 p.m. on October 26, 2022 from traumatic brain injury. https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Commonwealth/out/196CD25_4-23-26.pdf?cb=1

THE COURT HELD:

“The Complaint asserts claims for negligence/gross negligence (survival) (Count I) and wrongful death (Count II) against AMED, chiefly alleging that AMED’s failure to immediately transport Decedent to a Level I or II trauma center was ‘negligent, grossly negligent, and reckless.’

***

Because it also is undisputed that none of those exceptions apply here, we must determine whether, as the Estate argues, the General Assembly specifically intended to abrogate immunity for local agencies via Section 8151(2) of the EMSSA and permit claims for gross negligence or willful misconduct arising out of the provision of EMS care. See Doe v. Franklin County, 174 A.3d 593, 605 (Pa. 2017). We conclude that it did not.’

***

The EMSSA [Emergency Medical Services System Act] enacted in 2009, is a comprehensive statute that regulates the provision of EMS in Pennsylvania… a single miscellaneous provision of the EMSSA, Section 8151(2), prohibits the liability of EMS agencies related to the good faith rendering of EMS care unless gross negligence or willful misconduct is established. 35 Pa.C.S. § 8151(2).

(2) No EMS agency, EMS agency medical director or EMS provider[4] who in good faith attempts to render or facilitate emergency medical care authorized by this chapter shall be liable for civil damages as a result of an act or omission, absent a showing of gross negligence or willful misconduct. This paragraph shall also apply to students enrolled in approved courses of instruction and supervised pursuant to rules and regulations.”

Legal lesson learned: EMS agencies have broad immunity; follow your protocol on when to call Air Care for head trauma, and when to transport to Level I or II trauma hospital.

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Chap. 13 – EMS, incl. Community Paramedicine, COVID-19

VA: MED RECORDS – JUSTICE GINSBURG - 2 YRS PRISON

On April 14, 2026 in United States of America v. Trent James Russell, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (Richmond, VA) held (3 to 0) that jury properly found Russell guilty of (1) destroying and altering records, and (2) obtaining individually identifiable health information, and trial court sentenced him to twenty-four months’ imprisonment for posting on Twitter a screenshot of the George Washington University hospital’s patient search screen, which highlighted Justice Ginsburg’s name and showed the dates of ten visits, along with medical services she received (which included radiology, oncology, and surgery services). Based

on the dates captured in the screenshot, it was taken between December 31, 2018, and

January 9, 2019. https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/244620.P.pd

THE COURT WROTE:

“Before Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg passed away, someone posted

a screenshot of her private medical information on the internet. The information related to treatment the Justice received at George Washington University Hospital. An investigation led federal agents to Trent Russell, who worked for a company with access to the hospital’s medical records.

***

That led him to Russell, who worked for a non-profit that facilitates organ donations.

Russell’s position gave him both on-site and remote access to patient medical records and other hospital data.”

Legal lesson learned: Disclosure of individually identifiable health information can lead to criminal indictment and prison.

Note: See HIPAA Violations – 2026. https://www.hipaajournal.com/hipaa-violation-cases/

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Chap. 13 – EMS, incl. Community Paramedicine, COVID-19

NV: EMS OPER MGR – FIRED / ALS CREW – NO RETALIATION

On March 27, 2026, in Dusty Allen v. Mercy, Inc., U.S. District Court Judge Gloria M. Navarro, United States District Court for the District of Nevada, granted the employer’s motion for summary judgment; fired because of a weekend staffing shortage of ALS medics for one hour – a “critical system failure.” Plaintiff alleges he was terminated because one month earlier he confronted his supervisor, Kirk Schmitt, Regional Director of Southern Nevada, about two female coworkers uncomfortable with manager comments. But Court referenced plaintiff’s deposition testimony - he wasn’t making a formal report of sexual harassment complaints by two women, he was merely trying to “fix. . . a toxic work environment.” https://public.fastcase.com/Jhe1Qn%2BmJndQYQU6z%2FeNm2IRLtoYkrU6PXL9o8jwzst%2FNdrzc21hLfx%2B7rIFE%2Fjg?utm_medium=email&_hsenc=p2ANqtz--U5QylLiDrvLvgZPxLp1UD1XwB_7biW9lkq8qHdnYocPTAWXoAY4eWtL30hGAHlHHG6f150Lk3QwJZsSzIIPSSPKfBlQ&_hsmi=226712652&utm_content=226712652&utm_source=hs_email

THE COURT HELD:

“Plaintiff’s job duties as an Operations Manager, Plaintiff's job duties included working with the scheduling department and his team of operations supervisors to ensure that there was adequate employee coverage for has two locations in Las Vegas: MedicWest and American Medical Response (‘AMR’).

***

On September 25, 2023, Plaintiff had a conversation with a female coworker, Audra, who expressed to Plaintiff that she does not like Schmitt because he makes ‘comments that [are] sexist in nature,’ and feels uncomfortable around him…. Another female coworker, Stephanie, also expressed to Audra that she was uncomfortable being around Schmitt because of the sexist comments he makes…. Plaintiff does not know what the sexist comments made were. But Plaintiff encouraged Audra to report the allegations to HR and told her to advise Stephanie to do the same.

***

[Two days later] Plaintiff confronted Schmitt about the allegations two days after his conversation with Audra…. Plaintiff also spoke with Schmitt about the way he generally spoke to people, both men and women…. Plaintiff details that Schmitt was rude and condescending to a coworker, made another coworker cry, and raised his voice frequently….Plaintiff's goal in speaking with Schmitt was to get him ‘to be a little bit more mindful of the interactions he had.’ Plaintiff states that ‘the spirit of the conversation’ with Schmitt was to ‘fix. . . a toxic work environment. . . [and] if there was any sort of inappropriate [sic] with the [sexist] comments, that was up for the corporate HR to discuss and investigate.’

***

Making an informal complaint to a supervisor can be considered a protected activity, if Plaintiff was acting on a reasonable belief that an unlawful employment practice had occurred. Indeed, Plaintiff did not know whether any unlawful employment practices had occurred, took no position on whether he thought an unlawful act occurred, and instead deferred to HR to investigate whether there was anything inappropriate about the sexist comments. Thus, Defendant meets its initial burden of negating an essential element of Plaintiff's claim-the element of protected activity.”

Legal lesson learned: Employer terminated plaintiff for gross misconduct.

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Chap. 15 – Mental Health, incl. CISM, Peer Support, Pet Therapy

MD: DEPRESSION – SLOWER STATION – CASE PROCEED

On April 28, 2025, in Mark R. Levy v. Howard County, Maryland and Howard County Fire And Rescue, U.S. Senior District Court Judge Richard D. Bennett, United States District Court for the District of Maryland, denied plaintiff’s motion for pre-trial declaratory judgement; case will proceed with pre-trial discovery. The firefighter / paramedic has been diagnosed with anxiety and depression since 2002; the case will proceed with pre-trial discovery. The Court wrote: “To be clear, it is Levy's burden in this case of proving that he is a qualified individual with a disability and that, with a reasonable accommodation, he would be able to properly do the job of a Fire Fighter/Paramedic at Station 3.” https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/maryland/mddce/1:2024cv03580/573207/56/0.pdf?ts=1777474810

THE COURT HELD:

“Plaintiff Mark R. Levy has been employed as a Fire Fighter/Paramedic with Defendant Howard County Department of Fire and Rescue Services since October 31, 2016…. Levy alleges that he has been diagnosed with anxiety and depression since 2002…. As of December 8, 2025, the date Levy filed his First Amended Complaint in this Court, he was assigned to B Shift at Station 3, which is within Battalion 3 of the Howard County Department of Fire and Rescue Services…. Station 3 is located at 12535 Old Frederick Road in Sykesville, Maryland…. He asserts that Station 3 has a lower call volume in comparison to other stations within the battalion…. He claims that this lower call volume is the optimal assignment for him to be able to manage his mental health.

***

Levy alleges that, on multiple different occasions in 2022, he was reassigned from Station 3 to other stations within Battalion 3…. Each time, the Department apparently denied his requests to remain at Station 3…. Levy claims that the Department determined, without engaging in any interactive process, that he did not need a reasonable accommodation…. Ultimately, after multiple reassignments, Levy was placed at Station 3 under a Temporary Hardship Request…. He contends that the Temporary Hardship Request was ‘wholly improper and simply an attempt by Defendants to circumvent’ the ADA's accommodation obligations…. From the face of the First Amended Complaint, Levy continues to work as a Fire Fighter/Paramedic for the Department.

***

As noted above, Levy seeks declarations in Count Four that (1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) that he can perform the essential functions of his job with a reasonable accommodation; (3) that Defendants have an obligation to engage in the ADA's interactive process with him and explore reasonable alternatives; and (4) that Defendants have an obligation to grant him a reasonable accommodation.

***

Again, it is Levy's burden to prove that he was entitled to the ADA's interactive process and, ultimately, a reasonable accommodation. In sum, the four declarations that Levy requests in Count Four render that claim duplicative of Count One.”

Legal lesson learned: The firefighter has burden of proof in this ADA case; permanent assignment to a slower station is a unique request for “reasonable accommodation.”

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Chap. 15 – Mental Health, incl. CISM, Peer Support, Pet Therapy

TX: ASSISTANT CHIEF – PTSD – NOT RIGHT INDEF. LEAVE

On April 8, 2026, in Cameron Kramer v. City of Frisco, Texas, the Court of Appeals of Texas, Twelfth District, Tyler held (3 to 0) that trial court properly granted summary judgment to the City since the Assistant Chief never able to provide a psychological clearance to return to work and indefinite leave is not a reasonable accommodation. On August 15, 2022 he took Family Medical Leave Act leave for PTSD until November 1, 2022; took another 90 days of leave under City’s policy; in January 31, 2023 the city approved additional unpaid leave until March 31 as an accommodation for his PTSD; on March 31, Kraemer requested additional unpaid leave through April 30, stating at the end of the leave period, he would ‘be re-evaluated” by his treating physician. The City viewed this as a request for indefinite unpaid leave and the City’s human resources director, Lauren Safranek, initially informed Kraemer that the City could not grant such a request, but gave him until April 30 to allow him to obtain the required psychological clearance, which Kraemer did not submit. On May 1, 2023, the City informed Kraemer via letter that his employment was terminated because of his inability to return to work “with or without reasonable accommodations” following the end of his leave period. The letter stated, in relevant part, that “the vacancy in the position of Assistant Fire Chief is compromising the operations of the City of Frisco Fire Department and granting continued accommodations of additional leave would cause an undue burden and hardship for the department and the City, placing the safety of the community and the department at risk.” https://cases.justia.com/texas/twelfth-court-of-appeals/2026-12-25-00273-cv.pdf?ts=1775749638

THE COURT HELD:

“Although taking leave that is limited in duration may be a reasonable accommodation to enable an employee to perform the essential functions of the job upon return, taking leave without a specified date to return is not a reasonable accommodation.

***

The evidence shows that Kraemer discussed with Safranek whether he might be capable

of returning to work on a reduced schedule, but nothing showing that he, or any of his doctors, ever concluded that, despite his disability, he was capable of performing the functions of the assistant fire chief position at all, even on a part-time basis…. In April of 2024, Dr. Tedwell testified before an administrative law judge that throughout her treatment relationship with Kraemer, her opinion has ‘always been that he has not been ready to go back to Frisco Fire Department[,]” an opinion which persisted until the time of her testimony.”

Legal lesson learned: Indefinite leave is not reasonable accommodation.

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File: Chap. 16 – Discipline, incl. Code of Ethics, Social Media, Hazing

LA: 48-HR DISCIPLINE SET ASIDE – NO BILL RIGHTS NOTICE

On April 29, 2026, in Donald Adams v. New Orleans Fire Department, the Court of Appeals of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit held (2 to 1) that 48-hour suspension is set aside; he was disciplined for leaving a courthouse while the rest of 4-member team looked for cause of smoke alarm. The Court wrote:

“First Platoon Deputy Chief Castle completed his investigation and on April 22, 2024, he issued a letter to Adams informing him that he was suspended for 48 hours for violating fire department policy. The letter advised Adams that, ‘Specifically, on [March 17, 2024] while on an incident investigating an alarm you exited the building without the captain's permission while the rest of the crew remained inside to confirm the alarm status and mitigate the incident…. We are constrained to hold that the strict statutory requirements of La. R.S. 33:2181 were not met in this process…. At no point in the investigation was Adams notified of his rights under the Firefighter's Bill of Rights. To the extent that the record in this case reveals the substance of the investigation we conclude that the investigators were Edwards and Castle. https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/la-court-of-appeal/118312488.html

THE COURT HELD:

“On March 17, 2024, firefighters from Engine Company 20 were called out to the Second City Courthouse on Morgan Street in Algiers. The firefighters involved were Captain Randolph Edwards (‘Edwards’), Anthony Donseroaux (‘Donseroaux’), Milton Smith (‘Smith’) and Adams. It was the third callout to this address that day. On the two prior occasions, the team was not able to get into the courthouse. On this third occasion, a building representative was present and let the men in. They searched the building and found no evidence of fire. They were unable to stop the alarm. While awaiting someone from the alarm company to stop the false alarm, Edwards, who was the ranking firefighter on the scene, began a conversation with the building representative on matters unrelated to the fire call.

Approximately 10 to 15 minutes after the building was searched, the captain and other firefighters walked outside and saw Adams talking to Smith, the firetruck operator. The building representative commented that the two firefighters by the truck were ready to leave. Edwards then walked to the truck and chastised Adams for leaving the scene inside the building and informed him that he should stay next to his captain.

Edwards alleges that Adams told him, ‘you think you're in charge of f*****g E20 but you're not in charge.’ Adams alleges that he said, ‘you think you're in charge of E20 but it's a team.’ Neither Smith nor Donseroaux heard the profanity that Edwards described but both witnesses testified that the conversation was heated. Smith, who was outside at all times, explained that he called Adams to the truck to ask if the inspection revealed anything.

***

After the incident, Edwards asked every member of the team to write a Special Report (statement) regarding the call out. Edwards completed a Documentation of Disciplinary Action (‘DDA’) form charging Adams with violating NOFDRR57 of the New Orleans Fire Department (‘NOFD’) Rules and Regulations. RR 57 provides that, ‘At fire scenes or emergency calls, members shall not perform tasks without direction or orders from command or perform tasks that do not support incident objectives (i.e. freelancing).’

***

We believe that Edwards' initiation of a disciplinary procedure based on Adams' actions was appropriate. In this case, it does not appear that there was an emergency in progress when Adams decided to walk away from the working group in the courthouse. However, it is the very nature of emergencies that they occur without warning. No one was injured and there was no loss of life or property in this situation. For that, everyone must be grateful to good fortune. In the business of protecting life and property, good fortune is never a substitute for safe procedure.

Having noted for the record this court's support for the intention of the disciplinary proceeding, we find that the decision of the CSC was not manifestly erroneous. We are constrained to hold that the strict statutory requirements of La. R.S. 33:2181 were not met in this process.”

DISSENT:

“The distinction between investigation and formal investigation is an important one. Initial steps taken to prepare for a formal investigation (i.e., gathering witness statements, promulgating Documentation of Disciplinary Action) are distinguishable from the formal investigation itself. A formal investigation cannot commence unless and until a complaint is lodged, evidence is gathered, and such documentation is submitted to the appointing authority to determine whether a formal investigation is merited.” https://cases.justia.com/louisiana/fourth-circuit-court-of-appeal/2026-2025-ca-0639-0.pdf?ts=1777519082

Legal lesson learned: This is second New Orleans FD recent case where discipline is set aside. There is a clear need for written guidance from State’s Attorney General on when a “formal investigation” is deemed to start.

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File: Chap. 16 – Discipline, incl. Code of Ethics, Social Media, Hazing

LA: 36-HR DISCIPLINE SET ASIDE– NO BILL RIGHTS NOTICE

On April 28, 2026, in Michael Murphy v. New Orleans Fire Department, the Court of Appeals of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit held (3 to 0) that under the Louisiana Firefighter Bill of Rights, even though there is no question that the Fire Apparatus Operator’s failed to wear seat belts on December 2 and December 11, 2024 when driving Fire Engine 14. The NOFD Samsara video monitoring system recorded the seatbelt infractions and alerted Captain Jason Dufrene, who on December 20, 2024 issued the charges. The Civil Service Commission held (2 to 1) that there was no “formal investigation” under the Bill of Rights which would require the following notices: “notify the employee in writing of the nature of the investigation, of the identity and authority of the person conducting such investigation, and of the specific charges or violations being investigated. The Commission held: “Captain Dufrene’s routine review of photos or videos from an electronic monitoring system does not rise to the level of a formal investigation.” The Court of Appeals disagreed and set aside the suspensions. “The NOFD conducted a formal investigation of Mr. Murphy’s seatbelt violations without providing written notice of an investigation. The SAMSARA evidence does not abrogate the Firefighter Bill of Rights. Accordingly, we find that Mr. Murphy’s discipline was an absolute nullity.” https://www.la4th.org/opinion/2025/4959829_1.pdf

THE COURT HELD:

“[The] NOFD asserts that no formal investigation was warranted or

conducted due to the conclusive SAMSARA video evidence of Mr. Murphy’s

infractions. Nonetheless, the NOFD contends, ‘[t]o the extent any investigation

was conducted, which is denied, it was informal and had not arisen to the level of a

formal investigation and the required procedural steps pursuant to La R.S.

§33:2181(B).’

***

We must determine whether the NOFD conducted a formal investigation of

Mr. Murphy.

As stated above, the NOFD is required to provide notice in writing of a

formal investigation into a firefighter’s conduct. “The Louisiana Attorney

General’s office has interpreted La. R.S. 33:2181 as applying to all situations when

an authorized person makes an inquiry or collects evidence with a view to

disciplinary action.” Farrelly, 2019-216, p. 4, 284 So.3d at 683 (citing La. Att’y

Gen. Op. No. 13-0207, 2014 WL 1404481). This Court held that a formal

investigation began when the NOFD was made aware of the firefighter’s alleged

behavior and evidence was received.

***

Louisiana Revised Statutes: 33:2181(B), a portion of the Firefighter Bill of Rights, provides:

B. Whenever a fire employee is under investigation, the following minimum standards shall apply:

(1) Prior to commencing a formal investigation of a fire employee, the appointing authority shall notify the employee in writing of the nature of the investigation, of the identity and authority of the person conducting such investigation, and of the specific charges or violations being investigated.”

Legal lesson learned: Given this very broad decision about “formal” investigations, the fire department should consider providing written notice for all infractions that can lead to discipline.

Note: Read the Civil Service Commission report. https://nola.gov/getattachment/a5d775b2-685d-43c3-a7ff-ae60a9dcf745/Murphy,-Michael-9697-9698/

“Deputy Chief Larry White instructed the District Chief to instruct Captain Wiltz to charge Operator Murphy with a violation of the seatbelt policy. Captain Wiltz charged Operator Murphy on December 20, 2024, with violating the seatbelt policy, RR-55. Operator Murphy prepared a special report about the seatbelt infraction, which District Chiefs Ashburn and Kuruda required him to rewrite several times. (Tr. at 94-95). Operator Murphy appeared at a pre-disciplinary hearing before a panel of Deputy Chief White and two District Chiefs on January 16, 2025. NOFD suspended Operator Murphy for 12 hours for the December 2 offense, the minimum penalty for the offense under NOFD policy. (Tr. at 44). NOFD suspended Operator Murphy for 24 hours for the second offense on December 11, the minimum penalty for a second offense. (Tr. At 44).”

https://nola.gov/getattachment/a5d775b2-685d-43c3-a7ff-ae60a9dcf745/Murphy,-Michael-9697-9698/

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Chap. 16 – Discipline, incl. Code of Ethics, Social Media, Hazing

MA: FIRE CHIEF – FIRED - SCAMMERS – NO DEFAMATION

On March 26, 2026, in Ernest J. Cardillo, Jr. v. Donald M. Chabon, the Appeals Court of Massachusetts held (3 to 0) that trial court properly granted summary judgment to because the Town of Stockbridge’s Selectboard Chair Donald M. Chabon’s statements to a newspaper reporter about the former Fire Chief were not defamatory and not made with actual malice. On February 8, 2019, the Springfield Republican newspaper published an article in response to members of the fire department protesting Cardillo's termination. The article stated that Cardillo was terminated after repeatedly falling "victim to scammers" in the purchasing of equipment for the fire department. The article reported that the selectboard had estimated that Cardillo's actions cost the town around $83,000. Chabon told the reporter that after Cardillo had learned that he had been taken advantage of, he tried to conceal the purchases and "[h]e changed the books." After the newspaper article was published, Cardillo filed suit against Chabon alleging defamation and infliction of emotional distress. https://public.fastcase.com/Jhe1Qn%2BmJndQYQU6z%2FeNm0JH5q8gWciAXAF9bixHugWdaYIct3CF769DEA6AolcFot0MADEgf34paIS5RxXYfLHjDYkVz561VNE3Py00FLo%3D?utm_medium=email&_hsenc=p2ANqtz--lMiV9AKrZhOCKCU8G42zfsMnA0WduNXw5NGIFgBNIi3qKeq5uCBwN2k8_bjKsGZk1kObDueEzHePI446cTwvuol4Y2w&_hsmi=226712652&utm_content=226712652&utm_source=hs_email

THE COURT HELD:

“In 2012, Cardillo was appointed to the position of fire chief for the town of Stockbridge. That same year, Cardillo received an unsolicited telephone call from a sales representative of a New York company, Pioneer Products Inc. (Pioneer). Cardillo agreed to purchase four gallons of fire hose and gear cleaner from Pioneer. While the parties did not sign a written contract, it is undisputed that Cardillo agreed to this purchase and submitted the invoice to the town for payment.^[³^] Sometime after the initial purchase, Cardillo was contacted by Pioneer and told that the purchase price paid for his first order was contingent on accepting additional shipments. The sales representative told Cardillo that if he did not place an additional order, Pioneer would submit an amended invoice for the first shipment at a significantly higher price. Although there did not appear to be anything in writing memorializing Pioneer's claim that the price could be increased retroactively, Cardillo felt pressured and placed an additional order to avoid the ballooning costs.

***

December 2016, Cardillo agreed to purchase $6,779 of deicer from Pioneer. However, Cardillo's spreadsheet identified the vendor as Fire Tech instead of Pioneer. Two months later, Cardillo purchased additional deicer from Pioneer totaling $6,780 but logged the vendor as Meadow Farm and described the expenditure as fuel. The pattern was repeated in 2017, when Cardillo purchased over $7,500 of supplies (heavy duty truck wash and hose and gear cleaner) despite making the same purchase several months previous. This purchase was from Noble, but Cardillo listed the vendor as Stock Motor Car on the spreadsheets.

***

In 2018, one of Cardillo's purchases came to the attention of the town administrator, resulting in the selectboard retaining town counsel. Town counsel (Miyares) was tasked with investigating Cardillo's purchases from Pioneer and a related company, Noble Industrial Supply Corp. (Noble), and issuing a report (the ‘Miyares report’). The Miyares report found that both Pioneer and Noble had a history of defrauding small-town governments, especially fire departments. The Better Business Bureau had received complaints that the companies would initially offer to sell a product at a "seemingly favorable price" but then later demand additional purchases be made to avoid being charged for prior purchases at a higher rate. Pioneer and Noble shipped more products, each time with the representation that the customer had to accept the delivery to avoid additional charges. Even when customers complained that they had an adequate supply of a particular product, the message from Pioneer and Noble was firm. They would offer to switch to a different product, but the customer was obligated to pay for additional purchases.

***

Here, Chabon's statement, read as a whole, communicated that the town incurred a substantial cost when Cardillo fell prey to a purchasing scam orchestrated by Pioneer and Noble. The gist of Chabon's statement, even if the precise amount of loss to the town was inaccurate, is substantially true. The impact on the reader was the same regardless of whether Chabon's or Miyares's estimate reflected a thorough accounting of the financial harm to the town…. We conclude that, given the substance of the statement and when read as a whole, Chabon's statement was essentially true and was insufficient to establish falsehood for purposes of a claim of defamation.”

Legal lesson learned: The Town’s statements to the reporter were “essentially true” – no defamation.

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Chap. 17: Arbitration, incl. Mediation, Labor Relations

NC: PD UNION – PIO “NASTINESS” – NOT DEFAMATION

On March 4, 2026, in Sanda D’Elosua Vastola v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Lodge 9, Fraternal Order of Police, Inc. and Daniel Redfocd, President, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina held (3 to 0) that trial court properly dismissed slander / libel lawsuit by the PD Director of Public Affairs; the Union’s “purely subjective opinion” about PIO is not defamation. Four police officers were killed on April 29, 2024, and she declined to refute or otherwise respond to many of the questions by local press that allegedly certain officers of the department “who logged off and did not show up during the incident.” The Union in a number of FACEBOOK posts and press interviews referenced her “nattiness” and questioner her professionalism in responding to a serious press inquiry.

https://cases.justia.com/north-carolina/court-of-appeals/2026-25-761.pdf?ts=1772641555

THE COURT WROTE:

“A statement expressing a purely subjective opinion about a person—regardless of whether that person is a public figure, whether the statement was made publicly, or whether the statement caused harm—is not defamatory. As the statements here expressed purely subjective opinions, the trial court correctly dismissed Plaintiff’s slander and libel claims.

***

Plaintiff declined to respond to many of the questions based on the belief that they constituted private personnel records under N.C.G.S. § 160A-168, and described the story as ‘a slam job that would damage the very men and women who are still recovering from this heinous incident.’ When the story was run, it characterized the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department as lacking in transparency.

***

Here, none of the statements that Plaintiff identifies in her complaint can be

seriously understood as containing factual content. While perhaps deeply

unflattering, accusing Plaintiff of ‘nastiness,’ opining that her actions constitute

‘failures as a person with power[,]’ characterizing her statements as ‘dismissive’ or

‘snap[ping] back with insults[,]’ or expressing that she made ‘poor decisions’ or a

‘[g]arbage response’ are all decidedly subjective opinions offered to characterize her

behavior, not factual claims regarding the contents of her behavior.

***

The United States Supreme Court has said that ‘debate on public issues should

be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and . . . may well include vehement, caustic,

and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public

officials[,]’ New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); accordingly,

‘public figures bear the burden of proving that alleged defamatory statements

against them were published with actual malice in order to recover damages.’

***

Thus, even assuming arguendo that Plaintiff is not a public figure and that these statements publicly disparaged her to her material harm, they contain no factual content and therefore cannot, as a matter of law, be understood as defamatory.”

Legal lesson learned: Pure expression of opinion about person’s lack of professionalism is not defamation; if plaintiff was a “public figure” that she would also have to prove “malice.”

Note: See this April 8, 2026 article: Court sides with Char-Meck FOP in CMPD employee defamation case. https://www.qcnews.com/charlotte/court-sides-with-char-meck-fop-in-cmpd-employee-defamation-case/

April 29, 2025: One year later: A timeline of the tragic April 29th shootout that shook Charlotte. https://www.qcnews.com/shannon-park-shooting/one-year-later-a-timeline-of-the-tragic-april-29th-shootout-that-shook-charlotte/

“1:30 p.m. – Attempted warrant service turns deadly The U.S. Marshals Fugitive Task Force arrived at a home on Galway Drive to serve a warrant to 39-year-old Terry Hughes, wanted for felony gun possession out of Lincoln County. As officers approached the residence, Hughes opened fire without warning.

Within minutes – officers down Law enforcement scrambled as bullets tore through the quiet east Charlotte neighborhood. “Shots fired, shots fired!” rang out over police radios.

Officers reported being pinned down as Hughes fired from a second-story window using a semi-automatic AR-15 and a 40-caliber handgun.

“I got shots fired. He’s top window barricaded himself. Several officers are pinned,” one responder radioed in.

More than three hours – a barrage of gunfire For over three hours, Hughes exchanged fire with law enforcement, reportedly discharging over 100 rounds. Dozens of police units and SWAT officers swarmed the area as efforts to extract the wounded intensified.

Shortly after 4:30 p.m. – standoff ends Hughes was eventually shot and killed when he emerged from the second-story window. But the damage had already been done.

That evening – officers confirmed dead Three members of the Task Force — North Carolina Department of Adult Correction Investigators Sam Poloche and William Elliot, and Deputy U.S. Marshal Thomas Weeks — were pronounced dead at the hospital. CMPD Officer Joshua Eyer, a six-year veteran, was critically injured and passed away later that evening.”

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